




# EVALUATION

Evaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action



Evaluation on Finland's Development Policy and Cooperation

**2015/6**



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# EVALUATION

## EVALUATION OF HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION

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**2015/6**

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# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANDMA	Afghan National Disaster Management Authority
AOG	Armed Opposition Groups
APMBT	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme
CCW	UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CCO	Cross-cutting Objectives
CMAA	Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CNIDAH	National Demining Commission of Angola
DCA	Danish Church Aid
DHA	Department for Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
DDG	Danish Demining Group
DMC	(Afghanistan) Department of Mine Clearance
EMAO	Ethiopian Mine Action Office
EQ	Evaluation Questions
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
FCA	Finn Church Aid
FDF	Finnish Defence Forces
FIM	Finnish Mark
FRC	Finnish Red Cross
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HALO	Hazardous Area Life Support Organization Trust
HI	Handicap International
HIB	Handicap International Belgium
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
HSTAMIDS	Handheld Stand-off Mine Detection System
ICAI	Independent Commission on Aid Impact
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines

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ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMAS	International Mine Action Standard
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IRDEP	Integrated Rural Development through Empowerment
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit (UN)
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
LRRD	Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
LWD	Life with Dignity
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MAPA	Mine Action Programme Afghanistan
MASG	Mine Action Support Group
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
MOD	Ministry of Defence Finland
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
SAC	Survey Action Centre
TIA	Task Impact Assessment
ToC	Theory of Change
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WB	World Bank
VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action



# TIIVISTELMÄ

Arvioinnissa käsitellään Suomen tukemaa humanitaarista miinatoimintaa vuosina 1991–2015. Arvioinnin kohteena olivat kaikki ulkoministeriön tuemat hankkeet, mutta Angolassa ja Kambodzhassa tuetusta toiminnasta tehtiin syvällisemmät tapaustutkimukset kenttämatoineen.

Arvioinnin mukaan Suomen ulkoasiainministeriöltä puuttuu selkeä strategia siitä, miten miinanraivaustoiminta ja miinauhrien avustaminen sopii sen laajempaan kehitysyhteistyötoimintaan. Toimintaa toteuttavat järjestöt ovat suoriutuneet työstään hyvin, mutta vailla selkeää strategiaa siitä miten toimintaa sopeutetaan rahoituksen vähentyessä nopeasti sektorilla. Suomen ulkoasiainministeriön tulisi päättää humanitaariseen miinatoiminnan tukeminen Angolassa ja Kambodzhassa. Keskittämällä voimavarat hauraisiin valtioihin, joissa Suomella on suurlähetystö, miinatoiminnan ja laajempien turvallisuuskysymysten välinen täydentävyys voidaan taata sekä vaikuttaa kansainvälisten sopimusten toteutumiseen. Humanitaarisen miinatoiminnan kehitysvaikutuksista tarvitaan laajempaa empiiristä näyttöä.

*Avainsanat: humanitaarinen miinatoiminta, miinanraivaus, strategia, turvallisuus, kehitysyhteistyö, humanitaariset asiat.*

# REFERAT

I denna utvärdering analyseras finländskt stöd till humanitär minhantering åren 1991-2015. Perspektivet är globalt men det fokuseras särskilt på Angola och Kambodja, vilka utgjorde två ingående fallstudier inklusive besök på ort och ställe.

Enligt utvärderingen saknar utrikesministeriet en klar strategi för hur minhantering och hjälp till offer passar ihop med dess mer omfattande utvecklingssamarbetsmandat. Minhanteringsaktörer har gjort ett gott arbete men de har ingen effektiv exitstrategi som beaktade den snabbt minskande bidragsviljan inom sektorn. Utrikesministeriet ska sluta understöda Angola och Kambodja och i stället fokusera sina resurser till bräckliga stater där Finland har en ambassad, humanitär minhantering kompletterar allmänna säkerhetsfrågor och ministeriet kan proaktivt främja internationella fördrag. Ytterligare behövs det mer empirisk kunskap om minhanterings inverkan på utveckling.

*Nyckelord: humanitär minhantering, strategi, säkerhet, utvecklingssamarbete, humanitära frågor.*

# ABSTRACT

This evaluation examines Finland's support to humanitarian mine action from 1991 to 2015. The scope is global but with particular attention paid to Angola and Cambodia, the two in-depth case studies that included field visits.

The evaluation finds that MFA lacks a clear strategy over how mine action and victim assistance fits within its wider development cooperation remit. Implementing agencies have performed well but without an effective exit strategy corresponding to rapidly decreasing donor resources in the sector. MFA should cease funding Angola and Cambodia, concentrating its resources in fragile states where it has an embassy, where complementarity with wider security issues is assured, and where it can be proactive with respect to advocacy on international conventions. Greater empirical evidence of the developmental impact of mine action is required.

*Keywords: humanitarian mine action, strategy, security, development cooperation, humanitarian affairs.*

# YHTEENVETO

Tämä on ensimmäinen Suomen tukemasta humanitaarisesta miinatoiminnasta (Humanitarian Mine Action, HMA) tehty strateginen ja temaattinen arviointi. Arvioinnin päämääränä oli **tuottaa itsenäinen ja puolueeton arvio** vuodesta 1991 alkaen toteutetun **HMA:n saavutuksista, tuesta, vahvuuksista sekä heikkouksista**, keskittyen erityisesti ajanjaksoon vuodesta 2010 vuoden 2015 puoliväliin. Vuoteen 2014 mennessä Suomen vuosittainen tuki HMA:lle oli kuusi miljoonaa euroa ja kattoi kuusi eri maata – suurin osa tuesta kanavoitiin kolmen kansalaisjärjestön ja kahden kansainvälisen järjestön kanssa tehtyjen monivuotisten puitesopimusten kautta.

Arviointi sisältää kaksi osaa: 1) **dokumenttianalyysin** Suomen tukemasta HMA:sta vuosina 1991-2000, jota täydennettiin joidenkin HMA:ssa mukana olleiden henkilöiden, etenkin ulkoasiainministeriön virkamiesten haastattelulla Suomessa sekä 2) varsinaisen **arvioinnin** vuosina 2010-2015 annetusta tuesta, mukaan lukien Kambodžhan ja Angolan tapaustutkimukset. Toista osaa varten muodostetut arviointikysymykset ja alakysymykset perustuivat OECD/DAC:in sekä EU:n arviointikriteereihin ja pyrkivät käsittelemään myös uudelleen muodostetussa muutosteoriassa (Theory of Change) esille tuotuja laajempia toimintaympäristön ja strategiakysymyksiä. Arvioinnin neljä pääkysymystä olivat:

- Onko Suomen antama tuki avunsaajamaissa ollut asianmukaista kansainvälisesti sovittujen HMA-tavoitteiden sekä Suomen kehityspolitiikan kannalta ja ovatko toteutuksessa käytetyt metodit ja lähestymistavat olleet parhaiden kansainvälisten käytäntöjen mukaisia?
- Ovatko kumppaneiden valinta ja Suomen antaman tuen eri muodot olleet optimaalisia määriteltujen tavoitteiden saavuttamiseen? Mitä tämän osalta on opittu?
- Miten kehityspolitiikan läpileikkaavat teemat on integroitu Suomen tukemaan HMA:han ja miten tämä on vaikuttanut saavutettuihin tuloksiin? Mitä tämän osalta on opittu ja mitkä ovat parhaaksi todetut käytännöt läpileikkaavien teemojen integrointiin?
- Mitä Suomen tukemalla HMA:lla on saavutettu ja mitä siitä voidaan oppia?

Dokumenttianalyysi perustui suurimmaksi osaksi ulkoasiainministeriöstä saatavilla oleviin dokumentteihin vuodesta 1991 eteenpäin. Dokumentaatioissa oli huomattavia aukkoja (etenkin vuodesta 2002 eteenpäin), joita täydennettiin Kambodžhassa ja Angolassa toimivilta kumppaneilta saadun dokumentaation avulla, erityisesti Hazardous Area Life Support Organization Trustin (HALO), Mines Advisory Groupin (MAG), Suomen Punaisen Ristin (SPR) ja Kirkon Ulkomaanavun (KUA) avulla. Osana dokumenttianalyysiä arviointitiimi laati aikajan HMA:n päätapahtumista vuodesta 1991 lähtien rinnastaen ne Suomen

muuttuvaan kehitysyhteistyöpolitiikkaan ja HMA:han. Myös useita sidosryhmiä haastateltiin Suomessa toukokuussa 2015.

Kenttävaiheeseen lukeutui kymmenen päivää kestäneet kenttävierailut Kambodzhaan kesäkuussa 2015 ja Angolaan heinäkuussa 2015 sekä jatkohaastattelut Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) -järjestön henkilökunnan kanssa, tapaamiset HALO:n ja MAG:n toimistoissa Englannissa ja puhelinhaastattelut United Nations Mine Action Servicen (UNMAS) edustajien kanssa. Kenttävaiheen metodologiaan kuului henkilö ja -ryhmähaastattelut kattaen laajan joukon sidosryhmiä - hallinnon edustajia, hankkeiden toteuttajia ja edunsaajia kohdemaissa sekä kansallisella että alueellisella tasolla. Hankkeiden otokseen kuuluivat MAG:in, HALO:n ja KUA:n miinanraivausalueet (KUA:n tuki kanavoitiin sekä Danish Church Aid että Life With Dignity (LWD) -järjestöjen kautta) sekä Punaisen Ristin kansainvälisen komitean kuntoutus- ja proteesitilat, joita SPR rahoitti.

### **Löydökset ja loppupäätelmät**

**1991-2002** Kansainvälisten kehityssuuntien mukaisesti 1990-luvun toisella puoliskolla myös Suomen antama painoarvo HMA:lle kasvoi huomattavasti. Vuosien 1991-1997 aikana Suomen antama tuki muodostui pääasiallisesti tarveharkintaisesta humanitaarisesta avusta. Tuki kohdentui Afganistaniin, Angolaan, Bosnia Hertsegovinaan, Kambodzhaan, Laosiin sekä Mosambikiin. 1990-luvun toisella puoliskolla ulkoasiainministeriö, puolustusministeriö sekä Suomenpuolustusvoimatyhteistyössä asianomaisten yritysten kanssa aloittivat Finn Flail -palvelukonseptin kehityksen ja konsepti saavutti jonkin verran menestystä. Vuonna 1998 HMA sisällytettiin osaksi Suomen kehityspoliittisia tavoitteita ja sektorin rahoitus lisääntyi kehitysyhteistyömäärärahoista. Vuodesta 1998 vuoteen 2001, Suomen painopiste siirtyi mekaaniseen miinanraivaukseen tavara- ja henkilötuen muodossa - tarkoittaen etenkin Finn Flail -palvelukonseptin käyttöönottoa Kambodzhassa, Kosovossa ja Mosambikissa YK:n alaisuudessa. Samalla kun Suomen Finn Flail -konseptia voidaan pitää oman aikansa innovatiivisena lähestymistapana miinanraivaukseen, toimiminen YK:n alaisuudessa tarkoitti sitä, että YK-järjestelmän tehottomuus 1990-luvulla vaikutti myös Suomen toimintaan. Lisäksi mekaanisen miinanraivauksen sopivuus kehitysmaiden paikalliseen ympäristöön oli hiukan epäselvää. Ilmastolliset haasteet alensivat suomalaisen laitteiston tehokkuutta, mutta toisaalta suomalaiset laitteet toimivat usein paremmin kuin muut tuollain tarjolla olleet vaihtoehdot. Melko kallis mekaaninen miinanraivaus lopetettiin vuonna 2002 lähinnä teknisten ongelmien vuoksi.

Arvioinnin edellytyksiä koota kattava kokonaiskuva Suomen tukemasta HMA:sta 1990-luvulla rajoitti hyvän kokonaisraportoinnin puuttuminen sekä puutteellinen tiedonhallinta erityisesti suoriin raha-avustuksiin liittyen. Suomen tekemät tiedonkeruumatkat, säännöllinen seuranta ja siihen perustuva oppiminen näyttävät kuitenkin parantaneen HMA:n tehokkuutta pitkällä aikavälillä.

**2002-2010** Kaikki toimijat, mukaan lukien Suomen rahoittamat järjestöt, jatkoivat HMA:n edistymisen, tuloksellisuuden ja vaikuttavuuden mittaamista arvioimalla esimerkiksi raivattujen alueiden kokoa sekä raivattujen miinojen

lukumäärää. Task Impact Assessment (TIA) -arvioinnin käyttöönotto muutti tätä jonkin verran, kuin myös muutokset HMA:n toteutuksessa. Näiden vuosien aikana kehittyi yhteistyöhön perustuva ja tuloksellisuuden parantamiseen tähtäävä lähestymistapa, jossa yhdistyivät koulutus miinojen aiheuttamien riskien välttämiseksi (Mine Risk Education, MRE), miinauhrien avustaminen sekä miinojen ja räjähtämättömien ammusten raivaus. Miinaonnettomuuksien uhreista kerätyistä tiedoista kehittyi luotettava tapa kartoittaa miinoitettuja alueita sekä hyödyllinen työkalu vaikutusten ymmärtämiseen. Samanaikaisesti yhteistyöhaluttomat ja/tai korruptoituneet hallinnot kumppanimaissa saattoivat kuitenkin vaikeuttaa hankkeiden toteuttamista suunnitellussa aikataulussa. Tänä aikana Suomen HMA oli melko sirpaloitunutta, sillä rahoitusta jaettiin pienissä erissä useisiin maihin, osittain perustuen ulkopoliittisiin prioriteetteihin Pohjois-Kaukasiassa, Irakissa ja Afganistanissa - jo vakiintuneiden kohdemaiden Angolan ja Kambodžhan lisäksi.

**2011-2015** Humanitaarinen apu, jälleenrakentaminen ja kehitys linkitettiin yhä vahvemmin yhteen (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, LRRD) vuoden 2007 kehityspoliittisessa ohjelmassa. Lisäksi vuoden 2012 kehityspoliittisessa ohjelmassa myös sukupuoli, epätasa-arvon vähentäminen ja ilmastomuutos läpileikkaavina teemoina vaikuttivat myös HMA:han. Tästä huolimatta **ulkoasianministeriöltä puuttuu strateginen näkemys HMA:sta ja sitä pidetään lähinnä itsenäisenä sektorina, jonka suhdetta muuhun kehitysyhteistyötoimintaan ei ole määritelty.** Suomen tukea HMA:lle rationalisoitiin vuonna 2010 solmimalla muutamia monivuotisia puitesopimuksia rahoituksen ennakoitavuuden parantamiseksi useissa kohdemaissa sekä hallinnon helpottamiseksi ulkoasiainministeriössä Helsingissä. Vuoteen 2011 mennessä kolme kansalaisjärjestöä - HALO, SRP ja KUA - sekä kaksi kansainvälistä järjestöä - UNMAS ja GICHD - vastaanottivat valtaosan Suomen antamasta HMA:n rahoituksesta. Suurin osa tuesta kohdentui Afganistaniin, Angolaan ja Kambodžhaan.

**Suomen Afganistanissa rahoittama ja UNMAS:in ja HALO:n toteuttama HMA on ollut erittäin asianmukaista, tuloksellista ja tehokasta.** Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI) on ylistänyt HALO:n työtä Afganistanissa ja erityisesti sen tapaa tukea työllisyyttä eri poliittisten ja etnisten ryhmien keskuudessa, mukaan lukien Talibania ymmärtävissä yhteisöissä. Myös ulkoasiainministeriön vuoden 2010 sisäisessä arvioinnissa HALO:n tekemää työtä Kambodžhassa kehuttiin onnistuneeksi.

Joint Inspection Unitin (2011) sekä myöhemmän, DFID:n itsenäisen arvioinnin mukaan **yhteistyö UNMAS:in, UNICEF:in, UNDP:n sekä UNOPS:in välillä ei ole ollut optimaalista.** Suomen rahoittaman ja UNMAS:in koordinoiman Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) -rahaston toiminnasta on ristiriitaisia käsityksiä. **GICHD on vasta viime aikoina alkanut panostaa tulosperustaiseen hallintoon (RBM).** Organisaatio jatkaa roolinsa uudelleen määrittelyä kutistuvalla sektorilla.

**Yleisesti taloudellisen ja poliittisen kontekstin analyysin puuttuminen, yhdistettynä toimijoiden yhteen sektoriin keskittyvään lyhytnäköiseen ajattelumalliin, heikentää mahdollisuuksia HMA:n vaikuttavuuden todentamiseen.** Vaikka jotkut toimijat ovat aloittaneet miinanraivauksen jälkeisen

seurannan ja empiirisen tiedonkeruun, monia oletuksia HMA:n kehitysvai-  
kutuksista ei ole kyseenalaistettu. KUA-LWD-yhteistyö MAG:in kanssa Kam-  
bodzhassa on ollut innovatiivista yhdistäessään miinanraivauksen suoraan  
maatalouden kehittämiseen ja toimeentulomahdollisuuksien luomiseen. On  
kuitenkin epäselvää, onko tämä lähestymistapa enempää kuin osiensa summa  
ja mikä on KUA:n yhtälöön tuoma lisäarvo.

Erityisesti Angolassa **avunantajat ja HMA:n toteuttajat eivät ole tehokkaas-  
ti kyseenalaistaneet sitä, että hallinto ei ole siirtänyt paikallista rahoitusta  
kansainvälisten tai paikallisen kansalaisjärjestöjen toteuttamaan HMA-työ-  
hön.** Hallitukset ovat olleet tyytyväisiä kansainvälisten kansalaisjärjestöjen  
tuottaman tiedon korkeaan laatuun ja omaksuneet vastaavia työkaluja omaan  
toimintaansa. Paikallisen kapasiteetin kasvattamiseen on kuitenkin pyritty  
lähinnä esimerkkiä näyttäen, ei niinkään varsinaisen institutionaalisen kapa-  
siteetin kehittämisen avulla. Samanaikaisesti Angolan hallinto viivyttää edel-  
leen HMA-työtä vaikeuttamalla laitteiston tulliselvityksiä ja hidastamalla vii-  
sumiprosesseja. **Kambodzhassa Punaisen Ristin kansainvälisen komitean  
toteuttaman uhrien avustustyön tehokkuutta ja tuloksellisuutta on syönyt  
kansallisten viranomaisten kapasiteetin puute ja haluttomuus ottaa laa-  
jempi vastuu sektorista.**

HMA-toiminnan monimuotoisuuden puute on saattanut vähentää uusien ja  
vanhojen avunantajien halukkuutta jatkaa sektorin rahoitusta. Tähän yhdistyy  
se, että **toteuttajajärjestöillä ei ole suunnitelmia HMA-toiminnan sopeutta-  
misesta ja alasajosta.** Avunantajien vastuuta HMA:sta tulisi harkita huolelli-  
sesti – ottaen huomioon laajempi kohdemaissa toteutettu humanitaarinen ja  
kehitysyhteistyö, vastaanottajamaiden taloudellinen kapasiteetti sekä poliit-  
tinen halukkuus. **Vaikuttamistyö, mukaan lukien korruption vastainen työ,  
on joskus jätetty täysin kansalaisjärjestöjen vastuulle, joiden toimintamah-  
dollisuudet riippuvat vastakkainasettelujen välttämisestä kohdemaan hal-  
linnon kanssa.** Joillakin mailla, kuten Angolalla on merkittäviä taloudellisia  
resursseja, joiden avulla maan tulisi pystyä vastaamaan uhkiin itsenäisesti,  
kun taas toisten maiden, Somalian ja Afganistanin taloudellinen tilanne on  
taas huomattavasti epävakampi. Joissakin maissa (esim. Kambodzhassa)  
HMA:han on suhtauduttu positiivisesti, kun taas toisissa maissa (esim. Ango-  
lassa) kansalaisjärjestöjen toimintaympäristöä on hankaloitettu. HMA kohtaa  
samoja haasteita kuin muukin kehitysyhteistyö: missä määrin vastaanotta-  
jamaa käyttää hyväkseen kansainvälistä tukea kompensoimaan omaa halut-  
tomuuttaan tai strategisten kykyjen puutetta asianmukaisesti ratkaista  
perimmiltään kansallista ongelmaa. Ottaen huomioon jalkaväkimiinojen aiheut-  
taman uhan maailmanlaajuisesti, **Suomen tulisi suhtautua varauksella niiden  
maiden tukemiseen, joissa hallitus vaikeuttaa toimintaa ja joilla itsellään on  
varoja toiminnan rahoittamiseksi.**

Juuri siitä syystä, että HMA on ollut erityislaatuinen sektori ulkoasiainminis-  
terion toiminnassa ja sitä on toteutettu ilman hallinnollista tai suoraa poliit-  
tista suhdetta kehitysyhteistyön tai humanitaarisen avun prioriteetteihin,  
HMA:n perustarkoitusta/päämääriä ovat pitkälti määritelleet sitä toimeenpa-  
nevat järjestöt, joille on toiminnan jatkaminen on ollut etu ja joilta on perin-  
teisesti puuttunut kyky ja kokemus laajentaa toimintaansa miinanraivauksen

ulkopuolelle. Myös uhrien avustustoiminnan sijoittuminen HMA-kehikseen ja sen yhteys muuhun HMA-toimintaan on epäselvää.

Turvallisuus nähdään kehityspoliittisessa keskustelussa usein kestävästä kehityksen edellytyksenä ja HMA on tärkeä tuki tuon turvallisuuden luomiselle. **Miinanraivaustyö ei kuitenkaan yksinään edistä kehitystä, vaan tarvitaan myös paljon muuta toimintaa.** Toiminta maissa, joissa sota on loppunut jo kauan sitten, miinoitetut alueet ovat tiedossa ja kansallisia ja kansainvälisiä resursseja on ollut tarjolla, on muuttanut tapaa määritellä HMA-toiminnan ja -tuen prioriteetteja. Tästä huolimatta ulkoasianministeriön yhteistyökumppanit ovat usein keskittyneet miinanraivaustoimintaan, pyrkimättä syvällisempään ja laajempaan miinanraivauksen sosio-ekonomisten vaikutusten mitaamiseen. Vaikka yhteistyön tärkeys eri kehitysyhteistyötahojen välillä on yleisesti tiedossa, **joillekin HMA-työtä tekeville järjestöillä yhteistoiminta ja/tai miinojen kehitysvaikutusten ymmärtäminen on ollut vaikeaa.** Jotkut järjestöt mittaavat edelleen työnsä tuloksellisuutta laskemalla raivattujen miinojen lukumäärää.

Aihepiirin kirjallisuuden ja ulkoasianministeriön ajattelun taustaoletuksiin perustuva muutosteoria havainnollistaa miinanraivauksen ja kehityksen välisen yhteyden. **Taustaoletukset ovat kuitenkin virheellisiä** ja osittain syynä siihen, että miinanraivaustyön kohteiksi on valittu alueita, joissa sekä työn vaikutus että hyödynsaajien määrä on pieni ja muuta toimintaa kehityksen edistämiseksi ei ole suunniteltu.

Vaikka miinanraivaustyötä tekevät järjestöt ovat tietoisia näistä haasteista, on niiden ajattelutapana keskittyä omaan päätoimialaansa miinanraivaukseen – jolta rahoitus on hupenemassa – ja antaa muiden toimijoiden huolehtia kehityksestä. Lähestymistapa, jossa HMA sisällytetään kansallisiin kehityssuunnitelmiin selkeine kehitysvaikutuksineen uhrien määrän vähentämisen rinnalla, on haastavampaa ja harvoin näkyvän arvioinnin kohteena olevissa maissa. **Vaikka kansallisten HMA:sta vastaavien instituutioiden kapasiteetin kehitys on osa HMA-prosessia, on se ollut huonosti suunniteltua ja heikosti toteutettua.** Tältä osin on myös hyvin vähän tietoa parhaista kansainvälisistä käytännöistä.

Uhrien avustustyö ei sovi hyvin HMA-portfolioon ja se olisi siksi parempi ottaa osaksi Suomen kehitysyhteistyön maaohjelmia. Uhrien avustamisen tulokset ovat hyvin tapauskohtaisia. Punaisen Ristin kansainvälisen komitean tekemän työn tehokkuus on esimerkillistä, mutta kyseessä on pitkäkestoinen prosessi, joka vaatisi jatkuvaa rahoitusta samalla kun avunantajien kiinnostus vähenee ja rahoitus- ja toimeenpanovastuun siirtäminen paikalliselle hallitukselle on haasteellista (esim. Kambodzhassa).

### Suositukset

1. Ulkoasianministeriön tukema HMA-strategia tulisi vahvemmin linkittää hauraiden valtioiden strategiaan, mahdollistaen täten yhteydet turvallisuus- ja aseistariisuntakysymyksiin. Nykyisen kehityspoliittisen ohjelman (2012) rinnalle tulisi valmistella selkeä strategia ja toimeenpanosuunnitelma, joka osoittaa miten HMA tukee muuta Suomen tukemaa humanitaarista ja kehitysyhteistyötä.



2. Jotta toimeenpaneville järjestöille voidaan taata tarvittava tuki, tulisi HMA:ta jatkaa vain (1) hauraissa valtioissa, joissa myös muita, täydentäviä tukimuotoja ollaan toteuttamassa, sekä (2) niissä maissa, joissa Suomen ulkoasianministeriö suurlähetystöjensä avulla voi antaa aktiivista tukea vaikuttamistyölle, jolla kohdemaan hallintoa kannustetaan noudattamaan Ottawan (ja Oslon) sopimuksia sekä kansainvälisiä HMA-normeja.
3. Yhteistyötä ja toiminnan johdonmukaisuutta ulkoasiainministeriön ja puolustusministeriön välillä tulisi kannustaa. Yksityisen sektorin sekä niiden kansalaisjärjestöjen, joilla on ohjelmia aseiden ja ampumatarvikkeiden hävittämisestä - kuten HALO ja MAG - osallistumista tekniseen apuun tulisi kannustaa.
4. HMA:n rahoittamista tulisi jatkaa Afghanistanissa, Somaliassa ja Etelä-Sudanissa. Päätöksen rahoituksen jatkamisesta tulisi perustua todennettuihin turvallisuus-, työllisyys- ja taloudellisiin hyötyihin sekä pohjautua vahvaan talouspoliittiseen analyysiin. Tuettavia järjestöjä tulisi pyytää osoittamaan ja raportoimaan yhteyksistään muihin kehitysyhteistyökumppaneihin toiminta-alueillaan sekä osoittamaan, kuinka ne aikovat raportoida toiminnan kehitystuloksista miinanraivauksen tuloksia laajemmin.
5. Koska resurssit ovat rajallisia ja työn parhaan kustannus-hyöty-suhteen, tuloksellisuuden sekä tehokkuuden todentaminen on ollut rajallista, GICHD:lle annettua tukea ei pidä jatkaa voimassaolevan puitesopimuksen umpeutumisen jälkeen.
6. Koska resurssit ovat rajallisia ja työn parhaan kustannus-hyöty-suhteen, tuloksellisuuden sekä tehokkuuden todentaminen on ollut rajallista, UNMAS:n yleiseen toimintaa suunnattua tukea ei pidä jatkaa voimassaolevan puitesopimuksen umpeutumisen jälkeen. Kuitenkin UNMAS:in Afganistanin ohjelman tukemista tulisi jatkaa suosituksen 3 mukaisesti.
7. Ottaen huomioon käytettävissä olevan rahoituksen kohdemaassa, kohdemaiden tuen HMA-toiminnalle, miinakenttien sijainnin ja miinanraivauksen oletetun vaikuttavuuden, Angolan ja Kambodzhan HMA-tuen asteittainen alasajo tulisi tehdä suunnitelmallisesti, mutta nopeasti. Ulkoasiainministeriön ei tulisi enää jatkaa HMA-ohjelmien tukemista näissä maissa monivuotisten puitesopimusten avulla. Pisimmillään vuoden kestävä exit-strategia tulisi suunnitella niin, että rahoituksen lopettamisesta koituvat haitat (irtisanomiskorvaukset ja laitteisto) eivät siirry muiden avunantajien maksettavaksi. Yhteistyöjärjestöjä tulisi pyytää toimittamaan loppuraportti, jossa kerrotaan, kuinka resurssit on jaettu uudelleen.
8. Uhrien avustustyö tulisi siirtää HMA-strategiasta jo olemassa olevien kehitysyhteistyön maastrategioiden osaksi (terveyssektori) ja/tai sisällyttää se osaksi muita Punaisen Ristin kansainvälisen komitean kanssa tehtyjä rahoitusjärjestelyjä.

# SAMMANFATTNING

Det handlar om första strategisk-tematiska utvärderingen av finländskt utvecklingssamarbete kring humanitär minhantering (HMA) i världen. **Allmänna målsättningen var att oberoende utvärdera resultat och insatser samt starka och svaga sidor i samband med Finlands stöd till HMA** sedan 1991. Det fokuserades särskilt på perioden från 2010 till mitten av 2015. År 2014 anslog Finland kring 6 miljoner euro till HMA i sex länder, främst i enlighet med fleråriga ramavtal med tre icke-statliga organisationer och två multilaterala organ.

Utvärderingen är tudelad: (1) en **skrivbordsgranskning** av finländskt stöd till HMA åren 1991-2009, inklusive några intervjuer med tidigare tjänsteinnehavare vid finländska utrikesministeriet (UM) och (2) en **utvärdering** av finländskt stöd till HMA åren 2010-2015, inklusive fallstudier av två länder, Angola och Kambodja. I samband med andra delen utnyttjades ett set utvärderingsfrågor och relaterade delfrågor för att beakta såväl OECD/DAC- och EU-utvärderingskriterier som mer omfattande kontextuella och strategiska frågor i en omformulerad förändringsteori. Det fanns fyra huvudsakliga utvärderingsfrågor:

- Har stödet varit relevant för internationellt överenskomna mål för HMA och Finlands utvecklingspolitik i länderna i fråga och har utnyttjade metoder och approacher följt internationell bästa praxis?
- Har valet av partners, partnermixen och finländska stödpelarna varit optimala för att uppnå uppställda mål? Vad har man lärt sig i detta sammanhang?
- Hur har övergripande målsättningar integrerats i finländska HMA-åtgärder och hur har detta påverkat uppnådda resultat? Vad har man lärt sig och vad är bästa praxis för att genomföra övergripande målsättningar?
- Vilka resultat har uppnåtts och vad kan man lära sig av Finlands sätt att understöda HMA?

I skrivbordsgranskningen gick teamet igenom dokumentation som ficks huvudsakligen av UM och gick tillbaka ända till 1991. I materialet fanns några stora luckor som till viss del (särskilt fr.o.m. 2002) kunde fyllas i med hjälp av komplett dokumentation från partners i Kambodja och Angola, speciellt HALO, MAG, Finlands Röda Kors och Kyrkans Utlandshjälp. Det togs även fram en tidslinje över viktiga skeden inom HMA sedan 1991, vilka sammanställdes med politiska skiften och vidtagna åtgärder i Finland på årsbasis till och med 2015. Ytterligare intervjuades olika intressegrupper i Finland i maj 2015.

Fältarbetet inbegrep besök på tio dagar till Kamboja i juni 2015 och Angola i juli 2015, ett uppföljningsmöte i Genève (GICHD), telefonsamtal med UNMAS i New York och uppföljningsmöten med HALO och MAG i Storbritannien i juli 2015. Fältarbetsmetoden bestod av en mix av individuella och fokusgrupps-

diskussioner med alla intressegrupper: statstjänstemän, genomförare hos olika organ och stödmottagare på nationell och regional nivå. Det utfördes en subjektiv uttagning bland projekt, inklusive besök på orter där MAG, HALO, Kyrkans Utlandshjälp (via danska Folkekirkens Nødhjælp) och LWD just då røjde minor och hos rehabiliterings- och protesanläggningar under Internationella Rödakorskommittén (ICRC) finansierade av Finlands Röda Kors.

### Viktigaste observationer och slutsatser

**1991–2002** I enlighet med internationella trender började Finland fästa klart mer uppmärksamhet vid HMA under senare hälften av 1990-talet. Åren 1991–1997 bestod finländskt HMA-stöd främst av att vid behov allokera pengar från humanitära budgeten. Mottagarländer var Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnien-Hercegovina, Kambodja, Laos och Moçambique. Under andra hälften av 1990-talet började UM, försvarsministeriet och försvarsmakten tillsammans med nyttiga företag utveckla ett servicepaket för mekanisk minröjning, Finn Flail, som rön-te viss framgång. År 1998 nämndes HMA uttryckligen bland Finlands utvecklingspolitiska prioriteter och det allokerades mer resurser till HMA ur medel för utvecklingssamarbete. Åren 1998–2001 flyttades fokuset till mekanisk minröjning samt icke-finansiellt och personalstöd. Detta innebar att Finn Flail utnyttjades i Kambodja, Kosovo och Moçambique, med FN som paraplyorganisation. Finn Flail-konceptet var en mycket innovativ approach av Finland vid denna tidpunkt, men eftersom största delen av finländskt icke-finansiellt och personalbistånd ställdes under FN påverkades biståndet i viss grad av FN-systemets ineffektivitet på 1990-talet. Dessutom var det inte alltid självklart att denna ”mekaniserade fas” passade ihop med lokala förhållanden i länderna. Väderleksförhållanden påverkade utrustningen och dess effektiva användning men ändå var resultaten bättre än de skulle ha varit med vissa andra tillgängliga alternativ. Man slutade utnyttja den ganska dyra mekaniska minröjningen år 2002 främst på grund av tekniska utmaningar.

Bristen på bra översikter och rapporter samt otillräcklig kunskapshantering har gjort det svårt att skapa en detaljerad helhetsbild av finländskt HMA-bistånd på 1990-talet, särskilt i samband med finansiellt stöd. Det verkar dock som om observationerna, regelbundna kontrollen och inläringen på 1990-talet bidragit till effektiviteten hos HMA på längre sikt.

**2002–2010** Alla aktörer, inklusive de som Finland finansierade, fortsatte att mäta sina framsteg, framgångar och inverkan kvantitativt: arealen på röjda områden och antalet desarmerade minor. Lanseringen av Task Impact Assessment (TIA) förändrade situationen till viss del, likaså hur HMA-åtgärder vidtogs. Man gick in för mer samarbete och kombinerade röjning av minor och blindgångare med utbildning om risker med minor (MRE) och hjälp till offer för att uppnå bättre resultat. Genom att utnyttja information om offer kunde man tillförlitligt kartlägga drabbade områden och bättre förstå effekten. Samtidigt kunde dock en samarbetsovilja och/eller korruption hos myndigheter orsaka långa fördröjningar och problem för samarbetspartners att genomföra insatser inom överenskomna tidsfrister. Finland hade ett mycket fragmenterat program som bestod av små allokeringar till många länder, delvis för att man ville såväl beakta utrikespolitiska prioriteter i Nordkaukasien, Irak och Afghanistan som fortsätta etablerade program i Kambodja och Angola.

**2011–2015** Inom finländsk utvecklingspolitik uttrycktes HMA klarare som en kombination av nödhjälp, rehabilitering och utveckling (LRRD) från och med 2007. Efter att en ny utvecklingssamarbetspolitik antogs år 2012 har HMA baserats på en människorättsapproach och övergripande målsättningar kring kön, en minskning av ojämlikhet och klimathållbarhet. **UM betraktar dock inte HMA strategiskt. Den anses utgöra en separat sektor utan klart definierad synergi med andra utvecklingssamarbetsaspekter.** År 2010 rationaliserades HMA så att åtgärderna baserar sig på ett **fåtal fleråriga ramavtal, vilket garanterar en förutsägbarhet för finansieringen i flera länder och enklare kontroll från Helsingfors.** År 2011 innebar detta att nästan allt bistånd gick till tre icke-statliga organisationer (HALO, Finlands Röda Kors och Kyrkans Utlandshjälp) och två multilaterala organ (UNMAS och GICHD) och den största delen av pengarna gavs till tre länder: Afghanistan, Kambodja och Angola.

**I Afghanistan har HMA visat sig vara ytterst relevant, effektiv och effektiv i samband med både UNMAS och HALO.** Den senares arbete i Afghanistan har prisats högt av ICAI, särskilt då det handlar om dess anställningspolitik som överskrider etniska och politiska gränser och inkluderar samhällen positivt inställda till talibanrörelsen. HALO fick även gott betyg i UM:s interna Kambodjarapport år 2010.

**Allmänt taget har samordningen mellan FN:s minröjningsorgan UNMAS, FN:s barnfond UNICEF, FN:s utvecklingsprogram UNDP och FN:s Kontor för projekt-service UNOPS inte varit optimal,** vilket inspektionsenheten JIU betonade år 2011 och backas upp av en oberoende utvärdering utförd av DFID. Dessutom är man av olika åsikt om effektiviteten av frivilliga fonden för hjälp med minhantering förvaltd av UNMAS och finansierad av Finland. **GICHD har börjat satsa på resultatbaserad förvaltning endast nyligen** och fortsätter att omdefiniera sin roll inom en krympande sektor.

**Bristen på politisk-ekonomisk analys kombinerad med närsynt konceptuellt tänkande kring en enda sektor bland genomförare av HMA gör det allmänt svårare att finna bevis på verksamhetens inverkan.** Fastän vissa aktörer tagit i bruk kontroller i efterhand förekommer otaliga oemotsagda antaganden om hur verksamheten påverkar utveckling. I Kambodja har länken mellan FCA-LWD och MAG varit ett innovativt steg eftersom det skapats en direkt kontakt mellan minröjning, jordbruk och inkomstskapande verksamhet, men det kan gott ifrågasättas huruvida summan av delarna överträffas och Kyrkans Utlandshjälp tillför något medvärde i detta sammanhang.

Särskilt i Angola **har varken bidragsgivare eller genomförare effektivt konfronterat regeringen om de stora belopp nationella medel som överförts för att fortsätta finansiera arbetet hos internationella och nationella icke-statliga organisationer.** Regeringar har välkomnat högklassig information från internationella icke-statliga organisationer och tagit i bruk vissa nödvändiga tekniska instrument, men kapacitetsutvecklingen har främst baserat sig på demonstrationer i stället för att nationella institutioner skulle ha anammat ny sakkunskap. Samtidigt ställer Angola fortsättningsvis hinder för tullklarening av utrustning och behandlar visumansökningar mycket långsamt, vilket minskar effektiviteten av HMA. **I Kamboja är ICRC:s hjälp till offer nog effektiv och effektiv – problemet är nationella myndigheters möjlighet och villighet att ta på sig ansvaret för sektorn.**

Bristen på mångsidighet då HMA genomförs kan ha fått bidragsgivare att inte vilja eller inte fortsätta finansiera projekt. Detta **problem förvärras av att genomförarna inte tagit fram en exitstrategi**. Bidragande länders ansvar för minhantering ska noggrant övervägas med beaktande av allmänna humanitära och utvecklingsåtgärder på nationell nivå, nationella ekonomiska möjligheter och inte minst politisk vilja. **Ibland förväntas att icke-statliga organisationer ska ensamma utöva påtryckning, inklusive ta upp korruptionsfrågor, fastän deras fortsatta närvaro beror på vänskapliga relationer med myndigheter**. Vissa länder (Angola) förfogar över anseende nationella ekonomiska resurser som möjliggjorde egna åtgärder mot hot, medan andra (Afghanistan, Somalia) har sämre ekonomiska möjligheter. Vissa länder har understött och välkomnat HMA (Kambodja), medan andra är kända för att göra situationen svår för icke-statliga organisationer (Angola). HMA drabbas av samma "klassiska" utvecklingsutmaning som övriga sektorer: i vilken grad utnyttjar regeringen i värdlandet internationell generositet för att ersätta sin brist på vilja eller strategisk kompetens att adekvat ta hand om en i grund och botten inhemsk fråga? Med tanke på landminefrågans världsomfattande aspekt **ska Finland vara för-siktig med att satsa pengar på länder där det läggs hinder i vägen för stöd-åtgärder och nationella medel kunde användas för att råda bot på hotet**.

Just för att HMA hamnat i en egen "nisch" på UM utan administrativa eller direkta politiska anknytningar till varken utvecklings- eller humanitära prioriter, har dess bakomliggande idé till stor del fastställts av genomförande organ med starkt intresse av att fortsätta sina aktiviteter. Trots nyligen genomförda insatser har inte dessa heller själva traditionellt haft nödvändiga färdigheter eller erfarenheter för att kunna utvidga sitt perspektiv utanför minröjning. Hjälp till offer utgör även en underlig avskild sektor utan ett klart definierat samband med övriga HMA-åtgärder.

Inom utvecklingsdiskurs anses mänsklig säkerhet vara en nödvändig förutsättning för hållbar utveckling. HMA bidrar starkt till denna säkerhet. **Minröjning i sig själv leder dock inte automatiskt till utveckling utan det krävs även mycket annat**. En förändring i formuleringen av prioriter och allokeringen av medel har skett tack vare insikten att landminor är ett hot mot utveckling, särskilt på orter där kriget avslutats redan länge sedan, man känner till var det finns minor och det förekommer nationella och internationella resurser. Ändå har UM:s partners allt som oftast fokuserat på landminröjning och endast flyende och helt klart inte omfattande försökt analysera vilka sociala och ekonomiska fördelar deras praktiska arbete medfört på ort och ställe efteråt. Fastän det inte är en ny idé att aktörer inom utvecklingssektorn ska samordnat arbeta tillsammans **har vissa minhanteringsaktörer haft det svårt att samarbeta och/eller verkligen inse hur landminor påverkar utveckling**. Vissa HMA-aktörer mäter fortfarande sina framgångar genom att räkna antalet funna landminor.

Omformulerade förändringsteorin är baserad på underliggande antaganden inom sektorn och konceptuella tänkandet på UM. Teorin visar hur länken mellan minröjning och utveckling repeteras utan reflektion. **Underliggande antagandena är i grund och botten missriktade och har lett till att aktörer röjt minor på orter där inverkan varit maximalt försumbar, det funnits mycket få personer som direkt gynnats och det inte över huvud upprättats planer på hur hållbar utveckling i övrigt kunde främjas**.

Minröjningsorgan är inte omedvetna om dessa problem men deras viktigaste mandat och krympande finansiering leder obönhörligen till ett slags resultattänkande: röj minor och låt andra bekymra sig över betydelsen för utveckling. En mer utmanande och proaktiv approach till att förbättra sambandet mellan minhantering och utveckling går ut på att integrera HMA i nationella utvecklingsplaner och ställa upp klara utvecklingsmålsättningar i tillägg till traditionella målet att minska antalet offer. Detta var inte alltid märkbart i utvärderade länderna. En del av processen handlar om att öka kunskaperna vid nationella HMA-organ. **Detta har ofta genomförts på ett i stort sett tillfälligt, oplanerat och otillfredsställande sätt.** Ytterligare finns det endast lite information om bästa praxis inom detta område.

Hjälp till offer passar dåligt ihop med HMA. En bättre lösning kunde vara att inkludera hjälpen i ordinära landspecifika program. Resultaten av hjälpen varierar stort mellan individuella fall. ICRC är ytterst effektiv men det handlar om en lång process som kräver jämn kontinuerlig finansiering. Problem i detta fall är ett falnande intresse bland bidragsgivare och en nedslående överlämningsprocess med samband till att regeringen tog över finansieringen och administrationen (Kambodja).

### Rekommendationer

1. UM:s HMA-strategi ska närmare kopplas samman med dess agenda för bräckliga stater, vilket möjliggör en sammanlänkning med nedrustnings- och säkerhetsfrågor. Då nuvarande utvecklingspolitiken antagen år 2012 förlängs ska det tas fram en klar strategi och genomförandeplan för hur HMA kompletterar andra humanitära och utvecklingsåtgärder.
2. För att garantera att finansierade organisationer får det stöd de behöver ska HMA-åtgärder fortsättas endast (1) i bräckliga stater där det förekommer annat kompletterande stöd och (2) i sådana länder där UM via en ambassad kan aktivt stöda icke-statliga och FN-genomförare då det handlar om påtryckning och lobbyverksamhet för att se till att regeringar tar på sig sitt ansvar enligt Ottawa- och Oslofördragen samt internationella HMA-standarder.
3. Det ska uppmuntras till mer samarbete och bättre programsamordning mellan UM, försvarsministeriet och privata sektorns tekniska engagemang och med icke-statliga organisationer såsom HALO och MAG med existerande program för att förstöra vapen och ammunition.
4. Afghanistan, Somalia och södra Sudan ska fortsättningsvis finansieras bara det kan visas på att verksamheten skapat arbetstillfällen samt gagnat säkerheten och ekonomin och efter en robustare kontextuell politisk-ekonomisk analys. Aktörer ska bes demonstrera och rapportera om samband med utvecklingspartners inom verksamhetsområdena och hur andra utvecklingsresultat än minröjning kommer att registreras.
5. Med tanke på knappa resurser och nuvarande begränsade bevis på att man får valuta för pengarna och att verksamheten är effektiv och effektiv ska stödet till GICHD inte fortsättas efter nuvarande ramavtal.

6. Med tanke på knappa resurser och nuvarande begränsade bevis på att man får valuta för pengarna och att verksamheten är effektiv och effektiv ska grundstödet till UNMAS inte fortsättas efter nuvarande ramavtal men finansieringen av dess Afghanistanprogram ska fortsättas bara villkoren under rekommendation 3 uppfylls.
7. Med tanke på tillgängliga medel i varje land, världlandets stöd till minröjningsorganisationer, var det finns minfält och potentiella effekten av minröjningsoperationer ska HMA-programmen avvecklas planerat men snabbt i Kambodja och Angola. UM ska inte längre stöda HMA-program i dessa länder genom fleråriga ramavtal. Det ska tas fram en maximalt ettårig exitstrategi som inkluderar medel för att garantera att den ekonomiska skada som orsakas (arbetslöshetsersättningar och utrustning) inte slussas över på andra bidragsgivare. Bidragsmottagare ska bes lämna in en slutrapport över hur resurserna omfördelats.
8. Hjälp till offer ska överföras från HMA-strategin till existerande land-specifika program för utvecklingssamarbete (hälsosektorn) och/eller hänföras till gemensamma finansieringsarrangemang med ICRC ifall tillämpligt.



# SUMMARY

This is the first strategic thematic evaluation of Finnish development cooperation in humanitarian mine action (HMA) worldwide. The overall objective is to provide an **independent assessment of the achievements, contributions, strengths and weaknesses of Finland's support to humanitarian mine action** since 1991, with a particular focus on 2010 to mid-2015. By 2014 Finland was allocating some 6 million EUR per year to HMA in six countries, primarily under multi-annual Framework Agreements with three Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and two multilateral agencies.

The evaluation has two components: (1) a **desk review** of Finland's support to HMA, 1991-2009, that included some interviews with past post holders in MFA; (2) an **evaluation** of Finland's support to HMA, 2010-2015, including two country case studies - Angola and Cambodia. For the second component, a set of Evaluation Questions (EQs) and associated sub-questions not only addressed Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development OECD/DAC and EU evaluation criteria but also aimed to address the wider contextual and strategic issues of a reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC). The four main EQs were:

- Has Finnish support been relevant to internationally agreed goals of humanitarian mine action and Finland's development policies in the countries concerned, and have the methods and approaches used complied with international best practices?
- Have the choice and mix of partners, and the various pillars of Finnish support, been optimal to achieve the objectives sought? What lessons have been learned in this respect?
- How have cross-cutting objectives been integrated in Finland's interventions in humanitarian mine action and how has this affected the results achieved? What are the lessons learned and best practices in implementing cross-cutting objectives?
- What results have been achieved and what lessons can be learned from Finnish support in humanitarian mine action?

For the desk review the team examined available documentation provided mainly by MFA Finland dating back to 1991. There were some significant gaps in the literature which to some extent (notably from 2002 onwards) were filled by subsequently obtaining a full set of documents from partners in Cambodia and Angola, particularly from Hazardous Area Life Support Organization Trust (HALO), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Finnish Red Cross (FRC) and Finn Church Aid (FCA). The desk review also included the production of a Timeline of key HMA events since 1991 juxtaposed with Finnish policy developments and activities in each year to 2015. Various stakeholders in Finland were also interviewed (May 2015).



The field phase included 10-day team visits to Cambodia (June 2015) and Angola (July 2015) as well as a follow-up meeting in Geneva with Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), phone calls with United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in New York, and follow up meetings with HALO and MAG in the UK (July 2015). Field methodology comprised a mix of individual and focus group discussions across all stakeholders – government officials, agency implementers, and beneficiaries at national and sub-national levels. A purposive sample of projects was taken, including visits to mine clearance sites currently undertaken by MAG, HALO Trust, FCA (through Danish Church Aid (DCA) and Life with Dignity (LWD), and the rehabilitation and prosthetics facilities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) funded by the FRC.

## Key findings and conclusions

**1991-2002** In line with international developments, the importance Finland gave to HMA increased significantly during the second half of the 1990s. From 1991 to 1997, Finnish HMA support was mainly needs-based cash contributions from the humanitarian budget – with Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cambodia, Laos and Mozambique as recipient countries. In the second half of the 1990s, the MFA, the Finnish Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) with the involvement of relevant companies started to develop the Finn Flail service package for mechanical mine clearance with some noted success. In 1998, HMA was explicitly included among the Finnish development policy priorities and started to receive increased allocations from development co-operation funds. From 1998 to 2001, the focus shifted to mechanical mine clearance in a form of in-kind and personnel support – translating especially to the Finn Flail deployment in Cambodia, Kosovo and Mozambique under the UN umbrella. While this Finn Flail concept represented a rather innovative approach for Finland at the time, placing of most of Finnish in-kind and personnel assistance under the UN umbrella meant that it was affected by some of the inefficiencies of the UN system in the 1990s. Moreover, the suitability of the ‘mechanized phase’ to country-level local contexts was not clear. Finnish equipment faced climatic challenges to efficiency, yet fared better than some other alternatives available at the time. The rather expensive mechanical mine clearance ceased in 2002 mainly due to technical challenges.

The lack of good quality overview reporting, and inadequate knowledge management, has hindered the evaluation’s ability to form a thorough overall picture of Finnish HMA support in the 1990s, especially with regard to cash contributions. However, it appears that Finnish fact-findings, regular monitoring and learning in the 1990s improved the effectiveness of HMA support in the longer term.

**2002-2010** The quantification of cleared land and disarmed mines continued to be the primary measures of progress, success and impact in HMA by all actors, including those funded by Finland. The introduction of Task Impact Assessment (TIA) changed this to some extent as well as the way HMA activities were undertaken. A more collaborative approach emerged in which Mine Risk Education (MRE), Victim Assistance, and Demining/ Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) removal activities were combined to produce improved outcomes. The use of victim data became a reliable way of mapping affected areas and a

tool for understanding impact. At the same time, however, uncooperative and/or corrupt government structures caused serious delays in the ability of implementing partners to conduct operations within designated time periods. For its part, Finland had quite a fragmented programme of small grants spread across many countries, in part responding to foreign policy priorities in the Northern Caucasus, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the established programmes in Cambodia and Angola.

**2011-2015** HMA was couched more explicitly in terms of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in Finnish development policy from 2007 onwards and, since the 2012 Development Cooperation Policy, with reference to the human rights-based approach and cross-cutting objectives of gender, reduction of inequality and climate sustainability. However, **MFA Finland lacks a strategic perspective for HMA, treating it as a stand-alone sector without clearly defined synergy with other aspects of development cooperation.** Finland's HMA was rationalised from 2010 towards a small number of multiannual **Framework Agreements that ensured predictability of funding across several countries and more manageable oversight from Helsinki.** By 2011 this meant that three NGOs - HALO Trust, Finnish Red Cross (FRC) and FCA - and two multilateral agencies - UNMAS and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) - received almost all HMA funding; a large majority of funding was given to three countries - Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola.

**HMA in Afghanistan has proven to be highly relevant, effective and efficient, both from UNMAS and HALO.** There has been high praise for HALO's work in Afghanistan from the Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI), particularly with respect to its employment approaches that cut across ethnic and political spectra, including communities sympathetic to Taliban. Similarly, HALO scored high in the Finnish MFA's own internal review of Cambodia in 2010.

**Generally coordination between UNMAS, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has not been optimal,** highlighted by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) in 2011 and backed by an independent DFID evaluation. There are also contesting views over the efficiency of the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by UNMAS, funded by Finland. **The GICHD has only recently started to invest in results based management.** It continues to redefine its role within a shrinking sector.

**Generally the lack of political economy analysis, combined with single-sector myopic conceptual thinking among HMA implementers, impairs evidence of HMA impact.** Despite the introduction of post-clearance monitoring by some actors, there are a lot of unchallenged assumptions regarding developmental impact. The FCA-LWD link with MAG in Cambodia has been innovative for having directly linked demining with agricultural and income-generating activities, but whether this is more than the sum of its parts is questionable, as is the added value of FCA in this respect.

Particularly in Angola, **neither donors nor HMA implementers have effectively confronted the government over transference of plentiful national**

**funds to continue funding international NGO or national NGO work.** Governments have welcomed the high quality of data provided by international NGOs and have adopted some of corresponding technical tools, but capacity development is primarily through demonstration rather than embedding expertise within national institutions. Meanwhile, Angola continues to present obstacles to custom clearance of equipment and long delays in visa applications, impairing the efficient delivery of HMA. **In Cambodia victim assistance by ICRC, though effective and efficient, is marred by the capacity and willingness of national authorities to assume responsibility for the sector.**

The lack of diversity in how HMA is carried out may have dissuaded new or continued funding from donors. This is compounded by **the lack of any strategically planned exit strategy on the part of implementing agencies.** Responsibility for mine action by donor countries should be carefully considered in relation to both the general humanitarian and development efforts conducted at the country level, national financial capacity and not least political will. **Advocacy, including confronting issues of corruption, are sometimes left entirely in the hands of NGOs whose continuing presence depends on a non-confrontational relationship with government.** Some countries (Angola) have substantial national financial means, which would enable them to respond to threats themselves, while others (Afghanistan, Somalia) have more precarious financial means. Some countries have supported and welcomed HMA engagement (Cambodia), while others are renowned for making working conditions for NGOs hard (Angola). HMA is subject to the same ‘classic’ development challenge as other sectors: to what extent does the host government exploit international generosity to offset its own lack of will or strategic competency to adequately address an essentially domestic issue? Given the landmine threat worldwide **Finland should be wary of investing funds in countries where their support is hampered and where national funds could be used to deal with the threat at hand.**

Precisely because HMA has occupied a ‘niche’ within MFA Finland without a managerial or direct policy relationship to either development or humanitarian priorities, its rationale has been largely determined by implementing agencies with a vested interest in perpetuating their activities; and despite recent efforts, the agencies themselves have not traditionally had the skills or experience to broaden the discourse beyond simply mine clearance. Victim assistance also occupies a strangely dislocated area of assistance without a clearly defined connection to other HMA activities.

Development discourse sees human security as a necessary pre-condition for sustainable development, and HMA makes an important contribution to that security. However, **removing landmines alone does not automatically generate development; a much broader set of events is required.** Understanding landmines as a threat to development, particularly in places where the war has long ended, where general areas affected by landmines are known, and where national and international resources are available, has served to change how priorities are determined and resources allocated. Yet more often than not MFA partners have concentrated on landmine clearance, with only a cursory – and certainly not comprehensive – effort to measure the post-clearance social and economic benefits resulting from their work on the ground. While the idea that

development sector actors work together in a coordinated fashion is not new, **some mine action agencies have struggled with collaborative working and/or truly understanding the developmental implications of landmines.** Even today some HMA actors continue to count discovered landmines as a measure of their success.

The reconstructed ToC, based on the inherent assumptions of much of literature and MFA conceptual thinking, demonstrates how the link between demining and development is reiterated without qualification. **The underlying assumptions are fundamentally misguided** and have led agencies to conduct demining operations in places where the impact was negligible at best, where there is only a very limited number of direct beneficiaries, and where no planning has been made for additional inputs to sustain development.

Mine clearance agencies are not oblivious to these challenges, but their central remit – and the climate of reduced finance – inexorably leads to ‘bottom line’ thinking: clear the mines, and let others worry about developmental implications. A more challenging and pro-active approach to improving the mine action-development link is to build mine action into national development plans with clear development objectives alongside the traditional objective of casualty reduction. This was not always apparent in the countries reviewed in the evaluation. Capacity building of national HMA institutions is one part of the process; **this has often been addressed in a largely ad hoc, unplanned and unsatisfactory manner.** There is also little advice available on best practice in this area.

Victim Assistance sits uneasily within the HMA portfolio and is perhaps better placed within regular Finnish country programmes. The results of Victim Assistance are very much down to individual cases. ICRC’s efficiency is exemplary, but it is a long-term process that demands consistent funding in the face of decreasing donor interest and (in Cambodia) a discouraging process of hand-over for funding and management by government.

## Recommendations

1. MFA’s mine action strategy should be more closely linked to its Fragile States agenda, allowing alignment with disarmament and security issues. The extension to the current 2012 Development Policy should be accompanied by a clear strategy and implementation plan that demonstrates how HMA complements other humanitarian and developmental activities.
2. In order to ensure that funded organizations have the support they need, HMA activities should be continued only (1) in fragile states where other forms of complementary support are underway, or (2) in those countries where the MFA, through its embassies, is able to actively support NGO/UN implementers in advocacy and lobbying governments to uphold their responsibilities with respect to the Ottawa (and Oslo) Conventions and international standards in HMA.
3. Greater cooperation and programmatic coherence should be encouraged between MFA, MoD and private sector engagement in technical assis-

tance, plus an involvement with those NGOs like HALO and MAG that have existing weapons and ammunition disposal programmes.

4. Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan should continue to receive HMA funding contingent upon the demonstration of security, employment and economic benefits accrued, and a more robust contextual political economy analysis. Agencies should be requested to demonstrate and report on linkages with other development partners in areas of operation, and on how development outcomes beyond mine clearance will be recorded.
5. In light of scarce resources, and given current limitation in demonstrating best value for money, efficiency and effectiveness, support for GICHD should be discontinued beyond the current Framework Agreement.
6. In light of scarce resources, and given current limitation in demonstrating best value for money, efficiency and effectiveness, core support for UNMAS should be discontinued beyond the current Framework Agreement, but funding of the UNMAS Afghanistan programme should be retained under the provisions of Recommendation 3.
7. Given the available funds in each of the countries, the degree of support provided by the host country to the demining operators, the location of the minefields and potential impact of the demining operations, there should be a planned but rapid phasing down of HMA programmes in Cambodia and Angola. MFA should no longer support HMA programmes in these countries under multi-annual Framework Contracts. An exit strategy not exceeding one year should be designed, with funding allocated to ensure that the financial damage entailed (redundancy payments and equipment) is not passed to other donors. Recipient agencies should be requested to submit a closure report indicating how resources have been reallocated.
8. Victim Assistance should be removed from the HMA strategy and placed within existing country development cooperation programmes (health sector) and/or pooled funding arrangements with ICRC where applicable.

# KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
HMA was couched more explicitly in terms of LRRD in Finnish development policy from 2007 onwards and, since the 2012 Development Cooperation Policy, with reference to the human rights-based approach and cross-cutting objectives of gender, reduction of inequality and climate sustainability. However, MFA Finland lacks a strategic perspective for HMA, treating it as a stand-alone sector without clearly defined synergy with other aspects of development cooperation.	MFA lacks a clear strategy over how mine action and victim assistance fits within its wider development cooperation remit.	1. MFA's mine action strategy should be more closely linked to its Fragile States agenda, allowing alignment with disarmament and security issues. The extension to the current 2012 Development Policy should be accompanied by a clear strategy and implementation plan that demonstrates how HMA complements other humanitarian and developmental activities.
Finland's HMA was rationalised from 2010 towards a small number of multiannual Framework Agreements. By 2011 this meant that three NGOs and two multilateral agencies received almost all HMA funding; a large majority of funding was given to three countries – Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola. Finland does not have embassies in Angola or Cambodia and the oversight from Helsinki has been rather administrative in nature.	Advocacy, including confronting issues of corruption, are sometimes left entirely in the hands of NGOs whose continuing presence depends on a non-confrontational relationship with government. There is little evidence of consistent advocacy undertaken by MFA Finland in countries where its presence is limited.	2. In order to ensure that funded organizations have the support they need, HMA activities should be continued only (1) in fragile states where other forms of complementary support are underway, or (2) in those countries where the MFA, through its embassies, is able to actively support NGO/UN implementers in advocacy and lobbying governments to uphold their responsibilities with respect to the Ottawa (and Oslo) Conventions and international standards in HMA.
Apart from the distinct mechanical mine clearing phase, the rationale for the Finnish HMA support has been largely determined by implementing agencies. Although funded from the development co-operation funds, HMA is currently administered by the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy.	In the wake of the ratification of the Ottawa Convention, and despite that fact that Finland has yet to accede to the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions, HMA might be better located under disarmament. Access to expertise and specialised mechanical support assets as well as new technologies may provide openings for renewed collaboration with the Finnish MoD and/or private sector companies.	3. Greater cooperation and programmatic coherence should be encouraged between MFA, MoD and private sector engagement in technical assistance, plus an involvement with those NGOs like HALO and MAG that have existing weapons and ammunition disposal programmes.



Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>In Afghanistan, the total number of mine and ERW related accidents has fluctuated according to IDP population movements, but the overall trend is a much reduced caseload. HALO has demonstrated and documented good formal learning. In particular, it expanded its objectives to include livelihood and economic growth targets, conducting a livelihood survey to identify and define these targets. The national demining agency reviews HALO's performance on a quarterly basis and, to monitor future impact, HALO has developed a livelihoods monitoring survey (including a baseline survey) (ICAI, 2014).</p> <p>However, notwithstanding well-known contextual constraints, three main sets of objectives have yet to be achieved: a) national ownership on mine action; b) gender mainstreaming; c) increased focus on and impact of victim assistance (Samuel Hall, 2014).</p>	<p>HMA in Afghanistan has proven to be highly relevant, effective and efficient, both from UNMAS and HALO. There is general consensus among MFA staff that UNMAS has worked well in Afghanistan. There has been high praise for HALO's work in Afghanistan from the ICAI, particularly with respect to its employment approaches that cut across ethnic and political spectra, including communities sympathetic to Taliban.</p> <p>The lack of political economy analysis, combined with single-sector limited conceptual thinking among HMA implementers, impairs evidence of HMA impact. In Cambodia there are a lot of unchallenged assumptions regarding developmental impact.</p>	<p>4. Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan should continue to receive HMA funding contingent upon the demonstration of security, employment and economic benefits accrued, and a more robust contextual political economy analysis. Agencies should be requested to demonstrate and report on linkages with other development partners in areas of operation, and on how development outcomes beyond mine clearance will be recorded.</p>
<p>GICHD is currently working towards strengthening its Results Based Monitoring (RBM) but meanwhile the efficiency and effectiveness of funding provided is difficult to determine. The GICHD continues to redefine its role within a shrinking sector. Nevertheless, the funding allocated by the Finnish government has met all Finnish contractual obligations.</p>	<p>The degree to which funded interventions led to the most effective implementation of Finnish policy is not clear. Therefore, given the imminent reduction in available Finnish funding for development cooperation it seems that efforts by the GICHD may not prove the most efficient and effective funding avenues.</p>	<p>5. In light of scarce resources, and given current limitation in demonstrating best value for money, efficiency and effectiveness, support for GICHD should be discontinued beyond the current Framework Agreement.</p>
<p>Coordination between UNMAS, UNICEF, UNDP and UNOPS has not been optimal, highlighted by the JIU in 2011 and by a DFID evaluation in 2012. There are also contesting views over the efficiency of the Voluntary Trust Fund administered by UNMAS, funded by Finland.</p>	<p>The degree to which the funded interventions through UNMAS central funding have led to the effective implementation of Finnish policy is not clear given available documents and publicly available UNMAS reporting.</p>	<p>6. In light of scarce resources, and given current limitation in demonstrating best value for money, efficiency and effectiveness, core support for UNMAS should be discontinued beyond the current Framework Agreement, but funding of the UNMAS Afghanistan programme should be retained under the provisions of Recommendation 3.</p>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>The primary partners in Angola and Cambodia have no clear exit strategy. In Angola, neither donors nor HMA implementers have effectively confronted the government over transference of plentiful national funds to continue funding INGO or national NGO work. Meanwhile, through obstacles to custom clearance of equipment and long delays in visa applications, the Angolan government has presented obstacles to efficient delivery of HMA. The FCA-LWD link with MAG in Cambodia has been innovative for having directly linked demining with agricultural and income-generating activities, but whether this is more than the sum of its parts is questionable, as is the added value of FCA in this respect.</p> <p>In Cambodia, victim assistance by ICRC, though effective and efficient, is impaired by capacity and willingness of national authorities to assume responsibility for the sector.</p>	<p>Lack of an exit strategy itself is a key weakness, reflecting a somewhat myopic view of demining that has served the industry well for years but at the same time has resulted in very little integrated development thinking or strategic foresight on the part of the demining agencies. It has been mirrored in the MFA where there has been no discussion over 'thresholds' – i.e. the point at which the reduced number of casualties, fewer mines remaining in prime agricultural land, and the costs associated with clearing them, create a 'cut-off' for donors such as Finland, with residual efforts passed over to national authorities.</p>	<p>7. Given the available funds in each of the countries, the degree of support provided by the host country to the demining operators, the location of the minefields and potential impact of the demining operations, there should be a planned but rapid phasing down of HMA programmes in Cambodia and Angola. MFA should not continue to support HMA programmes in these countries under multi-annual Framework Contracts. An exit strategy not exceeding one year should be designed, with funding allocated to ensure that the financial damage entailed (redundancy payments and equipment) is not passed to other donors. Recipient agencies should be requested to submit a closure report indicating how resources have been reallocated.</p>
<p>Victim assistance occupies a strangely dislocated area of assistance within Finland's portfolio, without a clearly defined connection to other HMA activities.</p>	<p>Victim Assistance is perhaps better placed within regular Finnish country programmes. The results of Victim Assistance are very much down to individual cases. ICRC's efficiency is exemplary, but it is a long-term process that demands consistent funding in the face of decreasing donor interest and (in Cambodia) a discouraging process of hand-over for funding and management by government.</p>	<p>8. Victim Assistance should be removed from the HMA strategy and placed within existing country development cooperation programmes (health sector) and/or pooled funding arrangements with ICRC where applicable.</p>



# 1 INTRODUCTION

This is the first strategic thematic evaluation of Finnish development cooperation in humanitarian mine action<sup>1</sup> (HMA) worldwide.

The overall objective of the evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of Finnish support to the sector since 1991, with a particular focus on 2010 to mid-2015. With a global scope, the evaluation – conducted in 2015 – looks not only at the past but also towards the future programming of Finland’s HMA through practical and targeted recommendations. At the end of 2015 the current Framework Agreements with partners come to an end and the MFA will again define the scope of its regional and thematic support to the sector. The evaluation will feed into this review, as well as to the 2016 evaluation of the implementation of Finland’s Humanitarian Policy.

HMA is both a humanitarian and development issue. Globally it encompasses five pillars: mine clearance, victim assistance, advocacy, stockpile destruction, and mine risk education (MRE). Finnish HMA has, in its various stages of development, included all of these except stockpile destruction – that is, however, a central component of the domestic obligations of Finland’s ratification of the Ottawa Convention in 2012. The MFA’s 2012 development policy emphasizes an approach to HMA that links relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD), taking into account capacity building, the human rights based approach as well as the cross-cutting objectives of gender, reduction of inequality and climate sustainability. More specifically, the informal MFA ‘Guidelines for Targeting Finnish Humanitarian Mine Action’ (2009)<sup>2</sup> state that HMA, in accordance with Finland’s Humanitarian Policy (2007), covers “the clearance of mines and explosive remnants of war; victim assistance; developing national operating capacity and risk prevention; preventive awareness raising and other support activities; as well as the destruction of mine/explosive stocks”<sup>3</sup>. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) expands upon this definition: HMA is concerned with activities that aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of landmines and the explosive remnants of war (ERW). Mine action is the combination of activities designed to:

- reduce real and perceived risks to affected populations of landmines, cluster munitions, ammunition stockpiles and ERW
- address consequences of accidents upon victims
- reduce economic, social and developmental consequences of contamination

<sup>1</sup> A clear distinction is made between humanitarian, military and commercial mine action, the latter two not being eligible for humanitarian mine action funding.

<sup>2</sup> This is in Finnish, “Suuntaviivat Suomen humanitaarisen miinatoiminnan kohdentamiseksi”, with our own (unofficial) translation.

<sup>3</sup> Strictly speaking, the wording should be “advocacy for” stockpile destruction, since stockpile destruction as such (other than mine destruction ‘on site’) is not a component of Finland’s overseas work.

- advocate developing, adopting and complying with appropriate instruments of international humanitarian law (IHL)

The scope of the evaluation is global. With a particular focus on the past four years, the evaluation examines not only the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of its funded activities, but also how Finnish development cooperation has addressed issues of national ownership, alignment, coordination and harmonization as covered by the Paris Declaration principles. The evaluation is strategic and global in scope; individual projects have not been evaluated as such, though past evaluations of these projects are referred to, as well as observational judgments made by the team in the course of the field work.

The evaluation comprises two main components:

- **Component 1:** a desk review of the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact of Finland's support to HMA from 1991 to 2009.
- **Component 2:** a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact of Finnish support to HMA from 2010 to mid-2015, including country case studies undertaken in Angola and Cambodia.

The two components feed into each other and their combined findings are reflected in the conclusions and recommendations of this report.

The report begins with a methodological overview, including the presentation of a reconstructed Theory of Change. There is then an analysis of the first two historical periods of HMA for Finland: 1991-2002, and 2002-2009. This leads into the main evaluation period covered - 2010 to mid-2015 - and to which the key evaluation questions are addressed. The summaries of each of these three periods are presented, followed by a revisiting of the Theory of Change to critique the extent to which the evidence confirms the key assumptions. Finally, a set of recommendations is presented.

## 2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

### 2.1 Outline of approach

Regarding the approach, it is first important to distinguish between the two components of the evaluation. Component 1 is essentially a desk ‘review’ of Finnish approaches towards, and learning derived from, the almost 20-year involvement in HMA from the early 1990s to the time at which the current set of contracts were signed in 2010. Although MFA personnel with institutional memory and experience of working in the sector prior to 2010 have been interviewed, much of the review rests on existing documentation, both from MFA and from other agencies working in the sector.

**Component 1** builds a story-line of the following:

1. The rationale behind MFA involvement in HMA over the 20 years, and the extent to which this has changed over the period;
2. The changes in approach and activity that have occurred over this period, what provoked those changes and what were the implications of these changes;
3. The key lessons that have emerged and the extent to which these have informed subsequent shifts in policy and practice.

Taking into account the main developments in the Finnish support to HMA, the Component 1 is divided into two main periods: 1991–2002 and 2003–2009. The former period includes a rather distinct endeavour of supporting especially mechanical mine clearing efforts, while the latter period has a more comprehensive collection of documents leading to contemporary policy and practice.

**Component 2** – covering the period 2010 to mid-2015 – shifts from a review to an evaluation proper. It is reinforced by two field studies plus a greater level of institutional memory inside and outside the MFA. A standard methodology that encompasses the OECD/DAC criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability) is applied, within a set of EQs that also address the issues emerging from a reconstructed ToC. Component 2 thus comprises:

Across eight countries<sup>4</sup> and five implementing agencies<sup>5</sup> receiving support for humanitarian mine action, an examination of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact of Finnish support, using a short set of key EQs and related judgment criteria (sub-questions) that reflect the Terms of Reference (ToR) and address standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria;

<sup>4</sup> Iraq, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Chad, Laos, Angola, South Sudan, Somalia. By 2014, two of these (Chad and Iraq) were dropped from the portfolio.

<sup>5</sup> Halo Trust, UNMAS, Finn Church Aid, Finnish Red Cross/ICRC, GICHD.

The application of the same EQs to a more in-depth analysis of Finnish support to HMA in two country case studies (Angola, Cambodia), including a contextual analysis that more thoroughly locates the ‘relevance’ criterion within a specific socio-political context. Both countries have ongoing activities, so it is possible to capture some of the operational learning of agencies in the field and to compare this with other countries in the current portfolio.

A reflection on a reconstructed ToC that refers to overall Finnish development cooperation, including key policy references. The starting point is the MFA’s 2007 Development Policy Programme and the 2009 “Guidelines for Targeting Finnish Humanitarian Mine Assistance”, with consideration made of other policy documents such as the more recent 2012 Development Policy Programme, and the “Development and security in Finland’s development policy” 2009 Guidelines. The policy foundations for HMA are also guided by Finland’s Humanitarian Policy, the international aid effectiveness principles, and the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. Although subsequent policies such as the 2014 Fragile States Guidelines have more recently been developed, we cannot retrospectively apply these.

In addition, the evaluation overall takes an internationally comparative perspective in which Finnish support to HMA is contrasted with international best practices. Towards this end, a comparison is made between Finnish support and the international policy context as defined by multilateral institutions such the UN, including international political dialogue.

### 2.1.1 Evaluation questions and judgment criteria

The evaluation uses a set of four EQs, based on the ToR. They not only address Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development OECD/DAC and EU evaluation criteria but also aim to address the wider contextual and strategic issues presented in the reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC). The EQs also reflect the objectives of HMA as outlined in the 2009 MFA Guidelines on the subject. The EQs are applied primarily to Component 2 of the evaluation (programmes post-2010) including the case studies, though the findings are eventually synthesized with those derived from the ‘review’ process of Component 1 in the Conclusion.

Our main evaluation questions are:

**Has Finnish support been relevant to internationally agreed goals of HMA and Finland’s development policies in the countries concerned, and have the methods and approaches used complied with international best practices?**

- Extent to which the design of and strategic choices made within each country intervention was based on good contextual analysis, and an assessment of beneficiary needs;
- Extent to which MFA activities were complementary to those of other development partners working in humanitarian mine action;
- Extent to which other MFA interventions on the ground have been complemented by advocacy (political dialogue, etc) and the perceived benefits of this;
- Extent to which MFA-supported activities have complied with contemporary international best practices;

- Extent to which HMA has complied with the policy priorities set by MFA in its development policies and guidelines.

**Have the choice and mix of partners, and the various pillars of Finnish support, been optimal to achieve the objectives sought? What lessons have been learned in this respect?**

- Extent to which the choice and mix of partners undertaking HMA on behalf of the MFA have been optimal to the task;
- Extent to which there has been added value in channelling money through a partner to an implementing partner (eg. FCA to Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and FRC to International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ), as opposed to direct funding to agencies who implement the work;
- Extent to which Finland has applied its aid effectiveness commitments to activities undertaken under humanitarian mine action;
- Extent to which core funding of UNMAS and GICHD has increased the capacity of these agencies to deliver services, while also increasing Finland's access and influence to international dialogue in mine action;
- Extent to which the human resources and capacities within MFA have been sufficient to manage the objectives set under HMA.

**How have cross-cutting objectives been integrated in Finland's interventions in HMA and how has this affected the results achieved? What are the lessons learned and best practices in implementing cross-cutting objectives (CCOs)?**

- Extent to which CCOs were taken into account in the analysis and design of Finnish interventions in HMA;
- Extent to which CCOs were taken into account in political and policy dialogue;
- Extent to which MFA-supported interventions have been monitored with respect to CCOs and outcome/impact results obtained;
- Extent to which lessons on implementing cross-cutting objectives have been recorded and disseminated.

**What results have been achieved and what lessons can be learned from Finnish support in humanitarian mine action?**

- Extent to which results have been thoroughly monitored and reported, with results and learning obtained from these effectively disseminated;
- Extent to which the results obtained confirm or deny a corollary between HMA and peacebuilding, poverty reduction and economic growth;
- Extent to which the totality of resources made available and disbursed by MFA was equal to the ambitions set by programme objectives;
- Extent to which the results and achievements to date are likely to endure in the longer term. Whether leadership, ownership and capacity have been supported to strengthen sustainability of HMA in the partner countries.

## 2.1.2 Theory of Change

At the outset of the evaluation a provisional ToC was reconstructed derived from policy and guideline literature as seen in Figure 1. The bold italics in the first column of the ToC presented in this section are MFA activities cited in the HMA Guidelines.

The ToC addresses higher level strategic intentions for Finnish development cooperation; this requires extracting the assumed logic behind interventions undertaken. The strategic nature of this evaluation requires a differentiation between *intended* strategy (what was planned) and *realised* strategy (what was actually done). Initially the evaluation reconstructs only the first - intended - intervention logic. In Section X this analysis is revisited and, in light of what actually took place, the original assumptions are critically assessed.

Closely related to the ToC is Contribution Analysis that places MFA contributions in relation to other similar donor inputs and asks whether there is a causal/contributory relationship between Finnish inputs and activities and the ensuing outcomes, while pointing out potential - positive or negative - contextual factors influencing the achievement of desired objectives. This enables the evaluation to look beyond purely a project/programme logframe and consider the importance of exogenous factors likely to have affected outcomes. Such factors are picked up in the course of applying the EQs, but findings are also juxtaposed against a contextual timeline of events that has had some influence on programme outcomes, even beyond the project cycle.


## 2.2 Methodology

Much of the evidence for the evaluation was derived from a desk study of existing literature, project reports and other documentation supplied by MFA, supplemented by related contemporary expert reviews of the state of play within HMA worldwide. Added empirical evidence was drawn from a more in-depth analysis of two case studies - Angola and Cambodia - visited by the evaluation team.

For the **Desk Phase** the team examined available documentation provided by MFA Finland dating back to 1991. First, a review of Finnish documents (policies/projects) to ascertain the programme priorities and results (including their sources) was undertaken; second, the evaluation sought secondary and related documentation and data that confirmed, denied or complemented the MFA literature. There were some significant gaps in the literature which to some extent (notably from 2002 onwards) were filled by subsequently obtaining a full set of documents from partners in Cambodia and Angola, particularly from HALO, MAG, FRC and FCA. This set has been passed to MFA.

In addition, interviews were undertaken in Helsinki with MFA, FCA, FRC, independent NGOs and individuals who had been involved in the Finnish support to HMA in the past (Annex 2). These included personnel who had been in charge of the HMA portfolio in the 1990s and 2000s who reflected on the evolution of the portfolio and lessons derived from this history. There was a degree of overlap between this and contemporary approaches, and some of the persons interviewed offered comments on the contemporary portfolio.

**Figure 1.** Reconstructed Theory of Change for HMA supported by Finland





The **Field Phase** included 10-day team visits to Cambodia (June 2015) and Angola (July 2015) as well as discussions with GICHD, Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and UNMAS headquarters staff, and follow up meetings with HALO and MAG in the United Kingdom (July 2015). At each stage of the process, the evaluation team kept detailed notes of discussions held, as well as a comprehensive bibliography of data sources. This ensured that any statements contained in the Final Report could be traced and confirmed through detailed source material.

The case study field methodology comprised a mix of individual and focus group discussions across all stakeholders – government officials, agency implementers, and beneficiaries at national and sub-national levels. In terms of programme/project selection there was no statistically representative sampling as such; only purposive sampling was possible; however, the field schedule included visits to mine clearance sites currently undertaken by MAG, HALO, FCA (DCA and Life with Dignity (LWD) ) and ICRC (funded by FRC). At all sites interviews were undertaken with beneficiaries as well as the national demining authorities – national implementers, local government and policy makers. A full list of those interviewed is in Annex 2. The field methods included:

- Interviews to gather stakeholder perceptions of the Finnish contribution and added value; interviews with all key stakeholders including with MFA delegates, Government (national and provincial), civil society, UN and ICRC;
- Focus group discussions (including beneficiaries, past and present) to conduct multi-criteria analysis of factors that have supported or hindered effective implementation of the project/programme under consideration;
- A debriefing/validation workshop with partners at the completion of fieldwork.

For the two country studies a sample of project interventions was chosen based on a combination of the following variables:

1. Size and scope of the intervention;
2. Overlap/linkage of the intervention with that of other interventions (e.g. in Cambodia there was complementarity and/or contiguity between HMA and other humanitarian/development activities supported by Finland).

Finnish HMA is currently implemented by international NGOs and the ICRC. These partners operate across several countries, so the evaluation has been able to contrast work undertaken in Cambodia and Angola with that undertaken by the same agency in other key countries (notably Afghanistan, the third of the three largest country recipients of MFA funding). In this respect, it has been possible to comment on the cost efficiency aspects of working with a limited number of agencies, and the extent to which they transfer learning between countries as well among themselves.

### **2.2.1 Data collection and limitations**

There were significant gaps in literature that relate to an incomplete data collection in MFA Helsinki archives. In the course of the field work the evalua-



tion found large amount additional internal/external evaluations, monitoring reports and special studies in the database of implementing agencies which had not been available in the MFA archives for reasons that were unclear. Although the team collected these for Angola and Cambodia, time and resources did not allow for the collection of data from other countries unless it was forwarded to partner's headquarters and brought to the attention of the evaluation team. It is reasonable to assume, however, that there are many documents from these other countries not currently in the MFA archives. For GICHD and UNMAS the team made a direct appeal for additional materials. A final list of references is presented as part of this report.

Methodologically, there were some logistical constraints in Angola relating to the remoteness of areas currently demined by DCA that would take several days to visit; it was not possible to visit the area in the far east of the country where ongoing Finnish-funded operations are underway. However, recently completed areas were covered.

Deliberately identifying two country case studies where communities and individuals have different experiences allowed a degree of comparison from different contexts. However, these experiences may not have been replicated in other countries. Inevitably, comparative data has tended to be reduced to transferable technical approaches in demining rather than in institutional or developmental outcomes. A thematic evaluation of this kind might assert that mine clearance is a clear precursor to development, but evidence to that effect would require, among other things, sustained efforts of local communities to ensure a process of planned investment in infrastructure, capacity and development of input/output value chains. Beyond the tentative cooperation and coordination with development actors reported here, full integration of mine action in development at national level remains a significant challenge. Even where this is an explicit objective, as in the FCA/LWD/MAG collaboration in Cambodia, attempts to achieve this have been sporadic at best.

## 3 FINNISH POLICY WITHIN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

### 3.1 The evolution of Humanitarian Mine Action

HMA has evolved considerably over the last 25 years. In this time two major inter-linked developments have taken place: first the birth of civilian organizations designed to respond to the landmine threat; second, the signing and ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention).

The involvement of civil society organisations can be traced back to the 1980s before the drafting and adoption of the AP Landmine Convention. At the time Afghanistan did not have a military force willing or able to remove landmines and the landmine threat prevented the delivery of humanitarian goods and services, hence civilian organizations tasked with technical landmine removal were born. At the onset, the UN supported the establishment of national and international NGOs that could respond to the landmine threat locally. Subsequently MRE was developed, later becoming a pillar of what is now understood as HMA. Also, the understanding that landmine accident survivors have specific medical needs and social needs led to an additional pillar to HMA, victim assistance.

The AP Landmine Convention arguably can be traced back to 1991 when Asia Watch released a report detailing the impact and severe human costs of landmines in Cambodia. Here and in Afghanistan, where civilian demining efforts were underway, a broader discussion began on the threat of landmines, which in turn led to a coalition of NGOs coming together to campaign against their use. The coalition, active in some 100 countries, was formally organized in 1992 into what is known today as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL website). Their main objective was lobbying governments to garner support for a law that would prohibit the use, and stockpile of landmines and would bring attention to the need to fund the removal of landmines in affected countries. Their efforts culminated, on September 18th 1997, with the drafting of the Ottawa Convention. This came into force on March 1st 1999; Finland acceded to it in January 2012 and became a state party on July 1st 2012.

Currently, amongst the best known international NGOs working on clearance are Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Hazardous Area Life Support Organization (Halo Trust) and the MAG. Joining the ranks of these well-established organizations are Danish Demining Group (DDG) and DCA. Handicap International (HI) has focused primarily on victim assistance and MRE, as has the Red Cross (both the ICRC and national societies). Each of these organizations works in multiple countries around the globe.

The UN has maintained an important role in mine action, expanding far beyond its initial work in Afghanistan. Currently different agencies work on HMA where applicable, with UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UN Develop-

ment Programme (UNDP) having important roles as lead agencies for MRE and Demining and other technical aspects respectively. In 1997, the General Assembly established UNMAS which is an agency charged with coordinating the UN mine action response. UNMAS brings together 14 different UN agencies that play a role in mine action. In addition UNMAS is responsible for coordinating standing committee meetings linked to the Ottawa Convention and the Mine Action Steering Committee meetings which bring together intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies. UNMAS is also responsible for managing the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for Mine action, to which Finland is a donor.

HMA from the outset was regarded as a largely technical activity that included the identification, mapping and demining of contaminated areas. The recognition that landmine removal alone was insufficient was first openly acknowledged during the Bad Honnef conference in 1997, but understanding how to include cross-cutting issues and a more developed focused approach has taken far longer. Similarly building trust in the technical proficiency of demining operators has been a challenge that has threatened the success of many demining operations worldwide. As a response, some organizations have redefined their intervention model.

MAG was one of the first large international organizations to recognize HMA as a development activity. They introduced the notion of deploying small community liaison teams which focused on data collection, MRE, and the identification and removal of small numbers of landmines that had a high impact (for example, a single landmine in the backyard of a home). This approach, introduced in the late 1990s and early 2000 was revolutionary at the time. Since then operators have gradually changed their thinking and adopted new approaches. One approach emanating from this has been the use of Task Impact Assessment (TIA), a methodology utilised by both DCA and NPA, two of the agencies funded by the Finnish Government. Overall it is fair to say that some organizations were quicker to adapt from the focus on counting square meters cleared and number of devices removed to the understanding that impact meant the improvement in the lives of people living in contaminated areas.

HMA, particularly aspects related to technical demining, was not governed by operational protocols at the onset. Rather, each organization, having contracted numerous individuals with relevant military backgrounds, designed their own operational protocols. In 1997 the UN issued the first International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) that delineated the three levels of survey required for technical demining to effectively and safely take place: Level 1 (general assessment of the mine and UXO hazard); Level 2 (technical survey); and Level 3 (post-clearance survey). Informally, some actors later also referred to a Level 4 or land use survey. Since then IMAS and its corollary, the country-specific National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) detail almost every aspect of activities involved in HMA. Indeed, the process of identifying gaps in current standards and drafting new ones is ongoing. In addition to IMAS, the Swiss funded a project in the late 1990s in support of the Kosovo Mine Action Programme – the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) which has since become a tool used far more widely. Both IMAS and IMSMA continue to evolve; for example, through the use of drones for survey, the Mine Action Intelligence Tool, and others (GICHD webpage, GICHD 2006c, GICHD 2000c; Interviews with GICHD).

**The recognition that landmine removal alone was insufficient was first openly acknowledged during the Bad Honnef conference in 1997, but understanding how to include cross-cutting issues and a more developed focused approach has taken far longer.**

Following Table 1 shows a timeline that juxtaposes key international policy developments (including conventions and events) with Finland's milestone policies and activities. From an evaluation point of view, this not only presents a chronology, but also serves as a reminder that a retrospective analysis should be 'time bound' and not done against policies that are yet to be in place.

**Table 1. Timeline 1991-2014**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Major international policy developments (conventions, events)</b>	<b>Finnish policy developments (published policies, responses to conventions)</b>	<b>Main Finnish activities (countries, agencies, sectors covered)</b>
<b>Before 1991</b>	HMA is identified as a need to respond to clear threats in Afghanistan and other countries. Some demining organizations are born.	The Finnish government stopped the production of landmines (1981) and has never exported them.  Finland signed and ratified the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (1981-1982).	
<b>1991</b>	Asia Watch launches a report on the threat of Landmines in Cambodia and multiple NGOs come together to start a NGO campaign to ban landmines. The Prince of Cambodia calls for a ban on the weapon.		Finland funded the mine action programme in Afghanistan.
<b>1992</b>	The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is established and member NGOs start to establish a momentum based on coordinated efforts.  The European Union Signs a five year moratorium on the sale of Landmines and calls on member states to both Sign the CCW and make it applicable to internal conflict. The US signs a one-year landmine export Moratorium.		Finland funded the mine action programme in Afghanistan.
<b>1993</b>	The UN General Assembly passes a resolution calling for a review of the CCW, and another calling for an international moratorium on the trade of anti-personnel landmines.  ICRC hosts a three day symposium which brought together government representatives, NGOs, mine producers and mine clearance experts.  The ICBL holds its first international meeting, which brings together representatives from 40 NGOs worldwide.		Finland funded the mine action programme in Afghanistan.

Year	Major international policy developments (conventions, events)	Finnish policy developments (published policies, responses to conventions)	Main Finnish activities (countries, agencies, sectors covered)
1994	<p>UN Secretary General calls for a total ban on landmines.</p> <p>The ICBL holds its second international meeting.</p> <p>The USA congress introduces legislation to establish a moratorium on the production of landmines.</p> <p>The Italian government stops production and export of landmines.</p> <p>Netherlands supports the destruction of their stockpile and supports a total ban.</p>		Finland funded the mine action programme in Afghanistan.
1995	<p>At the CCW conference the ICBL lobbies for a total ban of landmines and the number of pro ban governments rises to 14.</p> <p>Belgium becomes the first country to ban landmines (national law).</p> <p>The third ICBL conference takes place and the ICBL launches its media campaign to support a ban.</p>		<p>Finland funded the mine action programme in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique</p> <p>Finland started exploring possibilities for providing in-kind and personnel support for mine clearing</p>
1996	<p>The CCW passes an amended protocol that allows the continued use of landmines. The 14 pro ban countries meet with the ICBL to strategize a way forward.</p> <p>Canada hosts a conference that brings together 75 governments and the ICBL and ends with a call for a treaty to ban landmines.</p> <p>155 countries support the UN General Assembly resolution to support negotiations for a treaty to ban landmines.</p> <p>The Swedish government adopts a unilateral ban on antipersonnel landmines</p> <p>Central America (6 countries) ban landmines becoming the first mine free region.</p>	Finland signs, among others, the Amended Protocol II of the CCW	Finland provides in-kind support to the programme in Angola, and Mozambique, providing funding to the Afghan, Cambodian and Mozambican programmes and funding agencies working in Bosnia.

Year	Major international policy developments (conventions, events)	Finnish policy developments (published policies, responses to conventions)	Main Finnish activities (countries, agencies, sectors covered)
1997	<p>Belgium hosts the government/ICBL second meeting, to follow up on progress made in Canada.</p> <p>Following extensive negotiations in Oslo in December, a treaty is adopted on September 18 1997.</p> <p>The ICBL is awarded the peace price.</p> <p>122 countries sign the Mine Ban Treaty.</p>	<p>Finland participated in the Oslo negotiation of the Mine Ban treaty as an observer.</p> <p>The delegation made the following statement "Finland believes that through a global and effective treaty it is possible to stop the further spread of APMs and hold those who use APMs against civilian population to account. This is why Finland has pronounced her support for a global, verifiable treaty banning APMs. This is not an easy commitment for us, given the fact that APMs continue to have an important role in our national defence, but we are ready to follow through that commitment provided that the treaty will truly affect the landmine crisis...." Excerpt.</p> <p>Finland states its commitment to sign the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006.</p>	<p>Finland continues to contribute to Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Mozambique and starts funding the programme in Laos.</p>
1998	<p>Hungary hosts a regional meeting to support the signing of the treaty.</p> <p>The first landmine monitor is released.</p>	<p>Finland's 1998 Policy on Relations with Developing Countries stressed promotion of global security as the first explicit objective. Enforcing the Mine Ban treaty, participating into EU-cooperation on mine issues and increasing support to the HMA were explicitly included under this umbrella.</p>	<p>A Finnish stand-by unit for Humanitarian demining is established.</p> <p>Finland deploys the Finn Flail mechanical mine clearing package, consisting of in-kind and personnel support, under the UN umbrella in Cambodia</p> <p>Finland provides in-kind support to the programme in Angola, and Mozambique, provides funding to the Afghan and Cambodian programmes and funds agencies working in Bosnia.</p>
1999	<p>The Mine Ban Treaty enters into force.</p> <p>The first state party meeting takes place in Mozambique.</p> <p>The first inter-sessional meetings are held in Geneva (thereafter all inter-sessional meetings are held in Geneva). These meetings take place twice per year.</p>	<p>Finland attended as an observer the state party meeting and voted for all UN resolutions in favour of an AP ban.</p> <p>Finland reiterates its commitment to sign the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006.</p>	<p>The Finn Flail package continues to be deployed in Cambodia and is expanded to Mozambique and Kosovo. Finland maintains the stand-by unit.</p> <p>Finland funds UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Afghanistan; ICRC in Angola; Finnish Red Cross in Bosnia; Cambodia; WEUDAM in Croatia; UNDP and NPA in Kosovo; UNDP in Mozambique and UNMAS.</p>

Year	Major international policy developments (conventions, events)	Finnish policy developments (published policies, responses to conventions)	Main Finnish activities (countries, agencies, sectors covered)
2000	The second state party meeting is held in Geneva.	Finland reiterates its commitment to sign the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006.	<p>The Finn Flail package continues to be deployed in Cambodia, Mozambique and Kosovo. Finland maintains the stand-by unit.</p> <p>Finland funds Afghanistan-UNOCHA for mine clearance; Cambodia to HALO, the Lutheran World Federation and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) for mine clearance; Handicap International (HI) CMVIS; the Finnish Red Cross and International Committee of the Red Cross for mine awareness; Mozambique; Croatia; UNMAS</p>
2001	<p>The third state party meeting is held in Nicaragua.</p> <p>The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) concept is negotiated and agreed upon at the meeting.</p>	<p>Finland attends the Managua meeting with observer status.</p> <p>Finland commitment to sign the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006 is confirmed in a government report and approved by Parliament.</p>	<p>The Finn Flail package continues to be deployed in Cambodia, Mozambique and Kosovo. Finland maintains the stand-by unit.</p> <p>Finland's funding to mine action includes: Afghanistan (UNOCHA); Angola: FRC/ICRC for victim assistance and mine risk education (MRE); Bosnia-Herzegovina-FRC/ICRC for MRE and other mine action, and NPA for manual mine clearance and flails; Cambodia-Mine Action Centre, HALO Trust for mine clearance, FCA for mine clearance, CMVIS, and FRC/ICRC for MRE; Croatia- Western European Demining Assistance Mission; Mozambique-the Accelerated Demining Program; Northern Caucasus- FRC/ ICRC; UNMAS; UNICEF- Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Guinea-Bissau.</p>

Year	Major international policy developments (conventions, events)	Finnish policy developments (published policies, responses to conventions)	Main Finnish activities (countries, agencies, sectors covered)
2002	<p>The fourth state party meeting is held in Geneva.</p> <p>Afghanistan accedes to the Mine Ban Treaty and Angola completes the ratification process.</p>	<p>Finnish policy is described as: "based on humanitarian aspects. We give support to the countries which have most mines. These countries are at the moment Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia. There are security problems in Angola so we give the support through the Finnish Red Cross. In Bosnia we support prosthesis production. If there is a country where there are not many mine victims, we will not give a lot of support." (2002 Landmine Monitor)</p>	<p>The Finn Flail package continues to be deployed in Cambodia and Mozambique.</p> <p>Funding to mine action includes:</p> <p>Afghanistan to UNOCHA and UNMAS.</p> <p>Angola FCA and the MAG for mine action and MRE; FRC and the ICRC for victim assistance; and to MAG for mine clearance.</p> <p>Bosnia and Herzegovina - to Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) for mine clearance and support to the mine action centre and entity Army demining efforts; and to FCA and ICRC for MRE and victim assistance; Cambodia - to HALO Trust for mine clearance; FCA and MAG for mine clearance; to HI for mine/UXO casualty information; FCA and ICRC for MRE.</p> <p>Laos - to the UN Development Program (UNDP) and UXO Lao for UXO clearance.</p> <p>Mozambique - to UNDP and the Accelerated Demining Program for mine clearance.</p> <p>General assistance - to UNMAS.</p>



Year	Major international policy developments (conventions, events)	Finnish policy developments (published policies, responses to conventions)	Main Finnish activities (countries, agencies, sectors covered)
2003	The fifth state party meeting is held in Thailand.	Finland backs away from its commitment to sign the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006.	<p>The following countries received Finnish funding: Afghanistan-to the mine action programme by UNMAS and UNOCHA</p> <p>Angola-to FCA for mine clearance in Luena; FRC/ICRC for MRE and mine clearance; HALO Trust for mine clearance in Maninga, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Cambodia-HALO for mine clearance, FCA for mine clearance, and CMVIS; FRC/ICRC for MRE; Ethiopia-UNDP for mechanical mine clearance; NPA and UNDP for mine/UXO clearance in Laos; Northern Caucasus-to FRC/ICRC for MRE and victim assistance; Somalia-HALO for mine clearance in Somaliland and Puntland;</p> <p>Sri Lanka-HALO and MAG for mine clearance.</p> <p>In addition the following organizations also receive funding: GICHD to support studies of manual demining and mine detection dogs; UNICEF for MRE in Africa; UNMAS for national mine action reports; Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) to conduct mine action training.</p>

Year	Major international policy developments (conventions, events)	Finnish policy developments (published policies, responses to conventions)	Main Finnish activities (countries, agencies, sectors covered)
2004	Kenya hosts the first treaty review conference.	<p>Finland again backed away from its commitment to sign the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006 and stated its commitment to do so by 2012 instead.</p> <p>Parliament approved a Security and Defence Policy review that would enable Finland to make adequate changes to its defence system to enable the signing of the Mine Ban treaty.</p> <p>Finland Development Policy 2004 mentions HMA only once, without detail over approaches.</p>	<p>Finland funded the following countries: Afghanistan-UNMAS for mine clearance;</p> <p>Angola-HALO Trust for mine clearance, FCA for demining and MRE, and FRC/ICRC for MRE and victim assistance;</p> <p>Bosnia and Herzegovina-FRC/ICRC for MRE; Cambodia-HALO for mine clearance, CMVIS, and FCA for mine clearance; Laos-UNDP for demining; Russia-FRC/ICRC for MRE and victim assistance in north Caucasus;</p> <p>Somalia- HALO for mine clearance;</p> <p>Sri Lanka-MAG for post-conflict rehabilitation in Vanni region.</p> <p>In addition Finland also funded GICHD; UNICEF for MRE in Sudan and Eritrea; and UNMAS for national level 1 survey.</p>
2005	<p>The sixth state party meeting is held in Croatia.</p> <p>The number of annual inter-sessional meetings is reduced to 1.</p>	<p>"Finland stated that ... Its commitment to mine action cooperation is not influenced by its status as a non-signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty" (Landmine Monitor. 2006)</p>	<p>Funding for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Laos and Mozambique.</p> <p>Funding continues as for 2004 (above)</p>

Year	Major international policy developments (conventions, events)	Finnish policy developments (published policies, responses to conventions)	Main Finnish activities (countries, agencies, sectors covered)
2006	The seventh state party meeting is held in Geneva.		<p>Finnish funding includes: Afghanistan-UNMAS for mine/UXO clearance;</p> <p>Angola-HALO Trust for mine clearance, FCA for mine clearance, and FRC/ICRC for victim assistance; Cambodia-HALO for mine clearance, CMVIS and FCA for mine clearance in Battambang;</p> <p>Democratic Republic of Congo to UNICEF for mine awareness; Eritrea-UNICEF for mine awareness; Ethiopia-NPA for mine detection dogs and technical survey; Jordan-NPA for mine clearance; Lebanon-UNMAS for ERW clearance; Somalia-HALO for mine clearance in Somaliland.</p> <p>Core funding for GICHD and UNMAS; HALO for evaluation.</p> <p>Countries that did not get funding in 2006, but had previously, included: The Russian federation, Sri Lanka, and Sudan</p>
2007	<p>The UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities is opened for signature.</p> <p>The eighth state party meeting is held in Jordan.</p>	Finland Development Policy 2007 introduces HMA in terms of the LRRD.	As with 2006
2008	<p>The ninth state party meeting is held in Geneva.</p> <p>Victim assistance becomes a key element in the ICBL agenda and gains more attention (Victim Assistance focal point position is filled).</p> <p>The Convention on Cluster Munitions is signed on December 3-4.</p>	Finland attends the state party meeting as an observer.	Finland provided support for clearance and victim assistance with limited amounts for non-specified activities. Their support was destined to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Somaliland, Ethiopia and Iraq. In addition they provided funding to UNMAS and the GICHD.
2009	Colombia hosts the second review conference.		Finland provided support for clearance and victim assistance with limited amounts for non-specified activities in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Somaliland, Chad, Ethiopia and Iraq. In addition they provided funding to UNMAS and the GICHD.

Year	Major international policy developments (conventions, events)	Finnish policy developments (published policies, responses to conventions)	Main Finnish activities (countries, agencies, sectors covered)
2010	The tenth state party meeting is held in Geneva.  The Convention on Cluster Munitions enters into force on August 1st.		FRC Framework Agreement (2 years): Chad, Iraq.  Support continued to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Somaliland, Chad, Ethiopia and Iraq. In addition they provided funding to UNMAS and the GICHD. Support to UNMAS was through the VTF.
2011	The 11th state party meeting is held in Cambodia.  The ICBL merges with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).	Finland participates in the Ministerial level meeting and announces the accession.	Finland provided support for clearance and victim assistance with limited amounts for non-specified activities to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Somaliland, Chad, and Iraq. In addition they provided funding to UNMAS and the GICHD. Notably the support to UNMAS is not listed in the landmine monitor, but was confirmed by UNMAS.
2012	The 12th state party meeting is held in Geneva	Finland accedes to the Mine Ban Treaty and commits to destroying its entire stockpile by 2016. Finland becomes the 156 <sup>th</sup> country to join the treaty.  Finland Development Policy 2012 reiterates the LRRD concept in respect of HMA, and introduces the human rights-based approach as well as the cross-cutting objectives of gender, reduction of inequality and climate sustainability.	4-year MFA Framework Agreements (2012-15):  HALO: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Somalia  FCA: Angola, Cambodia  FRC (for ICRC): Chad (completed 2013), South Sudan, Cambodia/Laos regional.  GICHD: global  UNMAS: Global and earmarked (800 000 EUR) Afghanistan 2012-13.
2013	The 13th state party meeting is held in Geneva	August: issuance of MFA (Unit of Humanitarian Assistance) Guidelines Concerning Humanitarian Assistance and the use of Funding Granted by the MFA.	
2014	The third review conference was held in Maputo, Mozambique on 23-27 of June	Finland participates in a Review Conference for the first time as a State Party and announces that it will comply fully with the commitments of the Treaty.	One year UNMAS agreement
2015	The 14th state party meeting is scheduled to be held in Geneva in late November.		One year UNMAS agreement

## 3.2 The funding and role of the donor community

The majority of mine affected countries are developing countries that suffer from a plethora of ills, landmines among them. The high costs of mine action, demining and victim assistance limits the ability of affected countries to respond to the landmine threat and the impact of landmines without foreign assistance. Coordination, however, has been challenging. A Mine Action Support Group (MASG) was founded in 1998 with the aim of coordinating programming, financing and information between donors but in reality the forum has served as an information exchange mechanism rather than an active platform for joint engagement. Finland is a member of the MASG, as are most other western donors, with observer status given to the GICHD and the UN Mine Action Team (representatives from the different UN Agencies which are involved in mine action). Donor countries such as Finland are able to Chair (rotated every year) and vote within the group. The UN agencies and GICHD have observer status only. Mine action has benefited substantially from the political pressure felt by governments to fund HMA, but this pressure has limited collaboration between donors and enabled a more relaxed approach to reporting requirements, baseline assessments, inclusion of cross-cutting issues, ensuring coordination with other humanitarian and development actors, etc.

The United States has been consistently the largest financial contributor. Table 2 shows levels of financial commitment over a five year period. Japan and Norway have been major donors; with Canada also being a key player. Compared to other donors, Finland has not been a major financial contributor to mine action, but has been a clear player in contributing to collective financial efforts. Although not a state party to the Ottawa Convention until 2012, Finland did support the humanitarian elements of the Convention and funded mine action intervention for years preceding its signature to it.

**Table 2.** Funding by donor and year 2009-2013

Donor	Contribution in USD Million				
	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009
USA	113.9	134.4	131.4	129.6	118.7
Japan	64	57.6	43	46.8	48
Norway	49.6	48.4	53.4	50.3	35.7
EU	39.6	60.7	19.3	49.8	48.1
Netherlands	23.4	24.1	21.3	228	18.4
UK	22.8	22	18	16.3	17.9
Germany	22.1	23.8	23.6	23.4	23.7
Switzerland	20.8	18.4	17.5	15.7	15
Australia	14.5	24	45.7	24.4	19.4
Sweden	12.9	14.1	12.2	13	14.9
Denmark	9.3	8.7	9.3	10.2	11.2
United Arab Emirates	9.3	13.4	2.0	0.0	0.0
Belgium	8.0	7.2	8.1	11.9	10.4

**A Mine Action Support Group (MASG) was founded in 1998 with the aim of coordinating programming, financing and information between donors but in reality the forum has served as an information exchange mechanism rather than an active platform for joint engagement.**

**The main funding recipients for Finland have been: HALO Trust; UNMAS; Finn Church Aid, which channels its funds to Dan Church Aid in Angola; MAG and LWD in Cambodia; the ICRC through the Finnish Red Cross; and the GICHD.**

Donor	Contribution in USD Million				
Canada	7.9	6.8	17.0	30.1	18.1
Finland	7.7	7.2	7.4	6.7	7.0
New Zealand	6.7	5.4	4.3	3.3	2.2
France	2.1	2.0	1.3	3.6	4.5
Ireland	4.1	3.6	4.0	4.5	5.2
Luxembourg	1.9	1.2	1.2	.9	1.0
Spain	1.6	1.9	5.3	5.4	14.8
Italy	1.5	2.8	3.4	4.0	3.9
Austria	1.2	0.9	2.8	1.9	2.1

Source: International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munition Coalition. 2014. Landmine monitor 2014. ICBL-CMC. p 46

Finnish funding has primarily focused on mine clearance, and to a lesser extent on victim assistance. Finland has also provided un-earmarked funding to institutions such as UNMAS and GICHD and in this way contributed to the overall achievements made by these multilateral funded institutions. This type of funding, though compliant with good humanitarian donor principles, makes attribution - knowing exactly what was achieved specifically by Finnish funding - difficult to determine because multiple donors funded a single set of activities. However, the funding by Finland does demonstrate a commitment to global as well as country-specific concerns.

The main funding recipients for Finland have been: HALO Trust; UNMAS; Finn Church Aid, which channels its funds to Dan Church Aid in Angola; MAG and LWD in Cambodia; the ICRC through the Finnish Red Cross; and the GICHD. Other organizations that have received funding from Finland, but not in recent years, include HI and the Cambodia Mine/ Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Victim Information System (CIMVIS). In addition to un-earmarked funds for UNMAS and the GICHD, UNMAS received additional earmarked funds for Afghanistan.

## 4 COMPONENT 1: REVIEW OF FINNISH SUPPORT TO HMA DURING 1991–2009

Component 1 (1991–2009) of the evaluation is essentially a desk review of Finnish approaches towards, and learning derived from a nearly 15-year involvement in HMA prior to the main period of assessment (2010–2014). Here we have relied on two sources: MFA and NGO personnel with institutional memory and experience of working in the sector prior to 2009; and existing documentation, both from MFA and from other agencies working in the sector.

Component 1 is divided into two sections: (1) Finnish activities 1991–2002, a period that covers the early MFA activities, including the higher profile and distinctive phase of ‘mechanised’ demining activities; and (2) a new phase of Finnish involvement from 2003–2009 that includes a ‘projectised’ approach in which some new partners were identified and in which the international priorities established under the Ottawa Convention (albeit without Finnish signatory to the Convention) became more pronounced. There is, of course, continuity between these two phases, but the story-line is easier to follow when distinguished from that of the third phase – the rationalisation and consolidation of MFA’s approach to HMA that saw the establishment of Framework Agreements in 2010 and Finland acceding to the Ottawa Convention in 2012.

### 4.1 Finnish support to HMA during 1991–2002

#### 4.1.1 Finnish development policy framework in the 1990s

Finland formed a comprehensive strategy for its development co-operation in 1993, prior to which the co-operation was guided by various position papers and statements. The need for a more strategic approach was driven by the changing global context, the increased amount of Finnish aid and the recession in Finland. After the end of the Cold War, development co-operation could no longer be justified by security policy rationale in an increasingly interdependent world. While Finland had been active in development co-operation since the 1960s, the significant increases in overall amount of funding during the 1980s called for a more strategic guidance. At the same time, the severe recession in Finland in the early 1990s put pressure on the public administration – including development co-operation – to operate more efficiently (MFA, 1993; MFA, 1996b).

Since the early 1990s, development co-operation and humanitarian assistance have been seen as integral parts of the Finnish foreign policy, also serving wider international dialogue and mitigation of global challenges. Global interdependence put increasing emphasis on the need for policy coherence, sustainability, capacity building and humanitarian assistance, rather than development co-

**Most of the Finnish HMA support in the 1990s was targeted towards demining in a few countries with funding channelled especially through the multilateral UN framework.**

operation pertaining purely to global social policy. In its 1993 strategy, the purpose of Finnish development co-operation was to transfer material and tangible resources to developing countries – with the overall objectives of reducing poverty and enhancing wellbeing, sustainable development, peace, equality, democracy, human rights as well as interactions between Finland and developing countries. The subsequent development co-operation strategy in 1996 and development policy in 1998 confirmed these broad objectives, with development policy and co-operation now as an integral part of a coherent Finnish foreign policy. While already the 1993 strategy acknowledged development co-operation as a means to reduce the need for humanitarian assistance, this link was further stressed since 1996. Overall, the second half of the 1990s saw an increasing emphasis on coherence and coordination within the EU on development, foreign and security policy. While the 1996 strategy acknowledged the importance of good governance, the 1998 development policy stressed the connection between development and global security (MFA, 1993; MFA, 1996a; MFA, 1998).

With regard to co-operation principles and modalities, Finnish development policy and co-operation in the 1990s combined developing country and Finnish interests. The 1993 strategy highlighted the principles of partner country driven development, a wide notion of sustainability and structural changes. The need to delegate operations to the recipient countries with the help of capacity building was stressed. The subsequent 1996 and 1998 strategies further emphasized developing country ownership, together with contextual analysis, relevance, quality and effectiveness in aid allocation. Since 1993, humanitarian assistance was to be allocated based on need and in line with general foreign policy – with the UN organs and NGOs working under the UN-umbrella as the main channels.

The 1993 strategy also pointed towards the principle of complementarity with other Finnish policies – such as trade or culture policy – and how to benefit from and build capacity within Finland. This meant taking advantage of the know-how within Finnish ministries and institutions, procuring from the private sector with increased co-operation in product and service development as well as developing relevant human resources within Finland. Regarding procurement, explicit priority was to be given to Finnish goods and services when deemed internationally competitive. The 1993 strategy pointed also towards the need for visibility in order to foster support for development co-operation by the Finnish public. Although the preference for Finnish know-how and procurement was no longer visible in the 1996 strategy, the 1998 strategy took a broad policy perspective in development co-operation and also highlighted the need for Finnish capacity building and supporting exports by Finnish companies (MFA, 1993; MFA, 1996a; MFA, 1998).

#### **4.1.2 The evolution of the Finnish support to HMA in the 1990s to early 2000s**

Most of the Finnish HMA support in the 1990s was targeted towards demining in a few countries with funding channelled especially through the multilateral UN framework, as shown in Table 3. Until 1995, Finnish HMA was directed to mine clearing in Afghanistan through cash contribution to UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA, which from 1997 became the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)). Most of the support being ear-



marked for mine clearance, though some was also for mine awareness raising and local capacity building. Later Finland supported demining in Angola, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cambodia, Laos and Mozambique. At this point several new partners (HALO Trust, Finnish Red Cross) became implementers. During the 1990s, especially Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique emerged as consistent recipient countries for Finnish HMA support. The mix of support to HMA increased towards the end of the decade (MFA Archives).

**Table 3.** Indicative table on the Finnish HMA support in 1991-1999

Year	Country	Organization	FIM	HMA area
1991	Afghanistan	DHA/MAPA	1 000 000	Demining
1992	Afghanistan	DHA/MAPA	1 000 000	Demining
1993	Afghanistan	DHA/MAPA	3 000 000	Demining, MRE, capacity building
1994	Afghanistan	DHA/MAPA	3 000 000	Demining, MRE, capacity building
1995	Afghanistan	DHA/MAPA	1 050 000	Demining, MRE, capacity building
	Angola	DHA	1 000 000	Demining
	Cambodia	HALO Trust	500 000	Demining
	Mozambique	UNHCR	500 000	MRE
	Angola, Mozambique	Finland	90 000	Fact-finding
1996	Afghanistan	DHA/MAPA	2 000 000	Demining
	Angola	DHA	450 000	Demining
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	FRC, WHO	2 000 000	Victim assistance
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Save the Children	100 000	Victim assistance
	Cambodia	HALO Trust	1 000 000	Demining
	Mozambique	DHA	450 000	Demining
1997	Afghanistan	UNOCHA/MAPA	2 000 000	Demining, MRE
	Angola	UNDP	2 000 000	Demining, MRE
	Cambodia	HALO Trust	2 500 000	Demining
	Cambodia	UNDP/CMAC	9 200 000	Demining, capacity building
	Cambodia	FCA	800 000	Demining
	General	Finland	850 000	Demining
	Laos	UNDP	1 500 000	Demining
	Mozambique	UNDP/ADP	5 200 000	Demining, capacity building
1998	Afghanistan	UNOCHA/MAPA	2 500 000	Demining
	Angola	UNICEF	2 500 000	MRE
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	FRC	1 000 000	Victim assistance
	Cambodia	HALO Trust	3 000 000	Demining, capacity building
	Cambodia	FCA	800 000	Demining
	General	Finland	8 100 000	Demining

**From 1991 to 1998, Finnish support to HMA fell under the umbrella of humanitarian assistance allocated to partner countries on a needs basis, with preference given to operations within the UN framework.**

Year	Country	Organization	FIM	HMA area
1998	Mozambique	UNDP	9 460 000	Demining, capacity building
	Mozambique	UNDP	3 120 000	Demining
	Mozambique	HI	3 000 000	MRE
1999	Afghanistan	UNOCHA/MAPA	3 000 000	Demining
	Angola	ICRC	3 000 000	Victim assistance, MRE
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	FRC	3 000 000	Victim assistance
	Cambodia	UNDP/CMAC	3 570 000	Demining
	Cambodia	HI	590 000	Capacity building
	Croatia	WEUDAM	360 000	Capacity building
	General	UNMAS	540 000	General
	Kosovo	UNDP/NPA	9 850 000	Demining, capacity building
	Mozambique	UNDP/ADP	7 700 000	Demining, capacity building

Note: Most of the data is based on an informal list of Finnish assistance to mine action in 1991-1999 by the MFA Unit of Humanitarian Assistance prepared in April 2000. Some of the data has been completed based on the sporadic information retrieved from the MFA Archives.

From 1991 to 1998, Finnish support to HMA fell under the umbrella of humanitarian assistance allocated to partner countries on a needs basis, with preference given to operations within the UN framework. The applications for humanitarian assistance were considered, proposed and decided by the Humanitarian Unit in the MFA Department for International Development Cooperation, the Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and the Minister for Development Cooperation (MFA, 1996b).

Finland began to allocate increasing importance to the HMA in the mid-1990s – responding both to a political need and a need to develop Finnish humanitarian assistance readiness. There was increased international attention given to HMA during the 1990s, in part spurred by the preparations for the International Mine Ban Treaty negotiations in the mid-1990s; Finland saw the need to simultaneously increase its profile as an active HMA actor in the international sphere. This was coupled with a more general aim to increase Finnish humanitarian assistance readiness with comprehensive and diversified aid packages – as opposed to cash contributions only. Mine clearance was an area where Finnish companies – such as Patria – were seen to possess know-how; Finland’s historical experience in the aftermath of the Second World War was also of value (MFA Archives). Indeed, although the 1996 Evaluation on Humanitarian Assistance had complemented Finland for efficiently allocating resources to those in need, it also pointed towards the need to have a more proactive attitude towards new humanitarian challenges and mobilizing broader Finnish capacities towards that end. According to Finnish priorities, the policy had “been to support ongoing relief and multilateral efforts” favoring “continuity in the humanitarian system” with “limited pressure for change in standards of work of implementing agencies”. The Finnish responses were seen “reactive”

more than active - “based on [resource] requests presented by agencies, rather than a careful analysis of situation”. There was “little evidence that humanitarian assistance [had] been used particularly with a mind to support sustainable development, or that it [had] favored peace processes during crisis” (MFA, 1996b).

Towards this end, the development of a Finnish in-kind and personnel HMA assistance started in the context of the broader UN framework. In 1995, the UN called for the creation of a stand-by HMA capacity and Finnish experts participated in UN/Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)-led fact-finding missions to Angola and Mozambique to assess the possibilities for using in-kind and personnel assistance. The Finnish service package was developed jointly by the MFA, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) over the following years - also with the involvement of Finnish military companies. The process resulted in the creation of a Finnish mechanical mine clearance service package - the Finn Flail - essentially consisting of two Finnish mine clearance vehicles (Raisu), one Finnish armoured vehicle (Pasi) and 4-6 technical staff. At the same time, Finland was building stand-by HMA capacity within Finland to be used within the UN framework in the case of need. Finally, to enable MOD and FDF participation in the actual implementation of HMA, Finnish legislation was altered in 1997 to allow agencies other than the MFA to be involved in development co-operation as implementers (MFA Archives).

In 1998, although Finland was a non-signatory country of the Ottawa Treaty, HMA became an explicit objective of Finnish development policy and co-operation with a major increase in resource allocation. Taking an increasingly comprehensive view, the 1998 development policy strategy stressed the connection between development and security with promotion of global security as the first explicit objective. Enforcing the International Mine Ban Treaty, participating in EU-co-operation on mine issues and increasing support to the HMA - mine clearing, mine awareness and mine victim assistance - were highlighted as explicit development policy aims for Finland (MFA, 1998). Accordingly, the work of a specific Anti-Personnel Mine Working Group appointed by Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time - Tarja Halonen - led to a 1998 decision to support HMA with the total allocation of 120 million FIM during 1998-2001 from development co-operation funds. This represented a significant increase compared to HMA support between 1995 and 1997 that had totalled 36 million FIM. The 1998-2001 support was planned to be provided mainly under the UN, in part partly due to the lack of resources for project management within the MFA (MFA Archives). Within the MFA, HMA was administered by the Department of Development Co-operation (unit KYO-23).

By 1998, the focus of the Finnish HMA had moved from humanitarian assistance cash contributions to in-kind and personnel assistance in the form of mechanical mine clearance. Mechanical mine clearance under the Finn Flail concept were planned to take about 75% of the total 120 million FIM allocation for the 1998-2001 period. The Finnish Stand-by Unit consisting of four Raisus, two Pasis and 20 reserve staff was established in 1998 to be deployed within 30 days upon a request by the UN demining programme. In 1998, The Finn Flail concept was first piloted in Cambodia which had received Finnish humanitarian assistance for HMA since 1995. With the total initial allocation

**In 1998, although Finland was a non-signatory country of the Ottawa Treaty, HMA became an explicit objective of Finnish development policy and co-operation with a major increase in resource allocation.**

amounting to 9.2 million FIM for 1998-1999, it was placed under the umbrella of Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) - a national mine action coordination body support by the UNDP and mainly funded through a UNDP Trust Fund. The second phase received an allocation of 13.2 million FIM in 2000. The Cambodian pilot scheme was followed by the deployment of the Finn Flail concept in Mozambique - also a recipient of the Finnish HMA support since 1995 - and Kosovo in 1999. With the total allocation of 17.2m FIM (2.89 million EUR) for 1999-2000, the Finn Flail in Mozambique was placed under the Accelerated Demining Program (ADP) by UNDP. In Kosovo, NPA under the UNDP umbrella provided the framework for the Finn Flail worth 9.8m FIM (1.65 million EUR) in 2000. Although mechanical mine clearance was funded through MFA development co-operation funds, the MOD was delegated the responsibility for its implementation due to the technical expertise required. This included training of the personnel, testing and assessing the need for and suitability of the mine clearance equipment as well as procuring, transporting and ensuring maintenance of the equipment.

However, in 2001 technical problems partly led the MFA eventually to shift its HMA support away from mechanical mine clearing. Although the Finn Flail concept was planned to be adapted for Bosnia and Herzegovina directly after the Kosovo experience and the ending of the Kosovo contract, this did not materialize. Instead, MFA provided a cash contribution towards the other, mainly manual, mine clearing activities by NPA - an organization initially planned to host the Finn Flail based on the recommendation of the UN that was not active in the field itself. By contrast, in Mozambique the use of Finn Flail was no longer seen as necessary, and in 2002 after a one year extension of the initial contract period the contract was halted. The first Finn Flail deployment in Cambodia also ended in 2002.

#### **4.1.3 Relevance of the Finnish HMA support in the 1990s and early 2000s**

Support to HMA can be seen as compliant with Finnish development policy and co-operation objectives of the 1990s. Since 1998, mechanical mine clearing support was aligned with Finnish development policy objective targeted towards global security, including HMA. Already, Finnish development co-operation had emphasized the overall objective of poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance; both of these aims were supported by HMA.

Overall, Finnish efforts towards developing a functional mechanical mine clearance approach can be considered as relevant and complementary to the prevailing international HMA context of the mid-1990s. At the time, nearly all demining in heavily affected developing countries such as Cambodia was done manually, resulting in 100% accurate but very slow clearing process. Even though technology was expected to help speed up the process, little equipment suitable for the specific climate and terrain conditions were available or in use. Mechanical mine clearance, though not as accurate, was expected to be a complementary measure enabling significant speeding up the overall clearing process. The demining vehicles would do the first detection that would then be quality assurance by the manual de-miners. By investing in the development of the Finn Flail concept, Finland took a pro-active and innovative approach -

with a risk inherent to innovation – to speed up the demining process – and, for example, the Mid-Term Evaluation (Anteroinen, 2000) recommended that the first Cambodian initiative should continue. Germany had also provided some mine clearing equipment to Cambodia and Mozambique prior to Finland, while Cambodia benefited also from Swedish mine clearing dogs. In Kosovo, in kind support was already provided by several donors (MFA Archives).

The focus on mechanical mine clearance also served broader Finnish interest and aims indicated in the development policy and co-operation strategies of the 1990s. The establishment of the Finnish Stand-by Unit and the development of the Finn Flail helped build capacity for international operations within Finland and in spreading Finnish know-how. At the same time, they allowed marketing of Finnish military equipment abroad and were thus coherent with the aim of supporting exports by Finnish companies. The mechanical mine clearance efforts enjoyed high visibility within Finland as well as internationally – for example, through several press articles (MFA Archives).

As to beneficiary countries, the relevance of the Finnish mechanical mine clearing support appears to be little less clear. On the one hand, the use of Raisu and Pasi was limited by the local conditions, although the initial design took into account their eventual use in the hot climate. In particular, the use of mechanical mine clearance was very difficult during the rainy season in Cambodia and Mozambique. The roads could not hold their weight during that time, and bush clearance was limited. In Kosovo, the use was also limited in the winter months. Also the amount of mine fields actually suitable for mechanical mine clearing was limited due to the landscape conditions (MFA Archives). On the other hand, national authorities appreciated the Finn Flail concept not least because it fared well against some of the other attempts to speed up the mine clearing process. For example, having passed the UN testing at the time, Finnish equipment was internally reported to be lighter and thus more suitable for its task than some other, alternative vehicles.

The relevance and allocation of the rather *ad hoc* Finnish in cash contributions in 1990s were internally justified on the needs of the beneficiary countries. This meant citing the estimated numbers of mines and mine victims as well as estimated reductions in economic productivity caused by the presence of mines in areas rich in natural resources. Preference was also given to the UN framework, important for the Finnish policy (MFA Archives).


#### **4.1.4 Effectiveness of the Finnish HMA support in the 1990s and early 2000s**

Overall, little can be said about the results of Finnish HMA support during the 1990s, due to the scarcity or inadequacy of the available documentation for the period. The sporadically cited and available HMA result indicators for the period consist only of the amount – and sometimes the type – of land cleared, the numbers of mines and UXOs destroyed as well as of the reductions in mine-related accidents. On mechanical demining, the results were reported in internal MFA documents. The Finn Flail mechanical mine clearance teams were reported to have cleared about 18 hectares and 30 mines in Cambodia in 1998–2000, about 25 hectares and 30 mines in Mozambique in 1999–2000 and

about 25 hectares and 30 mines in Kosovo in 2000. By the end of 2001, the Finn Flail in Kosovo was estimated to have cleared in total 44 hectares and all major mine field suitable for mechanical mine clearing. Between 1999 and 2002, the cleared area for Mozambique reached about 68 hectares (MFA Archives).

The Finnish use of fact-findings, regular monitoring and an approach focused on learning in the 1990s supported improved effectiveness of the HMA support in a longer term. Already during the early 1990s, the responsible Finnish embassy staff conducted monitoring missions in Afghanistan, meeting partners and visiting operation sites. The launch of the mechanical mine clearance efforts - including the selection of suitable partners and recipient countries - were preceded by several fact-finding missions by MOD and MFA technical experts since 1995. In addition to technical aspects, the fact-finding teams assessed the political context and operational framework for possible mine clearance; this contextual analysis was complemented by consulting some external experts. For example, although Angola was considered as a possible beneficiary of the Finn Flail package, it was concluded that the situation in the country was not stabilized and the organizational framework not developed sufficiently for mechanical mine clearance in 1998 (MFA Archives). The whole approach of piloting the innovative Finn Flail concept first in Cambodia and only then taking the further developed and improved concept - including selecting the suitable organizational framework - elsewhere can be seen as sensible from the effectiveness standpoint. In Cambodia, after addressing the early difficulties, the initiative was producing results that were expected from it towards the end - as illustrated in the following Figure 2. Although the initiatives did not have specific Project Documents from the start, this was later changed as a result of mid-term evaluations.

**Figure 2. Finn Flail Team in Cambodia 1998-2002**



Note: Q = Quarter

Source: Personal Archives of Finn Flail team in Cambodia.



#### 4.1.5 Efficiency of the Finnish HMA support in the 1990s and early 2000s

The efficiency of the Finnish cash contributions to various organizations in the 1990s cannot be assessed due to the lack of relevant documentation, although there does seem to have been some account taken of lessons from past evaluations. Finland started to diversify the channelling of its cash contributions towards NGOs since the mid-1990s. The 1996 Evaluation on Humanitarian Assistance pointed out the small proportion of Finnish funds channelled through NGOs compared to the other Nordic countries (MFA, 1996b).

The efficiency of Finnish mechanical mine clearance in the end of the 1990s was hindered by frequent problems. The expensive, automated gearboxes of the Raisus broke frequently and despite the efforts to improve their resistance the issue could not be satisfactorily solved. While technical issues could be expected in the use of mechanical mine clearance in a new context, one of the main efficiency issues appeared to be also the repair and maintenance. The spare parts for the Finnish vehicles had to be transported all the way from Finland and slow custom formalities further delayed the repair of the equipment. Although a spare part kit was added to the Finn Flail mechanism based on the lessons learned from the Cambodian pilot, this was not sufficient to allow a smooth functioning of the vehicles later on in Mozambique and Kosovo (MFA Archives).

The division responsibilities between the MFA, the MOD, the international/local partner organization and the manufacturer also delayed the procurement of spare parts and thus the repairs. Moreover, in addition to the delay in operations, the technical problems with the vehicles tended to increase the overall cost of the Finnish support to mechanical mine clearance. Eventually these accumulative factors - and in particular the fact that the Raisus had broken down in Kosovo - contributed to a change of approach by the MFA in Bosnia and Herzegovina from mechanical mine clearing towards cash contributions (MFA Archives).

The initial placing of most of Finnish in-kind and personnel assistance under the UN umbrella meant that it was affected by some of the inefficiencies of the UN system in the 1990s. For example, the start of the Finn Flail operations in Cambodia was delayed for several months by what appears to be a too bureaucratic and unnecessary testing by the CMAC hierarchy. The place of the Finn Flail within the CMAC hierarchy was also an issue, as was the selection of the demining sites by the organization - whether those were high or low priority. Although the Finnish contribution was not directly implicated by the financial and other irregularities found in CMAC at the end of the 1990s, this was to negatively affect the subsequent use of the Finn Flail. UN regulations required Finland to support the core Finn Flail teams with support staff, and the salary costs were fairly high. Overall, the Finnish staff under the UN framework in several countries seemed to be faced with delays in receiving contracts, visas or salary payments. Issues regarding the unclear organizational setting and contractual arrangements continued to hamper the efficiency of the mechanical mine clearance in Kosovo (MFA Archives).

**There is no information on the impact of the Finnish HMA support in the 1990s, and very little on sustainability.**

#### **4.1.6 Sustainability of the Finnish HMA support in the 1990s and early 2000s**

The sustainability of Finnish HMA support seems to have improved in the course of the 1990s in line with the increased emphasis on the link between development and humanitarian assistance. Support in the early 1990s was allocated on a needs basis with little long - or even medium - term financial foresight for the beneficiaries.

However, the sustainability of the Finn Flail mechanical mine clearing is less clear. Although the training of locals in mechanical mine clearance and mine detection, together with mine awareness activities, was integrated in the Finn Flail concept, most training was purely for the use of machinery that was never planned to be left behind.

#### **4.1.7 Gaps in information in the 1990s and early 2000s**

There is no information on the impact of the Finnish HMA support in the 1990s, and very little on sustainability. As far as we are able to tell, there were no indicators against which to measure results. This lack of good quality overview reporting and insufficient knowledge management has hindered the formation of a good overall picture of Finnish HMA support in the 1990s. When sporadic reports are available, the information is provided on monthly, quarterly and biannual basis; little summary information is available on an annual basis. In the case of cash contributions, the reports that are available focus on the use of and further need for funds - hampering the forming of the overall picture on those activities. Many of the major Finn Flail activities carried out in the end of the 1990s seemed to be missing overall project documents. The information on the initial goals of Finnish support against which to measure results is rarely available. Furthermore, while MFA commissioned mid-term evaluations were carried out on at least some of the major Finn Flail activities, all of those evaluation reports can no longer be found, even though they were referred to in other documentation. Even a reliable account of funding is almost impossible since the documentation is not harmonized (either something could be missing or counted twice).

### **4.2 Finnish support to HMA from 2002-2009**

#### **4.2.1 Finnish development policy framework during 2002-2009**

During the 2002-2010 funding period, Finnish support for mine action was governed by two Development policies: Government Resolution 5.2.2004 and Development Policy Programme 2007. These policies delineated both the Finnish approach to development aid as well as their objectives. The 2004 policy stresses the importance of supporting efforts that lead to a more equitable world, and further noted the responsibility of developing countries in securing their own progress. This sentiment is firmly aligned to the Ottawa Convention, which urges donor countries to support those who are mine affected, but notes that the ultimate responsibility of responding to the mine action threat lies with the affected state.



The concepts of rights and sustainable development underscore both policies and Finnish support to mine action is rooted in the promotion of development in affected countries. The 2004 policy centres specifically on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), while the 2007 policy focuses on environmental issues and their implications for development and peace processes. The policy notes that development can be considered economically, ecologically and socially sustainable when 12 key principles are met by the developing country (MFA, 2007b, pp15). Among them protection for the environment, respect for human rights, and the systematic reduction of poverty have clear implications for HMA operations. While the 2004 policy focuses primarily on the MDGs, and none of these are specifically focused on HMA, mine action activities can serve to facilitate or enable the attainment of individual MDGs, particularly goal 1. Landmines threaten people's livelihood (increase poverty) and threaten the environment. Studies on the impact of landmines have showed that landmines have, in some cases forced populations to overuse certain natural resources leading to numerous environmental challenges such as erosion, land subsidence, etc. (see Harpviken and Millard, 2000 and 2001); similarly the inability to access transport routes, or use energy sources (electricity lines) may also have implications on local poverty levels.

The 2004 Finnish policy does not mention HMA specifically, but post conflict recovery is noted as an issue of importance. Another is agriculture and forestry and therein the "importance of promoting development and increasing the productivity or rural livelihood" (MFA, 2004, p. 20). In most of the countries covered by HMA there is a solid reliance on subsistence agriculture-based livelihoods. By 2007 HMA was mentioned specifically, with the policy stressing the need to improve the link between humanitarian assistance, broader security concerns and development more generally. The policy makes special mention of HMA by proposing that it "creates the preconditions for development and supports the notion of linking relief, rehabilitation and development." (MFA, 2007b, pp.34). It further highlights a number of avenues of funding, including multilateral and bilateral cooperation and the need to focus support on target populations (i.e. directly to beneficiaries) and on the support for mechanism and standards that may support humanitarian interventions. The latter is in line with the support that has been given to the GICHD, and particularly to IMAS and their national equivalent.

#### **4.2.2 Finnish Support to HMA from 2002-2009**

From 2002 to 2009 Finland supported six NGOs, the Red Cross, a number of UN agencies and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Specifically NGOs funded included: HALO Trust; MAG; NPA; HI; and FCA in collaboration with DCA. The Red Cross family received funding through the Finnish Red Cross, in collaboration with International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). UN Agencies funded included UNMAS, UNICEF, UNOCHA, and UNDP; as well as the Mine Action Programme Afghanistan (MAPA). This funding comprised support for activities both directly to implementing partners operating in specific countries as well as to core funding of UNMAS and GICHD. Individual countries that received funding included Afghanistan,

Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, the Caucasus, Cambodia, Chad, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kosovo, Laos, Sri Lanka, Somaliland and Sudan.

### **4.2.3 Relevance of Finnish HMA support from 2002-2009**

Support to HMA can be seen as fairly compliant with Finnish development policy and co-operation objectives of the 2000s. What remains consistently true of all funding provided throughout the decade is that the support for the removal of a landmine threat was very much community and people-oriented. However, the Finnish emphasis in both the 2004 and 2007 policies on development overall, and on environment specifically (2007), lead the evaluation to query partners as to how and to what degree these considerations have been taken into account in programming. Interestingly, none of the documentation reviewed made mention of these cross-cutting issues or of how interventions specifically targeted broader environment issues.

As far as the evaluation team can ascertain, from the documents reviewed and claims made during the interviews, all organizations funded, without exception, adhered to accepted standards of best practice including both IMAS and NMAS, where relevant. Moreover the Finnish government focused its attention, during this time period, on funding a combination of countries included some which were, or still are, amongst the most affected as well as countries that have had a less known mine problem, but where mines posed a threat to civilian populations. However from the material available it is not possible to know with certainty if each individual intervention has aimed, and or succeeded, in having development implications as the policy would require. As is elaborated upon below there is indication that for the most part the interventions were generally in line with the relevant policy.

HALO was one of the main NGOs recipients of funding during the time period and remains one of the largest demining implementing agencies worldwide. The agency has received funding from Finland for operations in Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, Somaliland and Sudan. It primarily relies on manual demining, but has also employed demining machines. In addition to demining and UXO disposal, HALO has undertaken MRE. HALO states that their principal objective was the physical removal of landmines in order to a) protect/prevent potential victims and b) restore safe access to land and infrastructure. HALO supported land release operations primarily in Cambodia – mainly the re-classification of lands which were presumed affected, but were in use (HALO, 2006a, 2006b, 2006f). This approach is one that clearly supported efficiency as it enabled the release of land in a much faster manner than would have otherwise been possible. Lastly it is important to highlight that during this period there was a discernible shift in HALO documentation moving towards the importance of understanding community-based needs. All of these elements indicate that HALO's goals were aligned with Finnish development strategy.

HI Belgium's (HIB) work funded by Finland mainly relates to work conducted with the Cambodian Red Cross in a joint programme entitled the Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System (CMVIS) (HI, 2004). The project was initiated in 1995 and had as a main objective, the identification of contaminated

areas through surveying of accidents and incidents. The approach was to collect data directly from the field through trained survey staff and volunteers and to analyse the plotted data. Work has since expanded to other important aspects of victim assistance including identifying mechanisms of support for mine affected individuals, supporting the priority setting process and providing targeted MRE. The work funded through HIB and CMVIS specifically is an approach that is well respected and has been lauded as one of the most efficient ways of determining most affected areas, particularly in the early years when further survey was not yet available. In addition HIB has done considerable dissemination work both on how they conduct surveying (capacity development) and on the findings themselves. CMVIS has also collaborated with the introduction of the IMSMA database system, which was recently introduced into Cambodia in 2007 (HI, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008). Here too the work can be seen as broadly falling within the general parameters delineated by the Finnish policy.

FCA has worked with DCA in Angola and individually in Cambodia. DCA is one of the major mine action implementing partners today, although they are far smaller than other agencies funded by the Finnish government, such as HALO, NPA and MAG. From 2002-2000 their efforts focused on demining and on MRE (DCA, 2007). DCA's focus, by contrast to HALO, was more on impact. Their reporting mentions, for example, the use of TIA (DCA, 2007; NPA 2005, 2007), an approach that examines a varied number of factors, including local ways of life, resource availability, institutional resources and capacities as a way to prioritize activities based on both the institutional capacities, but also the needs of communities. In Angola, DCA's focus has been Moxico Province, a heavily mined area where routes were severely affected by the conflict and which had a substantial Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) population. The activities conducted by FCA, independent of DCA, are less clear from the currently available documentation. However, the data for the 2006-2007 implementation periods suggests that FCA was involved in activities that focused on resettlement of IDPs in Bavel, Kam Riegg and Phnom Preuk Districts and Battambang province (DCA, 2007). Moreover DCA utilized the TIA tool as an aid to its operations. Theoretically this tool has the ability to improve efficiency of the work conducted; however, the degree to which it did so is unclear from the data gathered. All we know is that the tools to support the efficient attainment of Finnish strategic goals were available and in use by the implementer. Overall, the specific focus and attention paid to both the efficiency of work and the impact on communities suggests that DCA was even more strongly aligned with the Finnish policy than other partners, such as HALO which started focusing on the development implications more recently. However, as noted below the effective use of the tools is less clear.

NPA is one of the main demining agencies worldwide. Finnish support to NPA focused on the establishment of a base in Ethiopia and initial surveying of the impacted areas (2005). The need to conduct a survey is an essential element to mine action activities. The establishment of a Dog Demining Capacity (2006) was also an effective way to support demining (NPA 2005, 2007). From the material available it is not possible to know with certainty what, if any, developmental implications the work had. However it is worth noting that NPA has, for some time, focused on the development implications of their work with the

use of tools such as TIA and made use of this tool during the Finnish funded intervention.

The GICHD, UNMAS and other UN agencies received funding during this time period. However, the degree to which the funded interventions led to the effective implementation of Finnish policy is not clear. The report discusses the GICHD and UNMAS in mainly in Section 5.2.4.

#### **4.2.4 Effectiveness of the Finnish HMA support from 2002-2009**

Effectiveness in achieving Finnish goals and objectives is difficult to ascertain for 2002-2009 because the documentation available is limited and the scope of the evaluation did not allow field-based analysis pertaining to this period. However, some broad findings can be highlighted.

HALO reporting generally reflects a strong emphasis on the quantification of demining achievements, including mention of how HALO's number of landmines removed or destroyed compared to other humanitarian demining agencies (HALO, 2008f). Developmental impact is generally assumed rather than proven, appearing to have been taken at face value and without empirical evidence.

The CMVIS by HIB reports for 2006, for example, indicate that many of the accidents are caused by tampering (33%) and conducting other livelihood related activities (39%) (CMVIS, 2006a-f). This type of data findings is mimicked in other years. The knowledge acquired laid the ground work for further understanding of how to minimize the threat while increasing public awareness. This shows that the effort was an effective approach to supporting both accident reduction and potential development, by steering attention to the most affected areas and finding alternatives of how to minimise accidents.

The information available does not elaborate on how TIA used by FCA and DCA was implemented during the 2002-2009 period - for example, how factors have been weighed, or the degree to which prioritisation conducted using TIA was supported by national authorities and/or their own prioritization setting. Neither do the reports indicate the extent to which different activities are complementary. Hence, although the use of the tool is regarded as positive the degree to which it ensured an effective tool to pursuing Finnish policy objectives is unclear. Similarly, from the available material it is not possible to confirm whether the efforts of NPA supported Finnish development objectives effectively.

#### **4.2.5 Efficiency of the Finnish HMA support from 2002-2009**

With the documented information available it has not been possible to determine in detail the efficiency of the activities carried out during the 2002-2009 period. However, review of the organizational models used, as documented in available material, provides some indication of levels of efficiency

The HALO operational model relied on limited international staff and primarily on large teams of national de-miners (HALO, 2008f). This model not only reduced costs but also provided valuable employment across all countries. Comparatively DCA has historically been a smaller implementing agency and

MAG has used a different intervention model with elements that were smaller and more flexible and able to respond more rapidly. Arguments can be made for both large and small teams, but these must be tied to an assessment of the activities on the ground. Hence efficiency most often requires a case by case assessment in order to identify accurate conclusions.

The NPA operated in close collaboration with the government authority, Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO), throughout and efforts were severely delayed on multiple occasions due to a sluggish governmental mine action structure (NPA 2005, 2007). This would suggest that the effort was not as efficient as could have been hoped. Indeed the experience from other countries has also shown that government authorities may, at times, contribute to the inefficiency of the funded effort. This is something that should be considered and accounted for in planning to ensure that the costs to the overall efficiency of the work undertaken is not compromised beyond a reasonable level. It is worth noting that NPA's intended model that combined manual and dog capacity and that their efforts in the identification of, and planning for, interventions included the use of TIA. Again the available material does not allow scrutiny of whether this was efficiently executed (NPA 2005, 2007).

#### **4.2.6 Sustainability of the Finnish HMA support from 2002-2009**

From the information available it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which the efforts have been sustainable. However the case study visits to Angola and Cambodia showed that demining efforts have led to the development of areas which were mine affected, including activities which were undertaken during the 2002-2009 time period. Therefore it can be argued that the Finnish funded efforts have led to sustainable development at some level, even if this is not quantified as such. Sustainability is discussed in greater depth in the following section.

## 5 KEY FINDINGS

Component 2 (2010–2015) of the evaluation shifts from a ‘review’ to a standard evaluation methodology that encompasses the OECD/DAC criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability) and a set of Evaluation Questions (EQs) that allow more in-depth analysis. The evidence here covers the period since 2010 in which MFA Framework Agreements with partners were established. The evaluation is reinforced by two field studies plus a greater level of institutional memory inside and outside the MFA. Again, there is some continuity between this and Component 1 and some of the findings refer back to lessons learned in previous years.

The four EQs are applied in such a way as to capture findings from the literature and interviews pertaining to all eight countries and five partners in receipt of Finnish support over the period 2010–2015. The reconstructed ToC is anticipated in the EQs, though revisited in the end of the Section 6. Although inputs and outputs have been checked against partner monitoring reports in some instances (in the case study countries), the emphasis here is on outcomes and projected impact. Our interest is on the extent to which the higher-end objectives (resettlement, economic improvements, sustained training and awareness, as well as mine clearance) have been achieved, and the level of plausible contribution Finland made towards results achieved.

The EQs also cover the broader issues of Finnish strategy and support (advocacy, coherence with other donors, and aid effectiveness) as well as some cross-cutting issues (human rights, gender). Given that many of the countries under review are ‘fragile states’ it will also be important to relate findings to contemporary understanding and application of international principles, both with respect to fragility and with respect to aid effectiveness.

### 5.1 Relevance of Finnish support to internationally agreed goals and Finland’s development policies

#### 5.1.1 Adherence to internationally agreed HMA goals

Finland stopped production of landmines in 1981, and signed and ratified the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1981/82. Finland did not, however, sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (the Ottawa Convention) until 2012. The Convention entered into force in Finland on July 1, 2012. The long delay in Finland’s accession (Poland and Finland were the only EU members which had not acceded to the Convention) has been a combination of failure to get cross-party consensus on the matter, and the prevailing view that landmines were still an important part of the Finnish defence system (ICBL & HRW 2003, MoD 2003). Yet throughout the 15 years prior to accession, Finland did not produce, import or export anti-personnel landmines and has been at pains to support the sentiment and intent of the Convention, backed with solid finan-



cial and advocacy support for HMA worldwide since the beginning of the process (ICBL-CMC, 2013). Finland also, as a non-State party, voted a number of times in favour of the annual UN resolution in support of the implementation of the Convention.

Finland was, nevertheless, subject to both scrutiny and sustained criticism, as recorded in, for instance, the Landmine Monitor, the annual report published by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. In the decade prior to signing the Treaty, the Finnish MOD indicated that Finland would not reveal the number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpile before Finland accedes to the Mine Ban Treaty, and that Finland would need to have alternatives to anti-personnel mines in place before joining the treaty (Landmine Monitor, 2010). Questioning a broad range of stakeholders, the evaluation asked whether this position undermined or compromised Finland's HMA approaches and policy abroad, and found this not to be the case. On the contrary, it was regarded as a domestic issue with no discernible impact on development priorities. This said, it was politically expedient for Finland to demonstrate its 'in principle' adherence to the Treaty through consistent funding of HMA abroad prior to 2012.

Upon signature of the Convention, Finland adhered to the stipulations of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), and is well on the way to meeting its requirements as stipulated by the convention by 1 July 2016 – as indicated in the stakeholder interviews. The last of the stockpile (4,500 mines) are scheduled for destruction at the end of 2015. Moreover, Finland has not planted minefields within the borders of its territory nor do they produce or export AP landmines. They have, however, declared that they intend to keep 16,500 anti-personnel mines for training purposes, which is well within the parameters outlined in Article 3 of the Convention. Still it is notable that Finland is currently the State Party that retains the largest number of mines under this article and in keeping with the objectives of the Convention should be encouraged to communicate regularly on the use or intended use for these mines.

The ISU relies exclusively on voluntary funding. In 2014, Finland contributed to the ISU for the first time to the tune of 9,896 CHF, a contribution in line with that of most other donors. The ISU has again appealed to Finland for support in 2015, but no final decision regarding a contribution has been made yet.

It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to measure the compliance of Finnish partners to international standards such as IMAS and IMSMA, but nothing was found to suggest shortfalls in this respect. In relation to advocacy specifically, Finland has consistently supported the spirit of the Ottawa Convention. Moreover its support for the GICHD, and more recently the ISU of the Convention housed within it, allows the provision of technical support to those intending to adhere to the Convention and to gain the support needed for compliance.

### **5.1.2 Adherence to Finland's development policy and assessment of beneficiary needs**

The current Framework Agreements were drafted shortly before the 2012 Finnish Development Policy was issued, and in this respect should refer to the previous 2007 Policy (see Box 1). However, in respect of current priorities and future directions, it is the 2012 Policy that sets the parameters. This does not address

**Finland was, nevertheless, subject to both scrutiny and sustained criticism, as recorded in, for instance, the Landmine Monitor, the annual report published by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.**

**It was regarded as a domestic issue with no discernible impact on development priorities.**

**The experience in Angola where the work conducted by NGOs is often truncated by the government itself suggests that either the support is not needed, it is unwelcomed or not (or insufficiently) aligned with government priorities.**

HMA specifically, but a number of policy elements can be inferred as relevant to HMA. In addition to the humanitarian imperative, the Policy highlights that ownership and accountability of engagement in relation to national development goals are key elements that must be met by funded efforts. Finnish funding must be aligned with clear broader objectives that have been born locally and the principal responsibility for development lies with the developing country. This is very much aligned with the Ottawa Convention which puts emphasis on the role played by the affected country.

The 2012 Policy highlights its intent to focus support on least developed countries, and on long term consistent, rather than fragmented, efforts. This would suggest that support to countries like Angola is problematic since the country has the financial means to support its own development. Lastly, emphasis is placed on the need for a result oriented approach.

Neither Cambodia nor Angola is mentioned as priority countries in the 2012 Policy. The strategy might support funding to NGOs, the UN and GICHD, but would demand stronger adherence to results based management (RBM). GICHD and UNMAS are currently working towards strengthening their RBM but meanwhile the efficiency and effectiveness of funding provided is difficult to determine. Moreover, the Policy denotes that countries themselves must be leading their own development and that Finnish support is to serve as a supplement to existing efforts. The experience in Angola where the work conducted by NGOs is often truncated by the government itself suggests that either the support is not needed, it is unwelcomed or not (or insufficiently) aligned with government priorities.

### **Box 1. Principles applied in assessing applications for assistance to HMA**

The 2007 Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines (MFA Finland, 2007a) stressed that HMA creates the preconditions for development after an armed conflict and therefore is couched in terms of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), and should be included in the development plan of the countries concerned (for discussion on the LRRD concept, see for example European Commission, 2001). In this respect HMA was depicted as primarily development cooperation and therefore financed as a 'thematic' issue from un-earmarked development cooperation funds, not out of the funds budgeted for humanitarian assistance.

The 2007 Guidelines were fairly brief and descriptive, but five years later in August 2013 the MFA issued a more comprehensive set of principles governing HMA, contained within new guidelines on humanitarian assistance (MFA, 2013). These outlined in more detail how the MFA was to implement its 2012 Humanitarian Policy with respect to HMA. It is worth quoting in full the 2013 principles applied to HMA applications:

- The thematic priorities of HMA, defined in Finland's Development Policy and Humanitarian Policy, must be observed in the assistance activities. The assistance aims at a comprehensive approach, paying attention, among other things, to the development of the national capacities, assistance of victims, prevention of risks and mine clearance. Different actors' projects have complementary priorities.
- The project's objective is to support development in the affected country. The project promotes, for example, the development of the country's national capacity, rural development by means of converting unused arable land to cultivation, and refugees' repatriation. The project can also support the coordination of different



forms of support by creating preconditions for early recovery, reconstruction and longer-term development.

- The project takes into account the human rights based approach and the cross-cutting objectives.
- Countries are selected based on their needs and the actuality of the need is monitored. The countries can be changed as necessary in the framework of the multilateral framework agreement.
- When an agreement is concluded, attention is paid to the projects' long-term impacts and the systematic nature of the proposals (target setting, appropriate implementation).
- In the implementation of the programmes by Finnish Partners, employment of Finnish staff is considered to bring added value.

### 5.1.3 Adherence to aid effectiveness principles

Finland's HMA work is guided by the international principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Action Plan, and the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles. At headquarters and Embassy levels, it participates in donor coordination through the MASG. Established in 1998, the MASG comprises 27-donor states (including Finland) plus the EU, with UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF and GICHD acting as observers. It is an international forum for the exchange of information and the coordination of financial support and resources. It meets once a year in New York City and once in Geneva. The EU is the second largest donor to HMA globally, and Finland has supported the EU budget that includes its Instrument for Stability that covers small arms as well as HMA. Despite not being a signatory until 2012, Finland also adhered to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty that included helping affected states achieve their Treaty obligations. This also applied to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), even though Finland is yet to be a signatory.

For the evaluation, a key question was how aid effectiveness principles translate to efficiency and advocacy on the ground. Mine action is increasingly focused on affected states understanding the scope of contamination and looking towards "completion" under their Mine Ban Treaty commitments. NGO partners have highlighted two particular advantages of working with a relatively small donor like Finland:

1. Bigger donors inevitably have more cumbersome tendering and contracting processes, which frequently lead to significant funding gaps between the end of one contract and the beginning of another. By contrast, a smaller donor such as Finland can ensure programme continuity, ensuring that programmes do not suffer sudden reductions in capacity, including loss of trained staff and closure of bases, which must later be scaled back up at significant cost (using funds which could have been spent on direct operations).
2. Donors have different regulations on procurement and eligible costs. Programmes are therefore ideally supported by a range of donors to ensure a flexible funding base that can ensure all programme needs are met, from equipment, to international staff salaries, to base running costs, to national staff living allowance, and so on. A reliance on one or two big donors risks losing this flexibility.

**The NGO partners would like to see Finland legitimately position itself as a knowledge leader in mine action and voice of authority in discussions on policy and programming. Unfortunately, this opportunity has not been taken up in most of the countries where HMA is funded.**

**A consequence of this lack of donor engagement is that HMA advocacy towards some host governments has fallen solely to implementing agencies with considerably less political weight in difficult negotiations over Mine Ban Treaty obligations, adherence to international standards or national budget allocations.**

The NGO partners would like to see Finland legitimately position itself as a knowledge leader in mine action and voice of authority in discussions on policy and programming. Unfortunately, this opportunity has not been taken up in most of the countries where HMA is funded. In Angola and Cambodia, where there is no embassy, there has been little Finnish engagement at international gatherings. In Angola there has been no joint donor advocacy for demining or even a coordination body for donors. The only forum has been the annual National Demining Commission of Angola (CNIDAH) Plenary, and for the last two years the only donor to attend has been Japan. According to HALO, the last time there was a joint donor meeting on HMA was 2007; the only remaining forum has been occasional HMA thematic briefings delivered at the EU's European Development Fund meetings.

A consequence of this lack of donor engagement is that HMA advocacy towards some host governments has fallen solely to implementing agencies with considerably less political weight in difficult negotiations over Mine Ban Treaty obligations, adherence to international standards or national budget allocations. In Angola, HALO pointed out that advocacy cuts both ways: they had asked CNIDAH as the national coordination agency to approach donors on their behalf for funding, but to no avail. Meanwhile, it has been almost impossible for international NGOs to access national funds for demining due to the monopoly enjoyed by national entities that includes the military funded through defence budgets. In Angola a new 2015 NGO law offers a small window of opportunity, but requires the NGO to obtain a Public Service Agreement that can take up to three years to be approved.

A further consequence of little donor engagement is that the perennial issue of corruption is seemingly ignored by the international community. In Angola and Cambodia extensive levels of corruption are known to have occurred within procurement contracts relating to demining; the actual money available for equipment and personnel of national entities carrying out work on the ground can be considerably less than that stated on the budget. Other than the personal testimony of those who have worked alongside government bodies for years, the evaluation unsurprisingly has no evidence of the extent of corruption. However, it is worth conjecturing that the amount of money that goes amiss would more than cover costs currently met by Finland in these countries.

## **5.2 The choice and mix of HMA partners**


### **5.2.1 The choice and mix of partners undertaking HMA on behalf of the MFA**

Apart from the distinct mechanical mine clearing phase, until 2010 Finnish HMA was very much 'projectized', with funding decisions based on two broad criteria: a consensus among demining organisations over which countries were the most heavily mined and where access was permitted, and the submission of proposals from Finland's preferred partners. Indeed, the latter criteria largely drove the agenda. HMA was almost a stand-alone sector with a ring-fenced funding window that stood outside both the development and humanitarian

portfolio. In the 2000s it was largely a matter of reacting to submissions by partners, with a degree of balance between Asia, Middle East and Africa.

After the relatively expensive phase of the joint MFA, MoD and FDF ‘mechanised’ mine clearing that ended in 2002, the yearly budget for HMA remained at EUR 5 million for 10 years, rising to EUR 6 million in 2013/14, as illustrated in Figure 3. Throughout this time Finland took its brief mostly from established demining NGOs such as HALO, MAG, HI and NPA. Its global HMA support is coordinated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ Department for Development Policy – the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance. HMA funds come from the so-called ‘thematic budget line’ of development co-operation funds, separate from the humanitarian aid budget.

**Figure 3.** HMA Total Annual Expenditure Finland 2009-2014



Source: MFA internal documentation.

Specific projects in North Caucasus (mine risk education and mine clearance), Mozambique, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau and Sudan were added to the consistently funded Cambodia, Angola and Afghanistan portfolios that retained the highest level of funding. These additionally funded countries were mostly in reaction to complementary funding to existing demining projects undertaken by the agencies concerned. They also followed an historical pattern of Finnish engagement in peace keeping operations and in this respect were complementary to a wider Finnish foreign policy that included its commitment to EU priorities.


The funding per project/country was relatively small, and in 2010 an internal MFA review saw the need for rationalization and a limiting of the country portfolio. Henceforth, support was given to six countries and one regional programme (Cambodia/Laos) as seen in the Figure 4. The 2010 review produced a “roadmap” outlining future actions; it led to a further rationalization of the administration of the HMA portfolio, including a move to multiannual Framework Agreements with the partner organizations (instead of project specific contracts) as well as focusing the funding to a smaller number of credible and experienced partners. The purpose was to ensure predictability of funding, and to heighten levels of complementarity between the activities of each partner agency.

**A further consequence of little donor engagement is that the perennial issue of corruption is seemingly ignored by the international community.**

**Until 2010 Finnish HMA was very much ‘projectized’, with funding decisions based on two broad criteria: a consensus among demining organisations over which countries were the most heavily mined and where access was permitted, and the submission of proposals from Finland’s preferred partners. Indeed, the latter criteria largely drove the agenda.**

**This ensures a predictability of funding and the possibility of a sustained programme of activities in which training and retention of staff are ensured.**

**Figure 4. Finland HMA funding by country 2009-2014**




Source: MFA internal documentation.

Four of Finland's operational partners pool funds and report generically on the country programme as a whole. The advantage here is that they are able to shift programme funding according to requirements, including the reassignment of equipment and personnel. By contrast HALO assigns 'donor teams' to each of its donors, and reports on progress made by that particular team in the context of the whole demining programme. Full project costs per year are then assigned to the project team, including percentages of support from the national office. This makes Finnish project funding more 'visible' and traceable, but equally more susceptible to fluctuations in exchange rates and/or disbursement delays. With multi-annual funding the latter constraint will not occur during the course of a four-year Framework Agreement, but in the event of future funding beyond 2015 there will be at least a six month delay prior to the next instalment. Since the largest element of costs is labour, this may entail some temporary redundancies.

### 5.2.2 Cost effectiveness in the choice of partners and sub-partners

Apart from UNMAS in Afghanistan, as shown in Figure 5, MFA's primary partners on the ground globally have been HALO Trust, FCA, FRC/ICRC, NPA, and HI over the recent years (though funding for the last two ceased in 2010). The first three of these currently operate under four-year Framework Agreements with the Government of Finland. Above all, this ensures a predictability of funding and the possibility of a sustained programme of activities in which training and retention of staff are ensured.

**Figure 5. Finland HMA Funding by Agency 2009-2014**



Source: MFA internal documentation.

For instance, HALO Trust has a Framework Agreement for mine clearance in four countries – Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Somaliland. Table 4 shows HALO Trust Budget for Framework Agreement with MFA Finland. With a small increase per year, the average support over the four year period has been 2.6 million EUR per year. By November 2011 across these four programmes HALO was deploying 5,989 national and 14 international staff. FCA likewise has benefited from a four-year Framework Agreement that in Cambodia, for instance, has ensured funding for MAG from June 2012 to May 2016 amounting to almost 1.3 million EUR of which 53,760 EUR goes to its development partner, LWD. In Angola and Cambodia the evaluation saw evidence of the value of this consistent funding, without which the costs of re-employment, retraining and redundancy payments (due to national labour laws) would have been proportionally far greater.

**Table 4. HALO Trust Budget for Framework Agreement with MFA Finland (EUR)**

Year	Cambodia	Afghanistan	Angola	Somaliland	Contingency	Total
2012	1,000,000	700,000	450,000	250,000		2,400,000
2013	1,012,500	725,000	500,000	262,500	100,000	2,600,000
2014	1,012,500	725,000	600,000	262,500	100,000	2,700,000
2015	1,012,500	725,000	600,000	262,500	100,000	2,700,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,037,500</b>	<b>2,875,000</b>	<b>2,150,000</b>	<b>1,037,500</b>	<b>300,000</b>	<b>10,400,000</b>

Source: MFA internal documentation.

**Demining is most cost effective 'at scale'.**

**The evaluation questioning whether outcomes warranted the expense incurred. In both Cambodia and Angola there is a palpable sense of diminishing returns in demining.**

**The overall trajectory has been towards NGOs being either 'pushed' to relatively lower-level priority sites, or to seeking project sites in areas where population density is much lower.**

**There is the perennial question of why national governments have not funded their own agencies to clear outlying rural land.**

Demining is most cost effective 'at scale'. If measured in terms of areas cleared and/or numbers of mines destroyed, the cost of deploying equipment and personnel, particularly to remote rural areas, becomes proportionally greater for smaller tasks. In Angola in recent years, DCA has had two areas of operation in Moxico Province: the large-scale programme around the provincial airport (Alto Campo) and the remote villages around Caianda (near the border with DRC in Moxico Province). In terms of costs, the contrast between these two operations is stark. The former is easily accessible and encompasses a fairly dense population; the latter entails a journey of up to 12 hours from the provincial capital Luena across rough terrain to reach the operational base camp, and is sparsely populated.

This and other examples from Cambodia and Angola raise concerns over cost efficiency, with the evaluation questioning whether outcomes warranted the expense incurred. In both Cambodia and Angola there is a palpable sense of diminishing returns in demining. The international NGOs operate very much on the periphery of the development priorities established by the respective governments. Major developments in housing, roads and industry are cleared by national commercial demining agencies and/or government demining agencies who collectively receive a majority of the pool of national funds available; this pool (in Angola, according to HALO Angola, it amounts to 45-68 million USD per year and in Cambodia about 150 million USD) far exceeds anything available to the NGOs. The consequence is that the NGOs now select the smaller community-level demining sites, often in remote areas. The number of families benefitting from clearance in these areas is small by comparison, yet the cost of deploying a demining team remains high.

The dilemma captures the historical evolution of demining in these countries. To a large extent the international NGOs paved the way for adherence to international standards; they also, in previous decades, undertook most of the crucial clearance of roads, airports and strategic agricultural areas. As these projects diminished, as the towns expanded, and as national demining agency budgets increased, the NGOs have found their remit to be much reduced. This is, of course, also due to diminishing funds available to them, but the overall trajectory has been towards NGOs being either 'pushed' to relatively lower-level priority sites, or to seeking project sites in areas where population density is much lower.

The evaluation is aware that the humanitarian imperative to avoid human casualty should not be costed, but the harsh reality is that choices have to be made and thresholds of acceptable levels of hazard established. HALO in Cambodia, for instance, is clearing areas along the Thai border near to where the heavily K5 mined 'belt' has existed for decades. Small numbers of poor families have migrated to these areas as land pressure increases. Arguably, HALO's endeavours pave the way for future development in these areas, but for the time being the costs per hectare of land cleared are high, and the number of beneficiaries is low. The Provincial Government is, understandably, grateful that international donors undertake this work - and it complies with the mapped LIS areas where mines are known to impair agricultural expansion - but economic returns will remain low for some time.

Notwithstanding issues of quality, there is the perennial question of why national governments have not funded their own agencies to clear outlying rural land. In both Angola and Cambodia there is no provincial budget for



HMA; all allocations are made at national level. An uncomfortable conclusion is that national authorities have encouraged international donors to pursue the ‘humanitarian’ agenda precisely because it allows them to concentrate on the more lucrative returns accrued from commercial contracts in high density, usually urban, priority areas.

### 5.2.3 Complementarity and added-value of Finnish support to HMA with other development partners and activities

There are limited examples of collaboration between mine action actors and development focused organisations that received Finnish funding. Here attention is turned to the funding provided to FCA particularly to collaboration model used by FCA with MAG. In 2013 the Finnish MFA support share for the FCA’s global development work as a whole was 39.6% (13.4 million EUR), including humanitarian aid, HMA and the framework agreement funding. MFA continues to be the most important public funding resource of the organisation (FCA, 2014).

HMA in that year for Angola and Cambodia totalled 0.8 million EUR (FCA, 2013). In neither of these countries did the evaluation find evidence of added value that FCA itself brought to HMA. In Angola the transfer of funds to DCA was purely administrative, an arrangement made through the ACT Alliance that has included neither policy nor technical additions to the demining work of DCA. In Cambodia efforts towards an integrated approach involving demining undertaken by MAG alongside FCA’s long term partner LWD (the national NGO that was mentored by and replaced the Lutheran World Federation) were commendable in design and intent, but it is the view of this evaluation that the value of this collaboration is no greater than the sum of the two parts.

It is worth first looking at the financial overheads. In 2014 MFA supported FCA with 350,000 EUR (approximately 380,000 USD) for HMA in Cambodia, as illustrated in Table 5. 336,000 USD was then transferred to LWD who retained 13,000 USD for its own educational and staffing costs, the remainder being given to MAG for demining. Thus, within this cascading subcontracting arrangement, FCA and LWD together received over 50,000 USD for educational, staffing and administrative costs associated with the demining programme alone. In addition, for its wider national programme LWD has a budget of 2.5-3 million USD per year that includes core and project funding from FCA (amounting to about 18% of LWD’s total budget) for regular development activities.

**Table 5.** MFA support to HMA in Cambodia in 2009-2014 (EUR)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
<b>Finn-ChurchAid</b>	250,000	250,500	250,000	350,000	350,000	350,000
<b>HALO Trust</b>	715,000	1,115,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,037,500	1,012,500
<b>Handicap International</b>	100,000	40,000				
<b>FRC/ICRC Regional (Cambodia and Laos)</b>				250,000	250,000	250,000

Source: MFA Finland

**It is the view of this evaluation that the value of this collaboration is no greater than the sum of the two parts.**

FCA's specific objective in Cambodia is to "support socio-economic recovery by reducing the threat of remnants of conflict and facilitating community access to land in Battambang Province." (FCA, 2013a). The Battambang project was to provide a continuum from demining (MAG) to development (LWD), and aimed to provide safe land from demining for public use and to promote livelihood of people at high risk of mine and UXO. In principle it provides an interesting and rare link between demining and development projects on the ground.

The model purports that as MAG clears land and trains local people on mine risk awareness, LWD then introduces improved farming practices, training, wells, etc, as well as some income-generating activities and village banking schemes. However, the reality is that LWD was working in four provinces of Cambodia already under its Integrated Rural Development through Empowerment (IRDEP) programme. Until the collaboration began in earnest in 2011, MAG's programme had also worked some of the same provinces. In a small number of communities the 'integrated' programme simply brought them together, not necessarily sequentially, nor with any clear cut criteria. Rather, it appears to have been a confluence of two projects driven by a donor compliance agreement. Certainly at community level there will have been self-evident advantages of having MAG clear mines in land hitherto inaccessible due to contamination, but the development of that village/community did not depend on this; it was simply incrementally advanced by it. The evaluation was left wondering why the full EUR 350,000 had not been given directly to MAG, with the convergence of the two programmes being decided, if appropriate, by the criteria that MAG uses for all other site clearances. This may have entailed a couple of meetings between FCA, LWD and MAG, but not 50,000 USD per year of added value.

#### **5.2.4 Effectiveness and efficiency of core funding for UNMAS and GICHD**

The four-year framework agreement for 2012-2015 between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and the GICHD amounts to predictable un-earmarked funding of 200,000 EUR per year, as illustrated in Figure 6. The GICHD reported that this was implemented to 50% at the end of 2013 (GICHD, 2013a). The Annual Reports (2012, 2013) are generic, providing results against indicators, and mostly reporting on meetings, country visits and individual studies. The evaluation has not scrutinized the GICHD's complete literature portfolio<sup>6</sup> but notes that this includes a series of country reports as well as thematic studies on, for example, Gender, national capacities, conference reviews and reports on specific issues (for example, anti-vehicle mines).

#### **Box 2. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining**

Created in 1998, the GICHD has 50 members of staff and receives funding from around 20 governments and organisations. Strategically, it supports national authorities, international organisations and civil society in their efforts to improve the relevance and performance of mine action. Core activities include furthering knowledge, promoting norms and standards, and developing in-country and international capacity. In doing so,

<sup>6</sup> GICHD has a good resource list and access to its own reports at <http://www.gichd.org/mine-action-resources/publications/page/1/#.VTkV4SFVhBc>



it visits about 60 countries per year, while working very closely with partner organisations to achieve its goals. The current strategy objectives (2015-2018) are three fold:


- That convention obligations are fulfilled and/or completion targets reached
- That residual contamination is effectively managed through sustainable national processes
- That mine action is fully integrated into a broader effort to achieve human security (GICHD, 2015)

The GICHD houses the ISU of APMBT. It sees itself as an institution that enables the more efficient and effective attainment of a world without mines. Key efforts include technical support and assistance such as efforts to promote land release protocols, manage information better and support the implementation of mine action standards.

Initially Finnish funding for GICHD focused on three main areas: IMAS, Socio Economic Outreach and Manual Clearance Study. Generally these activities focused on the development of capacity, either directly through workshops and sessions to support knowledge gain on IMAS or on socio-economic issues. There was also a Clearance Study that provided written resources aimed at supporting the work done by implementing partners (GICHD, 2006a). The flexible funding provided by Finland, commended by the GICHD, allows it the freedom to allocate funds as it wishes.

The evaluation is concerned that while GICHD activities may have helped improve efficiency and effectiveness in HMA globally, the organization has historically not invested in Results Based Monitoring (RBM), and only in 2015 contracted a consultant to work with them towards aligning their interventions with RBM principles. GICHD continues to redefine its role within a shrinking sector. While the findings indicate that the funding allocated to the GICHD has been spent on tasks which were approved by the Finnish government and generally in line with Finnish objectives, the lack of a detailed assessment of efficiency and effectiveness of the interventions funded serves to question whether future funding would be appropriate. This is particularly the case given the reduced Finnish resources which will be available for development aid.

**Figure 6. Finland Core Funding for HMA 2009-2014**



Source: MFA internal documentation.

**The evaluation is concerned that while GICHD activities may have helped improve efficiency and effectiveness in HMA globally, the organization has historically not invested in Results Based Monitoring (RBM).**

**There is dissatisfaction with the management of the VTF; key recipients and major stakeholders criticize its responsiveness, its transparency and associated overheads.**

Between 1995 and 2013, Finland contributed over 23 million USD in support of UNMAS headquarters coordination activities and UN coordinated operations in mine-affected countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Thailand, making it one of the largest and most loyal contributors to the VTF managed by UNMAS. The Framework Agreement between Finland and UNMAS has two components: core funding of UNMAS, and a specific contribution to UNMAS Afghanistan as shown in Figure 6. In 2013, the core funding of UNMAS came from five donors; Finland was the second largest after Netherlands.

A key use of Finnish funds to UNMAS was towards supporting monitoring within the Landmine Impact Survey. This was to follow the use specified by the Survey Action Centre (SAC), and thereafter they would be subject to UN certification. One of the main objectives of the conduct of surveys was the improved efficiency and effectiveness of mine action activities. Like the GICHD, UNMAS praises the Finnish government for being very flexible with its contributions. This has allowed UNMAS to allocate funding to whatever activity they felt has most needed it or has financing shortfalls.

Within the UN system, each of the main HMA actors - UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF - has established or manages specific funds. The 2011 Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) evaluation, covering the whole UN system, noted that UNMAS struggles to assert its leadership role within the UN family; UNDP, UNICEF and UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) have considerable leverage and there is a need for stronger coordination. The JIU evaluation further noted that despite efforts to capitalize on comparative strengths of these UN bodies, “there is a gap between mine action and national health systems that is not addressed properly by the United Nations system. There is a need for a victim-assistance leading entity within the United Nations system” (Roman-Morey and Mounir Zahran, 2011).

There is dissatisfaction with the management of the VTF; key recipients and major stakeholders criticize its responsiveness, its transparency and associated overheads (Millard, 2013, backed by comments made by MFA staff). The criticisms included delays in disbursements and the perceived conflict of interest between UNMAS as VTF administrator as well as direct beneficiary of the Fund. While Millard’s (2013) findings were strongly contested by UNMAS, she noted that this concern may be aesthetic rather than real, given that most funds are earmarked, so the ability of UNMAS to attract funds to itself is minimal. NGOs have also complained of having disadvantaged access to VTF funds and are not always familiar with UNOPS guidelines on tendering, which are the guidelines used for applications for VTF funds, etc. To this end UNMAS serves as a key administrator of funds which are disbursed to implementing partners and is hence responsible for oversight and ensuring reporting requirements are met, but this incurs additional costs for the donor. As with the GICHD there is no indication that UNMAS has not met all their contractual obligations with Finland in relation to current and past funding. However, the added value of this process seems marginal particularly in view of the limited funds that will be available for Finnish development aid in the future.

### 5.2.5 Finnish support to HMA in Afghanistan

It is worthwhile to discuss the case of Afghanistan more in detail in here, as it has been receiving the largest MFA support for HMA, as illustrated in table 4, but was not a field study country for this evaluation.

In January 2008, the Government of Afghanistan designated the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) under the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) to work jointly with the UNMAS under the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA). The work of MACCA, DMC, and UNMAS ensures an effective response to the problem while avoiding duplication of efforts and assisting the Government in achieving its obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (APMBT). Collectively known as the MAPA, 52 humanitarian and commercial organizations comprise one of the largest mine action programmes in the world. The MAPA provides employment for over 12,000 Afghans.

In 2013 there were eight donors to the UNMAS Afghanistan HMA programme; Finland was the third largest after Canada and Japan. The Finnish HMA support to Afghanistan is channelled through HALO and UNMAS, illustrated in Table 6. The HMA results from UNMAS are those of the collective endeavour of all 52 organisations under MAPA (including HALO). They indicate the following results:

- 1,178 minefields cleared
- 67 battlefields cleared
- 740,270 UXOs destroyed
- 20,735 anti-personnel mines destroyed
- 977 anti-tank mines destroyed (UNMAS, 2014a)

**Table 6.** MFA contributions to HMA in Afghanistan in 2009-2015

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>HALO Trust</b>	1,100,000	700,000	832,000	700,000	725,000	566,192	883,088
<b>UNMAS</b>	800,000	890,000	800,000	800,000	800,000	800,000	800,000

Source: MFA Finland

HALO's Finnish funded manual teams over the past three years have carried out clearance across the combined regions of North and Central Afghanistan. The tasks encompass clearance in both high priority residential areas and clearance of much needed agricultural land. HALO's focus has been on accident reduction and clearance of agricultural land to improve food security in semi-urban and remote rural communities. Currently HALO Afghanistan deploys a workforce of approximately 3,000 staff in 131 teams per month. Finnish 2013/14 funding accounted for four of these teams, and the Finnish budget represented approximately 6% of the programme's overall budget.

A 2014 independent evaluation by the Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI) looked at HALO's work in Herat. Although Finland does not directly

**The HALO Demining Project has demonstrated and documented good formal learning as it has progressed. In particular, it expanded its objectives to include livelihood and economic growth targets, conducting a livelihood survey to identify and define these targets.**

**HALO has assisted with the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) since November 2010 and is pioneering a critical strand within the peace building and reconciliation process.**

support work in Herat, the report is worth citing, since HALO's standard field operating procedures and general 'modus operandi' are common throughout the Afghanistan programme. The ICAI document speaks very positively about HALO's project in Herat Province, finding that HALO's Demining Project had been delivered very competently. It had clear, relevant and realistic objectives with a strong humanitarian and livelihoods focus. The Commission was impressed with the way HALO managed the high risks associated with working in Afghanistan, in part through very good community relations, as well as through its own high quality risk management systems. In terms of sustainability, it was noted that demining was followed by increased state- and NGO-led development, such as construction (ICAI, 2014).

The HALO Demining Project has demonstrated and documented good formal learning as it has progressed. In particular, it expanded its objectives to include livelihood and economic growth targets, conducting a livelihood survey to identify and define these targets. The national demining agency reviews HALO's performance on a quarterly basis and, to monitor future impact, HALO has developed a livelihoods monitoring survey (including a baseline survey) (ICAI, 2014).

General security from 2011-2014 was more stable than in previous years and did not adversely affect the deployment of Finnish funded manual teams. Periodical pockets of instability resulted in the temporary suspension of the affected sites and the re-deployment to more stable areas and to other priority work plan MACCA approved tasks. HALO forecast that it would return to productive use just over 54 hectares of mine and ERW contaminated land through Finnish funded operations in 2011. The teams comfortably exceeded this forecast, clearing a total of 62.53 hectares of high priority village land (HALO, 2011c). In 2012 predictions were again exceeded, with 62.91 hectares cleared (HALO, 2012). In 2013 clearing totalled 48.02 hectares or 95% of the forecast (HALO 2013b). Although HALO is unable, due to funding constraints, to conduct post-clearance impact surveys, it nevertheless quantifies how the land is used and the number of direct and indirect beneficiaries of the programme.

HALO deliberately recruits its 2,800 staff from mine and ERW affected communities. This provides individuals with long-term employment, and communities with an additional source of revenue, as they attempt to remove themselves from the poverty trap. Interestingly, HALO is also careful to recruit from across the ethnic and political spectrum, which includes communities sympathetic to armed opposition groups (AOG's). Their staff works in mixed teams and share meals and accommodation, building cohesion and challenging ethnic seclusion. By building indirect links with anti-government elements, HALO has been able to improve its own security, whilst also providing disaffected and alienated communities with a source of legal revenue and a respected form of employment. HALO has assisted with the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) since November 2010 and is pioneering a critical strand within the peace building and reconciliation process.

Agricultural land (cultivation/ grazing) makes up 72.5% of all mine clearance. The World Bank (WB) has demonstrated how closely related agricultural GDP is to overall GDP in Afghanistan, and how changes in agricultural outputs

cause dramatic fluctuations in overall GDP growth (WB 2011). Mines continue to affect Afghans of all ages and genders but rural farming communities and returning refugees remain the most vulnerable groups. With the rise in global food prices, communities of Afghanistan are desperate to have mines cleared from their fields. In terms of cost effectiveness, HALO estimated in 2012 that the cost per person per year for its 3,400 mine clearance staff was USD 6,764 which compares well with other agency costs (HALO 2013).

In general, the total number of mine and ERW related accidents in Afghanistan as recorded by the ICRC and ARCS, shows a significant drop since 2009 after the relatively static totals between 2006 and 2008. However, in 2010, the accident rate rose sharply partly in response to greater insecurity mainly across the north of the country, particularly in HALO Area of Operations. This violence contributed to newly contaminated areas of UXO and saw a rise in IDPs seeking new land. The result was an increase in mine casualties. As security stabilised in the north, the accident rate decreased again from 2011 to levels seen in the late nineties.

There is general consensus among MFA staff that UNMAS has worked well in Afghanistan. A recent evaluation of UNMAS in Afghanistan highlights a strong performance by UNMAS and MACCA in terms of relevance, effectiveness and humanitarian impact. However, notwithstanding well-known contextual constraints, three main sets of objectives have yet to be achieved: a) national ownership on mine action; b) gender mainstreaming; c) increased focus on and impact of victim assistance (Samuel Hall, 2014).

### 5.2.6 Management of Finnish HMA support by the MFA

There has been an understandable turnover of staff in the MFA Helsinki responsible for HMA in the period under review. Past and present staff on average held responsibility for about 2-3 years each, with under 10% of their time being given to the HMA portfolio over the recent years - a significant decrease from the late 1990s and the time of mechanical mine clearing programs. No particular HMA technical experience was required; this was more administrative oversight, with an intensity of input at the contract negotiation stages. The evaluation notes that very few of those in post in the last decade have actually visited HMA programmes in the field. Partner NGOs pointed out that compared to other key donors (USA, EU, DFID) MFA - including staff in regional embassies - have only rarely visited project sites<sup>7</sup>. Rather, the onus has been on partners to visit Helsinki. A notable exception is Afghanistan where there has been regular contact with the Finnish Embassy, including a site by the Finnish Ambassador to HALO's programme in December 2013.

HMA is guided by the 2012 Development Policy and its 2007 predecessor. With the exceptions of Afghanistan and Somalia, the MFA's 2014 guidelines on Fragile States sit uncomfortably with the choice of countries currently benefitting from HMA. HALO in Somaliland claim that demining will be completed by 2017, but no such cut-off date is projected for either Cambodia or Angola; indeed, the primary partners in these countries themselves have no clear exit strategy.

<sup>7</sup> MFA archives indicate visits to Angola (2007), Ethiopia (2006), Cambodia (2006 and 2009).

**There is general consensus among MFA staff that UNMAS has worked well in Afghanistan. A recent evaluation of UNMAS in Afghanistan highlights a strong performance by UNMAS and MACCA in terms of relevance, effectiveness and humanitarian impact.**

**There has been no discussion over 'thresholds' – i.e. the point at which the reduced number of casualties, fewer mines remaining in prime agricultural land, and the costs associated with clearing them, create a 'cut-off' for donors such as Finland, with residual efforts passed over to national authorities.**

**Might be better located under disarmament, despite that fact that Finland has yet to accede to the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions.**

**There has been an increasing shift from purely input/output data pertaining to clearance that dominated reporting in the 2000s.**

This itself is a key weakness, reflecting a somewhat myopic view of demining that has served the industry well for years but at the same time has resulted in very little integrated development thinking or strategic foresight on the part of the demining agencies. It has been mirrored in the MFA where there has been no discussion over 'thresholds' – i.e. the point at which the reduced number of casualties, fewer mines remaining in prime agricultural land, and the costs associated with clearing them, create a 'cut-off' for donors such as Finland, with residual efforts passed over to national authorities.

Historically HMA fell under the humanitarian remit, although it had a stand-alone budget. Arguably, in the wake of the ratification of the Ottawa Convention, it is now in the wrong unit of the MFA and might be better located under disarmament, despite that fact that Finland has yet to accede to the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions. Although at a very preliminary stage, MAG has had discussions with a number of civil-military experts from Switzerland about embedding their services in national mine action operations, something that might positively influence affected states' approach to mine action. Likewise, there is scope to explore contributing civil military expertise to UN mine action operations through secondments to the main UN agencies (UNDP, UNMAS). Access to expertise and specialised mechanical support assets as well as new technologies may provide openings for renewed HMA related collaboration with the Finnish MoD and/or private sector companies. Above all, though, this would mean a fundamental rethink over the place that HMA has within the Finnish development agenda.

## **5.3 Results achieved by and lessons learned from Finnish support to HMA**

### **5.3.1 Extent to which HMA results are monitored, reported and disseminated**

The evaluation found an impressive array of reported data available from NGO partners in Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan and Somalia. Similar details were a lot sparser for South Sudan and (previously) Chad, Iraq, Bosnia, etc. though it is supposed that this data is available at agency headquarters and has not been adequately logged in the MFA Finland.

There has been an increasing shift from purely input/output data pertaining to clearance that dominated reporting in the 2000s. HALO, for instance, started producing pre- and post- clearance data in Sri Lanka and later Cambodia; the data generated was increasingly towards economic impacts. In part, this followed changing patterns of activity, away from IDP returns and rapid emergency clearance and towards poverty reduction, with stratified reporting done according to donor interests. Baseline survey techniques used in Sri Lanka were similarly used in Zimbabwe, including local household surveys. Similarly, new technologies such as the dual-sensor Handheld Stand-off Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) detector have been trialed in Cambodia and now used in Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Afghanistan and Kosovo.

Crucially, the data generated by international NGOs has spearheaded changes in the reporting done by national bodies. In Cambodia a national baseline study



was undertaken from 2009 to 2012 by CMAC and HALO which constituted a comprehensive re-mapping of mine fields. This process is still being constantly updated and includes a fundamental and realistic reduction in the overall task aided by the 'polygon' system of mapping that allows priority areas to be determined, costed and cleared within a designated time period and includes evidence gathered from local key informants. The 'land release' programme in Cambodia releases land that has been ploughed for a minimum of three seasons; from a baseline of 2,000 sq km of mined land in 2012, this is now down to less than 1800 sq km. The UN estimates that with current resources it will take 15 years to complete the task at a cost of 500 million USD, according to interviews. For Cambodia to move towards fulfilling its Treaty obligations by 2019 the land release process is the only way forward. For years they were tied to a wholly unrealistic 'comprehensive clearance' modality.

By contrast, Angola does not have a comprehensive national baseline either of minefields or of mine victims. The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was completed in 2007 but is not sufficiently detailed or accurate to guide the work of those agencies which adhere to international standards. CNIDAH itself does not use the LIS, claiming this to be of value only for the 'humanitarian' demining agencies (primarily International NGOs (INGO) with 2-3 national NGOs) while CNI-DAH will update the mapping process (estimated cost of 2 million USD) by 2018, according to interviews. There continue to be flaws in data collection, management and methodology on which all national plans of work are based. Gaps in information management capacity and a lack of confidence in the veracity of data regarding actual levels of mine contamination have had a negative impact on accurate planning and monitoring.

The evaluation visited Huambo and Bié Provinces (HALO) and Moxico Province (DCA) in Angola. In the former, HALO have completed a more accurate survey - and have handed over data to CNIDAH - but now lacks the resources to clear the 42 minefields identified. In Moxico Province there are political reasons for why these areas continue to be relatively neglected by national demining agencies: they were strongholds for UNITA during the war and have subsequently been relatively neglected in development disbursements. Here the LIS listed 15 high, 105 medium and 171 low priority tasks, but in reality the operational agencies select their small number of tasks according to requests from municipalities and without comprehensive updated mapping data the scale of the problem remains onerous.

### **5.3.2 Extent to which results demonstrate a corollary between HMA and poverty reduction, economic growth and/or peacebuilding**

Clear successes in terms of community and economic impacts can be seen in countries such as Cambodia, where population density and hence immediate pressures to use released land are greatest. The two Cambodian provinces where LWD and MAG are working, Battambang and Pailin, have population densities of 89 and 88 persons per square kilometre. This is in stark contrast to the population density of Moxico Province in Angola which is 2.8 persons per square kilometre. The developmental implications are therefore different: in densely populated rural areas there are likely to be more immediate sizeable

**Clear successes in terms of community and economic impacts can be seen in countries such as Cambodia, where population density and hence immediate pressures to use released land are greatest.**

benefits from cleared land through its rapid return to productive use. In more sparsely populated regions, development planning would look more towards marginalisation, poverty and market failure. This same is true of other countries such as Mozambique and South Sudan where population density is sparse (WYG International, 2013).

The extent to which demining benefits the poorest is again highly contextual. In Cambodia, HMA priorities are established through a nationally led process that incorporates the socio-economic needs of communities into their prioritisation approvals (CMAA, 2011). However, the evaluation found that these do not always serve the needs of the poorest. The most vulnerable people (small land-owners) are particularly sensitive to the timing of demining. They do not have a buffer of reserves while waiting for their land to be demined. They often will either attempt cultivation on contaminated land or sell the land for less than it is worth, leaving the benefits accrued by demining to be enjoyed by relatively better-off farmers. Although Finland's partners had undertaken a general (provincial) assessment of the socio-economic status of the local population, the evaluation was not convinced that this extended to individual beneficiaries. There were undoubtedly instances where relatively richer farmers had persuaded commune authorities to prioritise their land for clearance, with demining agencies following through without further scrutiny.

A recent study in Afghanistan tackled the same issue, asking whether priorities for demining should be set mainly on the expected production value of each cleared area or through a more community-based approach (Paterson et al, 2014). If one cannot ascertain that the beneficiary household possesses the necessary complementary inputs (seeds, draught animals, farming implements) to use the land as anticipated, or that there is a sustainable connection with markets, then perhaps the answer lies in a more focused approach that take into account the needs (essential resources) of the poorest and most vulnerable in a community so that equitable socio-economic impact can be accrued from mine action.

### **5.3.3 Extent to which Finnish HMA resources are equal to programme ambitions**

In the following section we comment on Finnish HMA ambitions in relation to the reconstructed ToC. The key question – and one to which unclear answers were provided by MFA – concerns MFA's strategic priorities, notably in relation to Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty that relates to state obligations towards assisting developing countries in realizing their Treaty obligations. Globally Finland is a small donor to HMA, but is nevertheless a significant donor to the individual operators in the countries covered by the Framework Agreements. We present here a brief overview of achievements in Cambodia and Angola, those which have been to some extent been verified by the evaluation.

In Cambodia Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) reported that international support for mine action in 2013 amounted to US\$22.76 million while the Cambodian government contributed an additional \$3.1 million in costs and equipment. Funding of \$4.6 million provided through UNDP's Clearing for Results in 2013 represented one-fifth of total international support for



that year. Finland was the fifth largest in donor, after US, Japan, Canada and UK. Historically, there have been impressive results achieved by the demining operators supported by Finland. From 1992 to 2008, 305,863,922 square metres of land across 7,589 mined areas were cleared by CMAC, MAG and HALO, with an additional 170,640,882 square metres cleared by the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. Between these four agencies, 814,198 anti-personnel mines, 19,109 anti-tank mines and 1.74 million items of ERW were cleared (Lassila, 2010).

Finnish support to NGOs in Cambodia ensures that priority is given to those areas where the highest incidence of accidents is reported through the national database of affected areas. Recent rises in land prices have displaced the poorest in Cambodian society into the border areas where they have no choice other than to occupy and attempt to cultivate mined areas. HALO's focus for some years now has been clearing the heavily mined border areas along the K5 belt. Table 7 shows results pertaining specifically to the teams funded by Finland.

**Table 7. HALO Results for Finnish-funded Teams in Cambodia**

	Land Cleared (hectares)	Direct Beneficiaries	Indirect Beneficiaries
<b>2011</b>	365	2,336	76,776
<b>2012</b>	324	2,560	96,632
<b>2013</b>	233	1,887	94,304

Source: Final Report to MFA, 2011, 2012, 2013, HALO.

The results are uncontested: i) a reduction in mine-related casualties, ii) land being put back into productive use, iii) a reduction in poverty and vulnerability and iv) a promotion of confidence in the population of the mine-affected communities, who will no longer be excluded from access to external development opportunities. Finland is the second largest donor to HALO in Cambodia.

FCA, working through LWD and in collaboration with MAG in Battambang has provided community awareness-raising on mine and UXO, alongside livelihoods improvement projects undertaken by LWD. LWD has introduced Risk Reduction Education for high-risk households in 42 target villages by 2014. MAG conducted Impact Monitoring<sup>8</sup> between April 2011 and May 2013, wherein 30% of households were surveyed across 21 selected villages located across five of the 10 most mine-affected districts in the country. Data was collected prior to clearance, and then two years after land release: baseline figures from 1,389 household surveys and 42 focus group discussions provide a snapshot of life before clearance, and then were compared with Impact Assessment (IA) data from 1,309 households surveys and 42 focus group discussions collected two years later, after the implementation of MAG activities. The findings show that, as a result of MAG's work in Cambodia, there has been a reduction in fear (of both real and perceived contamination), and improved safety - a reduction in accidents and the use of contaminated land; an increase in income and improved economic opportunities (across both genders); an increase in productive land for use, and a decrease in known or perceived blockages; and that sustained mine action is necessary to maintain the momentum of progress (MAG, 2013).

<sup>8</sup> This is an element of the DFID-financed 'Support for Mine Action in Cambodia'.

FRC has been supporting ICRC to work with the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation to manage services at the orthopaedic component factory in Phnom Penh. It has also helped provide physical rehabilitation services in Battambang and Kompong Speu (more than 10,000 disabled people have benefitted), including outreach and dissemination campaigns (about 7,600 patients) and vocational training for over 60 patients. It also supports to community-based HMA programme through the Cambodian Red Cross Society (ICRC, 2014a).

### **Box 3. Mine Survey in Angola: from impossible to possible tasks**

- The 2004-2007 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) data in Angola is still used as the baseline data, though being incrementally updated since 2012 with data provided by HALO, DCA and NPA. The original LIS has been proven to be highly unreliable as an indicator of actual hazardous areas, not least because of the original methods used to obtain and report the scale of the problem. Using new techniques these international agencies have helped the Angolan government to make clearance a realizable objective. For instance, in 2013 in Huila Province HALO (with funding from JICA) was able to cancel a lot of suspect areas through reconfiguring the mapping to smaller polygons of 'real' minefields. From 121 such minefields in the baseline LIS, only 18 are now mapped as truly hazardous in Huila Province. Similarly, in Kwanza Sul Province (with US funding) HALO reduced the hazardous areas from 98 million square metres to just 4 million.
- The National Demining Commission 'Comissao Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistencia Humanitaria' (CNIDAH) has welcomed the new mapping technique, including it in the national database (IMSMA). This has allowed CNIDAH and Angola to articulate its achievements and remaining mines problem more accurately in those provinces so far covered by HALO, DCA and NPA, helping to stave off past criticism for a lack of clarity. HALO has, with current resources, been able to clear about 1 million square metres/year. Nevertheless, with reduced financial resources for both national and international agencies clearance rate is slowing down considerably and even with these revisions cannot be realized within the next 10 years.

In **Angola**, as far as can be known, the number of accidents in the areas worked by Finland's partners has fallen, and in almost all cases the cleared land was immediately exploited by the beneficiaries. However, there is currently no coherent system for recording victims of mines or ERW's. This hampers planning and renders it impossible to make well informed estimations about the resources required to address the problem. A detailed survey of accidents is necessary in order to establish a true baseline.

DCA works in Moxico Province and reports generically to its three donors - FCA (22% of total annual budget), APMoller (22%) and EU (56%). In 2012 DCA released 913,962 square meters (sqm.) back to the local community, benefitting 7,926 persons. In 2014 366,124 sqm was cleared and released, directly benefitting 4,500 people. A key achievement from 2012 to 2014 has been the clearance operations in Alto Campo (adjacent to Luena airfield) where DCA cleared 2.3 million square meters with final completion and hand-over in May 2014 (DCA/FCA, 2014). DCA continues clearance work in Caianda, a remote area of Moxico Province near the border with DRC.

### 5.3.4 Extent to which achievements are sustainable in partner countries

Due to the decrease in mine and UXO accidents over the last decade, the mine problem in most countries has moved from an emergency and recovery phase to one that can now be realistically quantified, managed and concluded. Yet it is a receding target. As human capacity decreases due to funding, it takes longer to finish tasks and there are diminishing returns. There has been a fairly dramatic reduction in international funding for HMA, affecting particularly those ‘aid dependent’ states such as Afghanistan. The Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACA) states that the number of people employed in HMA has dropped from 14,000 in the mid-2000s to less than 5,000 in 2014 (UNMAS, 2015). The Voluntary Trust is only 40% of what it was two years ago, yet there are still 500 sq km of uncleared land and casualties of about 90 people per year. Half of the remaining de-miners are with HALO, but it is running at only 60% efficiency with container loads of unused equipment.

Angola has a similar picture of declining funding. For instance, in 2008 HALO had 1,200 staff; it now has 450. The evaluation notes a comment from the recent independent evaluation of the EU’s demining programme in Angola (Atkinson et al, 2015). The largest tranche of EU funding, 12%, was allocated to co-ordination support and the capacity building of CNIDAH through the consultancy firm Civipol. The weakest link in the mine action chain of activities in Angola (reiterated by Finland’s partners) has been that of Quality Assurance of the operators in a manner compliant with IMAS. Yet CNIDAH’s 2015 Strategic Plan, undertaken in consultation with national institutions, UN agencies, national and international NGOs, did not contain clear specific operational objectives and targets. Performance and achievements have been disappointing, resulting in a recommendation to discontinue the EU capacity building programme from 2016, not least because CNIDAH did not accept the role of Civipol. Subsequently, the EU has declared that it will, in fact, close all its demining activities in Angola and that demining is not included in the 11th European Development Fund (EDF). The knock-on effect is that HALO, MAG and DCA will all have to drastically reduce staffing in 2016.

One should dispel myths about capacity development and the notion that national ownership is possible only under national agencies. International NGOs employ very few expatriate staff, are able to offer comparatively more attractive salaries and working conditions than national entities, and in general have maintained higher levels of training and expertise. For these reasons the evaluation asked not whether the HALO/MAG/DCA programmes should be handed over to governments, but rather whether governments should fund their continuation as NGO programmes. The international NGOs have to tackle the balance between residual risk and national capacity development, and which is worth investing in when funds are depleted. In Angola HALO is having discussions with the Office of the Vice President’s over the possibility of the government at least picking up the salaries of national staff; meanwhile, HALO maintains a rolling maintenance grant from donors in order to keep the equipment, albeit some of it dormant, in good order.

**One should dispel myths about capacity development and the notion that national ownership is possible only under national agencies. International NGOs employ very few expatriate staff, are able to offer comparatively more attractive salaries and working conditions than national entities, and in general have maintained higher levels of training and expertise.**

**None of the three organisations – HALO, DCA and MAG – have a convincing exit strategy in either Angola or Cambodia.**

**Victim assistance, although one of the five pillars of HMA, is a stand-alone aspect of Finland's HMA portfolio.**

**ICRC's efficiency and effectiveness in running these services is unquestionable.**

According to the Landmine Monitor the Angolan government contributed 215 million USD to mine action in the period 2009–2013, an average of 63 million USD per year. This went mostly to commercial demining to support national development. It also mentions that the government had contributed 16.6 million USD to CNIDAH, while 98.8 million USD was provided to the Executive Demining Commission (CED) comprising FAA, INAD, PN and CSPR, the main national operators. Despite these plentiful financial resources passed through national demining entities over the years there appears to have been a somewhat passive stance from international NGOs (not helped by the absence of donor pressure) towards the chronic corruption that pervades the sector. If CNIDAH values the approaches and data of INGOs so highly, to the extent that they will not even enter INAD (the national demining agency) data on the national database for fear of skewing its quality, then why has it been necessary for donors such as Finland to continue funding projects that could so easily be affordable within a 45–68 million USD per year national budget?

Notwithstanding all of the above, none of the three organisations – HALO, DCA and MAG – have a convincing exit strategy in either Angola or Cambodia. Their argument is built around receding targets and the necessity for donors to understand why a 'final push' on funding over the next five years will make all the difference. In part this reflects an outmoded 'total clearance' agenda that belies the likelihood of obtaining the required funding for this ambition. However, the evaluation is cautious in extending the critique to other countries. HALO in Somaliland, for instance, foresees actual closure of its programme by 2017, stressing that successes here send a strong message that a credible and time-bound programme is possible in Somalia itself and, like Afghanistan, the benefits from employment make a significant contribution to political stabilization.

Victim assistance, although one of the five pillars of HMA, is a stand-alone aspect of Finland's HMA portfolio. Since 2005 funds passed through FRC for ICRC in Northern Caucasus, Chad, Iraq, South Sudan, Angola and Cambodia/Laos (regional programme) primarily for MRE and victim assistance/rehabilitation. In the last four years, with the decrease in casualties in Cambodia/Laos the focus has been on rehabilitation and reintegration, though in South Sudan the need for emergency treatment has become more acute.

The evaluation visited the ICRC Rehabilitation Centre in Battambang (Cambodia) and the prosthetics production plant in Phnom Penh. With years of experience, ICRC's efficiency and effectiveness in running these services is unquestionable. In 2014, 10,183 people benefitted from various services provided at the two (Battambang and Kompong Speu) ICRC-assisted centres. From January to November 2014, 143 mine/ERW casualties were recorded in Cambodia, an increase over the previous year. ICRC also continues its outreach programme from these centres, benefitting 8,261 patients in the same year (ICRC, 2014b).

Yet ICRC has struggled with an exit strategy that was supposed to take place over a 3–4 year period from 2011 when the Battambang facility was handed over to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY). ICRC is still financing 75% of the \$1.1m cost of running the rehabilitation centre, and there seems little prospect that the government will increase its contribu-

tion beyond the current 25%, according to interviews. Shortcomings in national capacity have, for example, forced ICRC to return again to supporting the smaller facility in Siem Reap due to a decline in service efficiency since it was handed over to MoSVY two years ago.

Rehabilitation accounts for about one-third of ICRC's Cambodia budget and the organisation is facing severe 'donor fatigue' across all aspects of its work. This affects not only core funding but the prospects of referrals to NGO projects; there remain only three NGOs with whom ICRC works. An illustration of the challenges facing ICRC is that the national law states that all patients must receive 10,000 Riel transport costs to bring them to the centre, irrespective of where they come from. ICRC is meeting these costs, knowing that in many cases it exceeds actual expenses of the individual, yet the government is unwilling to change the law.

The same story was found in the prosthetics factory. The government funds only 30% of this through the Persons with Disability Foundation (PDF), the remaining 70% from ICRC, including supplementary salaries to offset the high level of trainees leaving for better paid jobs. The ambition is to make the factory an autonomous commercial entity providing supplies across the SE Asia region, but capacity constraints are a major impediment.

## 5.4 Cross-Cutting Objectives (CCO) of Finland's HMA

### 5.4.1 Extent to which CCO's were understood, reported and advocated by partners

The 2007 Finnish Development Policy Programme included, as cross-cutting themes to be supported, the promotion of gender and social equality, and the promotion of the rights of excluded groups. Historically, demining has been a circumscribed, predominantly technical, activity and the evaluation soon became aware that gender considerations have not been central to programme design or execution. Accepting that mines and UXO do not discriminate between sex or age, outputs are almost entirely measured in terms of mines found and destroyed, and outcomes in terms of safe access to land cleared.

Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) emphasizes the "need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls". In the Finnish reporting from NGO partners there is no specific reference to Resolution 1325, but HALO reported specifically on this to Norway in 2011 (HALO, 2011b). A key global criterion for HALO is proximity to areas of settlement and housing. While statistically in the most heavily mine-affected countries (Afghanistan, Cambodia) a disproportionate number of injuries happen to males, this is simply a consequence of the work and movement patterns of males in the rural communities of these countries. Woman and children are injured or killed by mines/UXO in Afghanistan, often when obliged to enter a suspect area in search of firewood and water or as children play.

Gender considerations have in other countries been taken into consideration in relation to the employment of de-miners. In Cambodia, for instance, 32% of

**Gender considerations have not been central to programme design or execution.**



**It is worth reflecting on the substantial contribution de-mining agencies make to employment in general, and by extension to local economies.**

**Although the link between demining and economic enhancement is generally uncontested, the measure of the extent to which it “opens the path for much needed development to occur in those communities which have historically been excluded”, cannot be made.**

MAG’s staff, including the demining teams, is female and a degree of gender balance has been achieved through recruitment from affected communities. HALO also has globally achieved about one-third female de-miners (WYG International, 2013). The exception is Afghanistan that prohibits the deployment of female de-miners, though HALO employs women as data managers. HALO has, however, had an annual contract with Kunduz Women’s Cooperative (KWC) that employs some 65 women to produce uniforms for its de-miners (HALO, 2011b). Meanwhile, both HALO and UNMAS are involved in developing a new strategy under the MAPA Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP). The Strategy mostly pertains to land release, MRE and victim assistance and to greater attention to be paid to disaggregating data along gender lines<sup>9</sup>. Ironically for a notoriously conservative country, this opens up the debate about gendered impact of landmines, something relatively neglected in other countries.

It is worth reflecting on the substantial contribution de-mining agencies make to employment in general, and by extension to local economies. In Afghanistan, HALO is the largest mine clearance agency, employing 3,184 Afghan staff managed by Afghans, with resident assistance in 2014 from just one expatriate operations officer, and one expatriate HQ support officer. The Finnish grant enabled five manual teams to operate for 12 months (i.e. 60 team months) (HALO, 2014a). HALO deliberately recruits its staff from mine and ERW affected communities under a Community Based Demining (CBD) approach, providing individuals with long-term employment, and communities with an additional source of revenue. Recruiting from across the ethnic and political spectrum, which includes communities sympathetic to AOG’s builds cohesion and challenges ethnic seclusion. It also provides disaffected and alienated communities with a source of legal revenue and a respected form of employment. One of the primary driving forces behind the current insurgency in Afghanistan is a lack of employment opportunities for young men, especially in the rural areas. These young men, marginalised by the current economic system are left with little choice but to take up arms in order to earn a living. Providing respectable work for fighting age men breaks the cycle between armed violence and poverty. This constitutes an important strand within the peace building and reconciliation process of the ongoing APRP.

#### **5.4.2 Extent to which CCOs are monitored and reported with respect to outcomes**

In Afghanistan in 2014 a total of 68.23 hectares of mine and ERW contaminated ground were cleared by five HALO manual teams funded by Finland (HALO, 2014a). HALO reports that these teams safely located and destroyed 400 anti-personnel mines and 27 items of UXO benefiting 4,275 local families. Although the link between demining and economic enhancement is generally uncontested, the measure of the extent to which it “opens the path for much needed

<sup>9</sup> The Gender Mainstreaming Strategy of the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan has been developed with UNMAS/UNOPS and GICHD funding, to ensure “that all those affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) enjoy equal access to age- and gender-sensitive assistance and services, direct and indirect victims are fully integrated into society, and where the mine action programme contributes to the adoption of safer behaviours, and to the creation of an environment conducive to development”. (Gender and Mine Action website, [http://www.gmap.ch/index.php?id=275&L=2%27%60\(%5B%7B%5E~%22\)](http://www.gmap.ch/index.php?id=275&L=2%27%60(%5B%7B%5E~%22))

development to occur in those communities which have historically been excluded”, cannot be made. It is simply stated in terms of direct and indirect beneficiary family numbers affected by the intervention and the size of the areas cleared, but without post-clearance data to provide evidence for developmental outcomes.

In Cambodia, the linkages between mine action and development are embedded in national planning, delivery and oversight systems and, for example, LWD is able to follow outcomes and impacts of its collaborative work with MAG, with economic data is more readily available for the 41 target communities under the project. Here the specific objective is to support socio-economic recovery through mine clearance in the districts Kamrieng, Bavel and Phnom Proek in Battambang Province. Beneficiaries of the clearance work are vulnerable rural families relying heavily on agriculture as the primary livelihood asset. Post-clearance impact assessments are made, mainly relating to agricultural production from cleared lands. Although this has yet to be translated into economic assessment as such, in 2014 MAG/LWD reported 24,221 people from 4,968 families benefitting from MAG’s clearance activities, including 8,727 men, 6,556 women, 5,179 boy and 3,759 girls (MAG 2015).

The positive impact on agricultural productivity in Battambang and Pailin provinces has, however, been demonstrated in a recent DFID evaluation of MAG’s work in the country. It included interviews in counterfactual communities against communities with ongoing or completed operations. It emerged that a key differentiating factor was in the recorded increase in school attendance as a result of more stable livelihoods. Households in cleared site were not only able to guarantee food security, but also to generate sufficient cash for basic school material requirements (WYG International, 2013).

In Cambodia, ICRC has, as part of its victim’s rehabilitation service, supported a women’s wheelchair basketball programme, the Cambodian National Volleyball League for the Disabled (CNVLD)<sup>10</sup> with additional funding from the International Olympic Committee. This was witnessed by the evaluation and was very encouraging.

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<sup>10</sup> The evaluation has no idea why this is named volleyball and not basketball!



**Although some HMA approaches are comparative across all countries, each country will have a unique contextual background that largely determines outcomes.**

## 6 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

The conclusions relate to Components 1 and 2 of the evaluation, though Component 2 (2011–2015, covered more extensively as an evaluation rather than review) will be of greater importance with respect to future HMA decisions. It was considerably easier for the evaluation to draw specific findings and recommendations from Cambodia and Angola through having a more in-depth access to literature and site inspection. This also points to an important finding: that although some HMA approaches are comparative across all countries, each country will have a unique contextual background that largely determines outcomes.

### 6.1 Key conclusions 1991–2002

- In line with international developments, the importance Finland gave to HMA increased significantly during the second half of the 1990s;
- From 1991 to 1997, Finnish HMA support took mainly a form of needs-based cash contributions from humanitarian assistance allocations – with Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cambodia, Laos and Mozambique as recipient countries;
- In the second half of the 1990s, Finland – the MFA, the MOD and the FDF with the involvement of relevant companies – started to develop the Finn Flail service package for mechanical mine clearance with some noted success. From 1998 to 2001, the focus of Finland shifted to mechanical mine clearance in a form of in-kind and personnel support – translating especially to the Finn Flail deployment in Cambodia, Kosovo and Mozambique under the UN umbrella;
- In 1998, HMA was explicitly included among the Finnish development policy priorities and it started to receive increased allocations from development co-operation funds;
- Finnish HMA support in the 1990s was relevant in relation to Finnish development policy and co-operation objectives at the time; Finnish proactive and innovative approach towards mechanical mine clearance was relevant and complementary to international priorities and context;
- The suitability and relevance of Finnish support at country-level local context was less clear – Finnish equipment faced climatic challenges to efficiency, yet fared better than some other alternatives available at the time. Expensive mechanical mine clearance ceased in 2002 mainly due to technical challenges;
- Finnish fact-findings, regular monitoring and approach focused on learning in the 1990s improved the effectiveness of the HMA support in the longer term;

- Placing of most of Finnish in-kind and personnel assistance under the UN umbrella meant that it was affected by some of the inefficiencies of the UN system in the 1990s;
- The lack of good quality overview reporting, and inadequate knowledge management, has hindered the evaluation's ability to form a thorough overall picture of Finnish HMA support in the 1990s, especially with regard to cash contributions.

## 6.2 Key conclusions 2002-2009

- Quantification of cleared land and disarmed mines continued to be the primary measure of progress, success and impact;
- The introduction of TIA has provided organizations with the opportunity to change the way mine action activities were undertaken;
- The collaborative approach to mine action where MRE, Victim Assistance, and Demining or UXO removal activities are combined produced improved outcomes;
- The use of victim data was a reliable way of mapping affected areas and a tool for understanding impact;
- Uncooperative and/or corrupt government structures caused serious delays in the ability of implementing partners to conduct operations within designated time periods.

## 6.3 Key conclusions 2010-2015

- HMA was couched more explicitly in terms of LRRD in Finnish development policy from 2007 onwards and, since the 2012 Development Cooperation Policy, with reference to the human rights-based approach and cross-cutting objectives of gender, reduction of inequality and climate sustainability. However, MFA Finland lacks a strategic perspective for HMA, treating it as a stand-alone sector without clearly defined synergy with other aspects of development cooperation.
- Finland's HMA was rationalised from 2010 towards a small number of multiannual Framework Agreements that ensured predictability of funding across several countries and more manageable oversight from Helsinki. By 2011 this meant that three NGOs and two multilateral agencies received almost all HMA funding; a large majority of funding was given to three countries - Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola;
- Advocacy, including confronting issues of corruption, are sometimes left entirely in the hands of NGOs whose continuing presence depends on a non-confrontational relationship with government.
- HMA in Afghanistan has proven to be highly relevant, effective and efficient, both from UNMAS and HALO. There has been high praise for HALO's work in Afghanistan from the ICAI, particularly with respect to its employment approaches that cut across ethnic and political spectra,

**MFA Finland lacks a strategic perspective for HMA, treating it as a stand-alone sector without clearly defined synergy with other aspects of development cooperation.**

**Finland's HMA was rationalised from 2010.**

**Advocacy, including confronting issues of corruption, are sometimes left entirely in the hands of NGOs.**

**HMA in Afghanistan has proven to be highly relevant, effective and efficient.**

**The lack of political economy analysis, combined with single-sector myopic conceptual thinking among HMA implementers, impairs evidence of HMA impact.**

**Particularly in Angola, neither donors nor HMA implementers have effectively confronted the government over transference of plentiful national funds to continue funding international NGO or national NGO work.**

**MFA Finland has depended on their funded partners to provide this contextual overview, yet these partners have a vested interest in presenting themselves as indispensable.**

including communities sympathetic to Taliban. Similarly, HALO scored high in the Finnish MFA's own internal review of Cambodia in 2010;

- Coordination between UNMAS, UNICEF, UNDP and UNOPS has not been optimal, highlighted by the JIU in 2011. There are also contesting views over the efficiency of the VTF administered by UNMAS, funded by Finland;
- The GICHD has not invested in results based management, has no monitoring with respect to Value for Money and no exit strategy; rather, it continues to redefine its role within a shrinking sector.
- The lack of political economy analysis, combined with single-sector myopic conceptual thinking among HMA implementers, impairs evidence of HMA impact. There are a lot of unchallenged assumptions regarding developmental impact;
- The FCA-LWD link with MAG in Cambodia has been innovative for having directly linked demining with agricultural and income-generating activities, but whether this is more than the sum of its parts is questionable, as is the added value of FCA in this respect.
- Particularly in Angola, neither donors nor HMA implementers have effectively confronted the government over transference of plentiful national funds to continue funding international NGO or national NGO work. Meanwhile, through obstacles to custom clearance of equipment and long delays in visa applications, the Angolan government has presented obstacles to efficient delivery of HMA.
- In Cambodia, victim assistance by ICRC, though effective and efficient, is impaired by capacity and willingness of national authorities to assume responsibility for the sector;
- The lack of diversity of practice in HMA may have dissuaded new or continued funding from donors. This is compounded by the lack of any strategically planned exit strategy on the part of implementing agencies.

## 6.4 Review of the reconstructed Theory of Change

Evaluation is always cautious of the term 'impact'. Intervention timelines and the scarcity of longitudinal data often make it almost impossible to gauge the contribution of one donor to changes that may occur over decades. However, our reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC) allows us at least to comment on anticipated incremental progress towards predicted outcomes. The EQs probed the extent to which the Finnish contribution has had measurable results, recorded and analyzed by implementing partners.

The evaluation began by citing the IMAS 'five pillars' of mine action - humanitarian demining, victim assistance, stockpile destruction, MRE and advocacy. These are now nine years old and do not reflect recent developments in thinking in the sector. The pillars make no mention of socio-economic development, and although victim assistance is still important, declining casualties makes this a central component of HMA in the 'traditional' contaminated countries.

Responsibility for mine action by donor countries should be carefully considered in relation to both the general humanitarian and development efforts conducted at the country level, national financial capacity and not least political will. Paradoxically, MFA Finland has depended on their funded partners to provide this contextual overview, yet these partners have a vested interest in presenting themselves as indispensable. Some countries (Angola) have substantial national financial means, which would enable them to respond to threats themselves, while others (Afghanistan, Somalia) have more precarious financial means. Some countries have supported and welcomed HMA engagement (Cambodia), while others are renowned for making working conditions for NGOs hard (Angola), and in some cases even increasing costs. HMA is subject to the same 'classic' development challenge as other sectors: to what extent does the host government exploit international generosity to offset its own lack of will or strategic competency to adequately address an essentially domestic issue? Given the landmine threat worldwide Finland should be wary of investing funds in countries where their support is hampered and where national funds could be used to deal with the threat at hand.

Precisely because HMA has occupied a 'niche' within MFA Finland without a managerial or direct policy relationship to either development or humanitarian priorities, its rationale has been largely determined by implementing agencies; and despite recent efforts, the agencies themselves have not traditionally had the skills or experience to broaden the discourse beyond simply mine clearance. Victim assistance also occupies a strangely dislocated area of assistance without a clearly defined connection to other HMA activities.

The development discourse sees human security as a necessary pre-condition for sustainable development, and HMA makes an important contribution to that security. However, removing landmines alone does not automatically generate development; a much broader set of events is required. Understanding landmines as a threat to development, particularly in places where the war has long ended, where general areas affected by landmines are known, and where national and international resources are available, has served to change how priorities are determined and resources allocated. Yet more often than not MFA partners have concentrated on landmine clearance, with only a cursory - and certainly not comprehensive - effort to measure the post-clearance social and economic benefits resulting from their work on the ground. Although the evaluation is able to comment on some of these through observation, acquiring empirical evidence would require consistent collection of localized data, including variables not relating to cleared land. This was beyond the scope of the evaluation and is rarely available elsewhere other than in macro-economic data.

While the idea that development sector actors work together in a coordinated fashion is not new, some mine action agencies have struggled with collaborative working and/or truly understanding the developmental implications of landmines. Even today some HMA actors continue to count discovered landmines as a measure of their success. The reconstructed ToC, based on the inherent assumptions of much of literature and MFA Finland conceptual thinking, reiterates the link between demining and development without qualification. The underlying assumptions are fundamentally misguided and have led agen-

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**Capacity building of national HMA institutions is one part of the process; this has often been addressed in a largely ad hoc, unplanned and unsatisfactory manner.**

**Victim Assistance sits uneasily within the HMA portfolio and is perhaps better placed within regular Finnish country programmes.**

cies to conduct demining operations in places where the impact was negligible at best, where there is only a very limited number of direct beneficiaries, and where no planning has been made for additional inputs to sustain development.


The danger of working to the limited brief of requests for mine clearance issued by local municipal authorities, and without a thorough examination of the political economy, is illustrated in Cambodia. In some areas where demining was expected to improve the economic prospects of poor families precisely the opposite has happened: in the absence of any formal land ownership rights, once cleared land becomes attractive it is been 'grabbed' by those paying money to the military and/or local authorities. Evidence presented to the International Criminal Court shows that since 2000, 830,000 people, equivalent to 5.5% cent of the country's population have been forced off their land, away from the farmland and forests they rely upon for survival, and pushed deeper into poverty. With the court system highly-politicized and the judiciary co-opted by ruling elites, these land grab victims currently have no chance of receiving any kind of recompense (Global Witness, 2015). The evaluation came across land that had changed hands several times in the few years since mine clearance, with the land 'owners' now becoming labourers on the same land.

Mine clearance agencies are not oblivious to these challenges, but their central remit - and the climate of reduced finance - inexorably leads to 'bottom line' thinking: clear the mines, and let others worry about developmental implications. A more challenging and pro-active approach to improving the mine action-development link is to build mine action into national development plans with clear development objectives alongside the traditional objective of casualty reduction. This was not always apparent in the countries reviewed in the evaluation. Capacity building of national HMA institutions is one part of the process; this has often been addressed in a largely ad hoc, unplanned and unsatisfactory manner. There is also little advice available on best practice in this area.

Victim Assistance sits uneasily within the HMA portfolio and is perhaps better placed within regular Finnish country programmes. The results of Victim Assistance are very much down to individual cases. ICRC's efficiency is exemplary, but it is a long-term process that demands consistent funding in the face of decreasing donor interest and (in Cambodia) a discouraging process of hand-over for funding and management by government.

## 7 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. MFA's mine action strategy should be more closely linked to its Fragile States agenda, allowing alignment with disarmament and security issues. The extension to the current 2012 Development Policy should be accompanied by a clear strategy and implementation plan that demonstrates how HMA complements other humanitarian and developmental activities.
2. In order to ensure that funded organizations have the support they need, HMA activities should be continued only (1) in fragile states where other forms of complementary support are underway, or (2) in those countries where the MFA, through its embassies, is able to actively support NGO/ UN implementers in advocacy and lobbying governments to uphold their responsibilities with respect to the Ottawa (and Oslo) Conventions and international standards in HMA.
3. Greater cooperation and programmatic coherence should be encouraged between MFA, MoD and private sector engagement in technical assistance, plus an involvement with those NGOs like HALO and MAG that have existing weapons and ammunition disposal programmes.
4. Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan should continue to receive HMA funding contingent upon the demonstration of security, employment and economic benefits accrued, and a more robust contextual political economy analysis. Agencies should be requested to demonstrate and report on linkages with other development partners in areas of operation, and on how development outcomes beyond mine clearance will be recorded.
5. In light of scarce resources, and given current limitation in demonstrating best value for money, efficiency and effectiveness, support for GICHD should be discontinued beyond the current Framework Agreement.
6. In light of scarce resources, and given current limitation in demonstrating best value for money, efficiency and effectiveness, core support for UNMAS should be discontinued beyond the current Framework Agreement, but funding of the UNMAS Afghanistan programme should be retained under the provisions of Recommendation 3.
7. Given the available funds in each of the countries, the degree of support provided by the host country to the demining operators, the location of the minefields and potential impact of the demining operations, there should be a planned but rapid phasing down of HMA programmes in Cambodia and Angola. MFA should no longer support HMA programmes in these countries under multi-annual Framework Contracts. An exit strategy not exceeding one year should be designed, with funding allocated to ensure that the financial damage entailed (redundancy payments and equipment) is not passed to other donors. Recipient agencies should be requested to submit a closure report indicating how resources have been reallocated.

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8. Victim Assistance should be removed from the HMA strategy and placed within existing country development cooperation programmes (health sector) and/or pooled funding arrangements with ICRC where applicable.



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## Other – MFA Archives

Covering the period from early 1990s to early 2000s, this material includes paper copy archived material by the MFA from various types of internal memos to reports and press articles concerning either HMA directly or co-operation with countries known to have received support for HMA. In total, over 50 folders with a large selection of documents each and over 20 related annexes generally containing reports were screened. Material for further analysis was selected from over 40 folders and over 15 annexes.

# EVALUATION TEAM

**Team Leader.** *Mr. Jon Bennett* (Masters in Sociology) has over 35 years of experience in development policy, co-operation and humanitarian assistance. Team leader for well over 25 evaluations in the past, his extensive evaluation experience consists of large program, strategy or policy evaluations – often covering multiple countries and taking place in difficult settings. Overall Mr. Bennett has extensive experience in international policy work and political dialogue, coupled with designing and managing large development and relief programmes – including with ten years of long-term field work experience. With solid experience in using a human-rights based approach, he has taken into account gender, inequality and climate sustainability aspects in his work. Overall the work of Mr. Bennett has covered over 25 countries worldwide, including Angola and Cambodia as well as the most difficult conflict settings.

**Evaluation Expert.** *Dr. Ananda Millard* (Doctorate in Peace Studies) has over 15 years of experience in policy, strategy, and program evaluations and studies in the humanitarian as well as development policy and co-operation fields. She has led or participated in well over 20 evaluations and studies, often in conflict or post-conflict settings. Dr. Millard masters a wide range of evaluation and social science methodologies, having acted as a methodology lead in various studies and designed data collection modalities in difficult settings. Moreover, HMA is one of her fields of expertise – she has worked for over seven years specifically on mine action issues and has carried out several major evaluations concerning the topic. She has also ample experience especially in gender issues and has recently published on equity issues in evaluations, while having examined climate change as cross-cutting issues in various evaluations often with human rights based approach. Dr. Millard has worked in over 30 developing and emerging countries, including with significant field work experience both from Angola and Cambodia.

**Policy Expert – Home-Office Project Director.** *Ms. Kiira Kärkkäinen* (Masters in International Affairs) has extensive international experience in policy work and various development policy and co-operation issues from the OECD, the European Commission, UNESCO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. While she is the author or co-author of several policy-oriented OECD reports, an essential part of her policy work has included internationally comparative, quantitative and qualitative analysis with extensive data sets. Ms. Kärkkäinen has conducted several multi-country evaluations and studies – recently also for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland providing her with a solid understanding of the Finnish priorities and cross-cutting issues. Overall she has years of experience in working on development policy and co-operation especially with regard to conflict settings and on the links between security and development.

**Local Expert.** *Mr. Vibol Kan* (Bachelor in Agricultural Economics) has over 20 years of experience on development strategy, policy and co-operation in Cambodia – including several years of work particularly on land use and mine action. He has solid experience in working with communities in Cambodia as well as on climate change and gender issues. Experienced in liaising with and advising government officials and the civil society, Mr. Kan has worked extensively with both multilateral and bilateral development partners. Furthermore, an academic lecturer at the Royal University of Agriculture, he has taken part in several evaluations and reviews as well as large scale field surveys covering up to 14 000 villages in Cambodia.



# ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

UHA2014-036199, 89892484

## Evaluation on Humanitarian Mine Action

### 1 BACKGROUND TO THE EVALUATION

The evaluation at hand is the first evaluation of the humanitarian mine action supported by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) through development cooperation funding. Finnish humanitarian assistance was evaluated in 2005. However, humanitarian mine action was reviewed only descriptively. Neither has Finland's humanitarian mine action been covered by other thematic or country programme evaluations. This means that humanitarian mine action has not been evaluated and therefore this evaluation addresses the gap of a large thematic evaluation combining analysis from different countries.

However, the global context and Finland's implementation modalities have been changing and there is a need to conduct an evidence-based assessment on the results and lessons learned about Finland's support to humanitarian mine action in 1991-2014. The evaluation will not look at the past only but also give orientation to the future programming of Finland's humanitarian mine action. It will also give information for the evaluation of Finland's humanitarian policy which is tentatively scheduled for 2016.

The evaluation will consist of two parts: 1) a desk study will assess effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact to the extent possible of Finland's support to the humanitarian mine action in 1991-2014, and 2) a comprehensive evaluation on effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact to the extent possible of Finnish support to the humanitarian mine action in 2010-2014 including also country case studies in Angola and Cambodia.

### 2 CONTEXT

#### 2.1 Global context and the basis for Humanitarian Mine Action

Humanitarian mine action is based on the Ottawa Convention in 1997 (the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction) and on the UN Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (1980) and its Amended Protocol II (1996). Also The Oslo Convention (The Convention on Cluster Munitions), which entered into force in 2010 has humanitarian mine action related Articles. Humanitarian mine action is constantly discussed and its implementation evaluated in the meetings of States Parties of all the above mentioned Conventions and Protocols.

##### *Amended Protocol II of the CCW*

The original Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices was adopted in 1980. Amended Protocol II entered into force on 3 December 1998. AP II seeks to limit the indiscriminate damage caused by landmines and requires States Parties to take all feasible

precautions to protect civilians when using these types of weapons. The Protocol also contains provisions on mine clearing.

#### *Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty – Ottawa Convention*

The Treaty is the cornerstone of the international effort to end the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines. States that accede to the Convention accept that they will destroy both stockpiled and emplaced anti-personnel mines and assist the victims of mines. The Treaty currently has 162 States Parties.

The Ottawa Convention contains provision that each State Party must “as soon as possible” ensure that these mined areas “are perimeter marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed.” Each State Party must render these mined areas no longer dangerous “as soon as possible but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.”

The Convention’s preamble records the wish of the States Parties “to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims.”

Finland joined the Ottawa Convention in 2012 but has followed the humanitarian obligations since 1991.

#### *Convention on Cluster Munitions – Oslo Convention*

Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is an international treaty that addresses the humanitarian consequences and unacceptable harm to civilians caused by cluster munitions. The Convention prohibits all use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions. In addition, it establishes a framework for cooperation and assistance to ensure adequate care and rehabilitation to survivors and their communities, clearance of contaminated areas, risk reduction education and destruction of stockpiles.

Adopted on 30 May 2008 in Dublin, Ireland, and signed on 3–4 December 2008 in Oslo, Norway, the Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010. Currently the Convention has 108 signatories, out of which 86 are also State parties.

Finland has not signed the CCM. Finland will continue to follow up on the development of the Convention and supports the spirit of the Convention through humanitarian mine action. Finland regularly evaluates progress in military technologies and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy monitors the situation also regarding cluster munitions. From the Finnish perspective no such changes in conditions have taken place which would as yet enable accession to the Convention.

## **2.2 Finland’s support to humanitarian mine action**

Finland has been supporting humanitarian mine action since 1991. Finland looks at humanitarian mine action from a development and humanitarian angle. The policy foundations for humanitarian mine action are Finland’s Development Policy Programmes and Finland’s Humanitarian Policy. Humanitarian mine action is also guided by the international aid effectiveness principles as well as the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. Humanitarian mine action is also a way to support fragile states and the transition to a more stable situation allowing development and thereby will be guided by the Fragile States Guidelines (published in March 2014). Finland’s support to humanitarian mine action covers humanitarian demining, victim assistance, development of national capacities and Mine Risk Education. All countries and actions supported by Finland must be ODA eligible. A clear distinction is made between humanitarian, military and commercial mine action, the latter two not being eligible for humanitarian mine action funding.

To enhance effectiveness Finland has focused the support to humanitarian mine action on a small number of credible and experienced partners and has decreased the number of interventions while increas-

ing their size. The agencies funded have been chosen in a way to ensure that they complement each other to meet the different objectives of humanitarian mine action.

The principles for humanitarian mine action are defined in the Guideline for Finland's Support to Humanitarian Mine Action (August 2009) (that is not in the reference list in Annex 1 but will be given to the evaluators). The principles governing humanitarian mine action are also summarised in the Guideline Concerning Humanitarian Assistance and the Use of Funding Granted by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (August 2013), even though the Humanitarian Assistance Guideline do not apply to it in other respects.

Finland promotes the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) Women, Peace and Security which e.g. emphasizes the needs for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls. To implement the resolution 1325 Finland has national action plans for 2008-2011 and for 2012-2016.

MFA's Fragile States Guidelines were published in March 2014. The Guidelines are a condensed recap of the central principles now underpinning OECD donor approaches towards fragile states. The Guidelines reaffirm Finland's holistic approach towards tackling the challenges in fragile states: a well-researched and judicious use of military and/or civil crisis management, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. Long-term cooperation should focus on three thematic priorities: conflict prevention; development of a democratic and accountable society and the rule of law; and the participation of women at all levels. Human rights-based approach is at the heart of these priorities.

Finland supports humanitarian mine action in countries which have a major mine problem and which need assistance to resolve the problem. The Finnish funding is channeled to the most affected countries. In 2014, Finland supported humanitarian mine action in six countries: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Angola, Somalia and South Sudan. Apart from the country programmes, UNMAS and GICHD receive core funding. Currently, the support is channeled through five partner organizations. These are HALO Trust, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Finnish Red Cross (through which the funding is channeled to the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC) and Finn Church Aid (FCA). Finland has flexible multiannual Framework Agreements with these organizations to ensure the predictability of funding and decrease the administrative burden. The first Framework Agreements came into force in 2010. The current Framework Agreements came into force in 2012 and will end in 2015. Since the Framework Agreements are coming to the end it is timely to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability and impact of the current programmes, regional scope, partners and thematic scope (i.e. pillars of humanitarian mine action) in order to make evidence-based decisions on new multi-annual funding agreements.

Currently, the budget for humanitarian mine action is roughly 0,5 % of the total ODA (Official Development Assistance). The budget has increased steadily in the past years from 5 million to 6 million euros in 2014. In total the Finnish support to humanitarian mine action has been 93 million Euros since 1991. Humanitarian mine action is primarily development cooperation and it is therefore financed from the unearmarked development cooperation funds and not from humanitarian assistance which was 10 % of the total ODA in 2013.

### 3 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION

**The purpose** of the evaluation is to improve accountability of Finland's support to humanitarian mine action and to serve strategic planning and decision making needs in the MFA. The evaluation is expected to bring forward issues and lessons learned and make innovative but practical and concrete recommendations on e.g. regional and thematic scope and selection criteria for partners. The recommenda-

tions will help the MFA to make informed decision regarding the future orientation and funding of the humanitarian mine action in the changing global context after the current Framework Agreements will come to an end.

The evaluation will also inform the general public, parliamentarians, academia, and development professionals outside the immediate sphere of the decision-makers in development policy of what has been achieved by the use of public funds.

**The objective** of the evaluation is to assess the achievements, contributions, strengths and weaknesses of Finland's support to humanitarian mine action. The evaluation will provide an overall independent assessment on the humanitarian mine action supported by Finland in relation to effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact as well as the implementation of the UN Resolution 1325 in humanitarian mine action.

#### 4 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation covers multilateral and NGO cooperation (including Finnish and international NGOs and foundations). The evaluation will also cover the possible links between humanitarian mine action and international political processes regarding anti-personnel mines and other explosive remnants of war.

The temporal scope of the evaluation is 1991-2014. However, the main focus is in the period of 2010-2014.

The evaluation consists of two parts:

1. Desk study will contain an assessment of Finland's support to the humanitarian mine action in 1991-2014 focusing on effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact to the extent possible. When analyzing the humanitarian mine action, the evaluation is not intended to examine each individual intervention meticulously but rather focus on how the entire cooperation portfolio and the related policy dialogue have supported the humanitarian mine action.
2. Comprehensive evaluation on effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact to the extent possible of Finnish support to the humanitarian mine action in 2010-2014. The second part will include country studies in Angola and Cambodia.

The evaluation is organised in such a way that the two parts can feed into each other and their findings will be merged into one final report.

A systematic analysis of the main policy documents and previous relevant evaluations and reviews (see the tentative list in Annex 1) on the focus areas should form the baseline for the assessment.

#### 5 ISSUES BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

The following issues by evaluation criteria will guide the evaluation. Priority issues for each criterion are indicated below. The evaluation team is expected to develop a limited number of more detailed evaluation questions based on the priorities set below and expand the set of questions where it deems this necessary. The evaluation questions will be based on the OECD/DAC and EU criteria where applicable and will be prepared as part of the inception report. The evaluation is also expected to apply a theory of change approach in order to contextualize the evaluation questions to fit in the assessment.

##### Effectiveness

- Assesses if the choice and mix of the pillars of humanitarian mine action funded by Finland's programmes is effective.

- Assesses the choice and mix of partners to support humanitarian mine action and the effectiveness of their actions vis-à-vis the set objectives.
- Analyses the extent to which the HRBA and cross-cutting issues/objectives have been incorporated into the action and how this has affected the results of the action.

### **Efficiency**

- Assesses the administrative efficiency, including adequacy of human resources of humanitarian mine action in the MFA.
- Assesses the efficiency of humanitarian mine action, in particular the participation of all stakeholders (rights holders) and the cost-efficiency of actions and partners funded by Finland.
- Assesses the efficiency and added value when the financing has been channeled from the MFA's contractual partner to other cooperation partners.

### **Sustainability**

- Assesses the sustainability of humanitarian mine action of the MFA's partner organizations.
- Assessment focuses on whether leadership, ownership and capacity have been supported to strengthen sustainability of humanitarian mine action in the partner countries. Analysis also considers how participation of men and women as well as different beneficiary groups has been organized.
- Analyses the extent to which humanitarian mine action is integrated in the partner countries' overall policy/strategy and programmes and whether this has played a role in Finland's choice of partner countries.

### **Impact**

- Assesses the impact of humanitarian mine action through the selected partners in the case countries.

### **Relevance**

- Analyses the extent to which the humanitarian mine action supported by Finland is in line with contemporary best practices of humanitarian mine action.
- Analyses the extent to which the humanitarian mine action supported by Finland is relevant to the development objectives of the partner countries/regions and the needs of different beneficiary groups, including men and women, boys and girls and especially the easily marginalized groups and the extent to which Finland's support is coordinated with other development partners and partner countries' programmes related to mine action.

### **Complementarity**

- Assesses the complementarity between humanitarian mine action and different modalities of Finnish development cooperation as well as humanitarian assistance to the extent possible in countries where different cooperation modalities are used, i.e. humanitarian mine action is only one part of Finnish development cooperation.

## **6 GENERAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY**

The approach of the evaluation seeks to combine the need to obtain a general overview of the initiatives undertaken and to study in more depth separate projects and programmes in selected case countries.

The approach and working modality will be participatory. Mixed methods will be used (both qualitative and quantitative) to enable triangulation in the drawing of findings. The evaluation covers both targeted and mainstreaming approaches, and the methodology should be elaborated accordingly to assess the value of each of the approaches. The evaluation team is expected to reconstruct the theory of change, prepare evaluation questions and sub-questions and propose a detailed methodology in an evaluation matrix which will be presented in the inception report.

During the field work particular attention will be paid to ensure that women, vulnerable and easily marginalized groups are included. Particular attention is also paid to the adequate length of the field visits to enable the real participation as well as sufficient collection of information also from sources outside of the institutional stakeholders (e.g. statistics and comparison material). The field work should last at least 3-4 weeks. Adequate amount of time should also be allocated for the interviews conducted with the stakeholders in Finland. Interview groups are to be identified by the evaluation team in advance.

Validation of results must be done through multiple sources. The main document sources of information include programme and project documents and reports, project/programme evaluations, Finland's Development Policy Programmes, thematic guidance documents, previously conducted country programme and thematic evaluations, development strategies of the case country governments, country analyses, and similar documents. The evaluation team is also encouraged to use statistics and different local sources of information to the largest possible extent. It should be noted that a small part of the material is in Finnish.

If sampling of documents is used, the sampling principles and their effect to reliability and validity of the evaluation must be elaborated separately.

During the process particular attention is paid to a strong inter-team coordination and information sharing within the team. The evaluation team is expected to show sensitivity to diverse communication needs, gender roles, ethnicity, beliefs, manners and customs with all stakeholders. The evaluators will respect the rights and desire of the interviewees and stakeholders to provide information in confidence. Direct quotes from interviewees and stakeholders may be used in the reports, but only anonymously and when the interviewee cannot be identified from the quote.

The evaluation team is encouraged to raise issues that it deems important to the evaluation which are not mentioned in these ToR. Should the team find any part of the ToR unfeasible, it should bring it to the attention of the Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11) without delay.

## **7 EVALUATION PROCESS, TIMELINES AND DELIVERABLES**

The evaluation is tentatively scheduled to start in January 2015 and end in August 2015. The evaluation consists of the following phases and will produce the respective deliverables. The process will move forward according to the phases described below. It is highlighted that a new phase is initiated only when all the deliverables of the previous phase have been approved by the EVA-11. The reports will be delivered in Word-format (Microsoft Word 2010) with all the tables and pictures also separately in their original formats. The language of all documents is English. The consultant is responsible for the editing, proof-reading and quality control of the language.

### **I. Start-up meeting**

The purpose of the start-up meeting is to discuss the entire evaluation process including the content of the evaluation, practical issues related to the field visits, reporting and administrative matters. The start-up meeting will be organized by the EVA-11 after the signing of the contract and it can also be organized as a video conference.

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## II. Inception

**Deliverables:** Inception report and inception meeting (incl. minutes of the meeting), Quality Assurance expert(s) comments/notes to the report

Inception report specifies the approach and methodology and includes the final main evaluation questions and sub-questions, the evaluation matrix and the work plan. The main evaluation questions will be broken down to specific research questions and respective indicators. The methodology and sources of verification will be explained in detail, including the methods and tools of analyses, scoring or rating systems and alike.

The division of tasks between the team members will be presented in the inception report. In addition, a list of stakeholder groups to be interviewed will be included in the inception report. The inception report will also suggest an outline of the final reports. The structure of the report will follow the established overall structure of the evaluation reports of the Ministry. The inception report should be kept concise and should not exceed 25 pages, annexes excluded.

The consultant will organize the inception meeting in Helsinki. The meeting can also be organized as a video conference. The consultant will prepare the minutes of the meeting.

## III. Desk study

**Deliverable:** Desk study report, Quality Assurance expert(s) comments/notes to the report

The desk study report will provide a concise analysis of the written material, e.g. project/programme related documents, previous evaluations, policy documents, guidelines, thematic/regional programming, context analysis and other relevant documents related to the evaluation subject. Tentative hypotheses as well as information gaps should be identified in the desk study report.

It will also present plans for the interviews, participative methods and field visits including the identification of local informants (beneficiaries, government authorities, academia, research groups/institutes, civil society representatives, other donors etc.) and other sources of information (studies, publications, statistical data etc.) as well as an outline of the interview questions and use of participative methods according to the interviewee groups in each of the field visit countries.

The desk study report will be submitted to the EVA-11 and is subject to the approval of the EVA-11 prior to the interviews in Finland and field visits to case study countries/regions. The report should be kept analytic, concise and clear.

## IV. Field visits to Angola and Cambodia

**Deliverable:** Presentation supported by PowerPoint on the preliminary results, stakeholder workshops in the case countries

The purpose of the field visits is to reflect and validate the results and assessments of the desk study phase. The field visit(s) may possibly be a joint mission with MFA participation. The evaluation team is expected to propose the suitable timing of the visits, preferably at least 3 weeks.

The preliminary results of the visits will be presented and discussed in with the relevant persons from the Ministry (e.g. EVA-11 and Unit for Humanitarian assistance and policy, KEO-7o). The presentation will be organized by the Consultant and it can be organized also through a video conference. In addition, the preliminary results will be presented and discussed at the stakeholder workshop where also beneficiaries from easily marginalized groups are present to be organized by the Consultant in Angola and Cambodia.



After the field visits, it is likely that further interviews and document study in Finland will still be needed to complement the information collected during the desk study phase and the field visits.

## V. Final reporting

**Deliverable:** Final report (including final draft report and final report), public presentation supported by a power point presentation and Quality Assurance expert(s) comments/notes to the report (including signed quality assessment grid)

The final report should be kept clear, concise and consistent. The report should contain inter alia the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations and the logic on those should be clear and based on evidence.

The final draft report will be subjected to a round of comments by the parties concerned. The purpose of the comments is only to correct any misunderstandings or factual errors instead of rewriting the reports or adding new content.

The report will be finalized based on the comments received and will be finalized by 31 August 2015. The final reports must include abstract and summary (including the table on main findings, conclusions and recommendations) in Finnish, Swedish and English. The reports, including the Finnish and Swedish translations have to be of high and publishable quality and it must be ensured that the translations use commonly used terms in development cooperation and humanitarian mine action.

A public presentation will be organized in Helsinki when the final report is ready (tentatively in late August 2015). In addition to the presentation in Helsinki, a presentation of the findings of the evaluation may be organized through a webinar or video conference.

The MFA also requires access to the evaluation team's interim evidence documents, e.g. completed matrices, although it is not expected that these should be of publishable quality. The MFA treats these documents as confidential if needed.

The Consultant will submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control was addressed during the evaluation and how the capitalization of lessons learned has also been addressed. The quality assurance consultant will also fill the EU Quality Assessment Grid.

It should be noted that for quality assurance internationally recognized experts may be contracted as external peer reviewer(s) for the whole evaluation process or for some parts of the evaluation process, e.g. final and draft reports (inception, desk study, final draft and final report). The views of the peer reviewers will be made available to the Consultant.

## 8 EXPERTISE REQUIRED

Successful conduct of the evaluation requires a deep understanding and expertise of humanitarian mine action and humanitarian assistance. It also requires understanding and expertise of overall state-of-the-art international development policy and cooperation issues including programming and aid management, development cooperation modalities and players in the global scene. It also requires experience and knowledge of HRBA and cross-cutting objectives, including 1325. Solid experience in large sectoral/thematic/policy or country programme evaluations or large evaluations containing several countries is required. In addition, hands-on long-term experience at the field level is needed.

All team members shall have fluency in English; one senior team member shall be fluent in Portuguese. It is an asset to have one senior team member fluent in Finnish. Knowledge of local administrative languages of the case study countries among the experts will be an asset.

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The competencies of the team members will be complementary.

The evaluation team will include a mix of male and female experts. The team will also include senior experts from both developed and developing countries.

One of the senior experts of the team will be identified as the Team Leader. The Team Leader will lead the work and will be ultimately responsible for the deliverables. The evaluation team will work under the leadership of the Team Leader who carries the final responsibility of completing the evaluation.

Detailed team requirements are included in the Instructions to the Tenderers (ITT)

## **9 BUDGET AND PAYMENT MODALITIES**

The evaluation will not cost more than € 180 000 (VAT excluded).

## **10 MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION**

The EVA-11 will be responsible for the management of the evaluation. The EVA-11 will work closely with other units/departments of the Ministry and other stakeholders in Finland and abroad.

## **11 MANDATE**

The evaluation team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this evaluation with pertinent persons and organizations. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland. The evaluation team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity.

Both the evaluation team and the MFA have immaterial rights to the material produced during the assignment and to draft or final reports (any potential immaterial rights are jointly owned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the consultant).

## **12 AUTHORISATION**

Helsinki, 16.10.2014

Sanna Pulkkinen

Director (a.i.)

Development Evaluation Unit

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

## ANNEX 1

### Reference and resource material

Development Policy Programmes of Finland:

- Development Policy Programme 2004

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=84297&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

- Development Policy Programme 2007. Towards a Sustainable and Just World Community.

Government Decision-in-Principle 2007, MFA

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=107497&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

- Development Policy Programme 2012

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=251855&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Finlands National 1325 (UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) Women, Peace and Security),  
Action Plan for 2008-2011:

<http://www.finnland.de/public/download.aspx?ID=32702&GUID=%7B6E789E51-2C81-4F67-B12D-23E7389922F4%7D>

Finlands National 1325 (UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) Women, Peace and Security),  
Action Plan for 2012-2016:

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=250834&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Evaluation of Finland's Development Cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=50643&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Evaluation of Finnish Humanitarian Assistance (2005)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=71279&nodeid=15454&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI>

Evaluation of Finnish Aid to Afghanistan (2008)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=124847&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Evaluation of Kosovo Country Programme (2008)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=162685&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Evaluation of Development Cooperation with Ethiopia 2000-2008 (2010)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=214918&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Evaluation of Finland's Contribution to Building Inclusive Peace in Nepal (2012)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=260055&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

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Evaluation of Peace and Development in Finland's Development Cooperation (2014)  
To be published in autumn 2014

Other published sectoral, thematic, policy and country programme evaluations are available at:  
<http://formin.finland.fi/developmentpolicy/evaluations>

Evaluation Manual of the MFA:  
<http://www.formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=288455&nodeid=34606&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Finland's Humanitarian Policy (2012)  
<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=101288&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Guideline Concerning Humanitarian Assistance and the Use of Funding Granted by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2013)  
<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=296518&nodeid=34606&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Fragile State Guidelines (in Finnish)  
<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=300822&nodeid=15457&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI>

Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Cooperation (2010)  
<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=206482&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship  
[http://www.goodhumanitarianonorship.org/Libraries/Ireland\\_Doc\\_Manager/EN-23-Principles-and-Good-Practice-of-Humanitarian-Donorship.sflb.ashx](http://www.goodhumanitarianonorship.org/Libraries/Ireland_Doc_Manager/EN-23-Principles-and-Good-Practice-of-Humanitarian-Donorship.sflb.ashx)

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## ANNEX 2: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

### FINLAND

#### MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN FINLAND

**Anna Gebremedhin**, Former Director, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy

**Paula Sirkiä**, Former HMA related Desk

**Jukka Pajarinen**, Unit for Arms Control

**Tarmo Kauppila**, Former Senior Technical Advisor for Cambodia

**Simo Pajulahti**, Former Senior Technical Assistant for Cambodia

**Seppo Koponen**, Former Technical Assistant for Cambodia

**Kimmo Kulonen**, Former Technical Advisor for Cambodia

**Kimmo Leskinen**, Former Technical Advisor for Cambodia

**Ulla-Maija Finskas**, Former Director, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy

**Erik af Hällström**, Former HMA related Desk

**Anna Merrifield**, Current HMA related Desk

**Pia Nordberg**, Former Arms Control Unit

#### PEACE UNION OF FINLAND

**Laura Lodenius**, Director

#### FINN CHURCH AID (FCA)

**Eija Alajarva**, Head of Humanitarian Assistance

**Liisa Perkkiö**, Regional Desk Officer, Asia

**Saara Lehmuskoski**, Director, International Cooperation

#### FINNISH RED CROSS (FRC)

**Maria Suoheimo**, Director of International Operations

**Eeva Maijala**, Planning Officer for International Assistance

**Jani Leino**, Legal Adviser

**Sari Autio**, Programme Officer

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## **ANGOLA**

### **NATIONAL DEMINING COMMISSION OF ANGOLA (CNIDAH)**

**Jose Antonio Dandula**, Deputy Chief Administrator, Cunhinga Municipality

**Norberto Quintas**, Bie Province

**Chile Manuel Chicanha**, Moxico Province

**Maria Madelena Neto**, Head of Victim Assistance

**Mr Simba**, Victim Assistance Department

**Jose de Oliverira**, Chief of Operations/Information

**Rita de Jesus**, Chief of Planning

**Mr Jaque**, Quality Assurance

**Mr Manuel**, Quality Assurance

### **DANISH CHURCH AID (DCA)**

**Rownan Fernandes**, Country Representative

**Mr Masamba**, Project Manager

### **HAZARDOUS AREA LIFE SUPPORT ORGANIZATION TRUST (HALO)**

**Gerhard Zank**, Country Manager

**Jose Agostinho**, Deputy Country Manager

**Alfred**, Programme Manager, Bie Province

## **CAMBODIA**

### **CAMBODIAN MINE ACTION AND VICTIM ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY CMAA**

**Ly Panharith**, Deputy Secretary General

**Han Kan**, Quality Assurance

**Sreng Sopha**, Administration

### **FINNISH CHURCH AID (FCA)**

**Anu Riikonen**, Asia Regional Representative, Phnom Penh

**Mari Laaksonen**, Asia Regional Desk, Phnom Penh

### **HAZARDOUS AREA LIFE SUPPORT ORGANIZATION TRUST (HALO)**

**Adam Jasinski**, Programme Manager

**Letti Philips**, Project Officer

**Sara Mao**, Assistant Operations Manager

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## **INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC)**

**Valentina Berlosconi**, Regional Delegate, Bangkok

**Bart Vermeiren**, Head of Mission, Cambodia

**Didie**, Project Manager, Prosthesis Hospital

**Mom Phireak**, Formerly with ICRC

## **KEPA**

**Helena Ahola**, Director, Bangkok

## **LIFE WITH DIGNITY (LWD)**

**Min Sor**, Director

**Chan Vanna**, Programme Manager

**Oenk Pisith**, Community Empowerment Officer

## **MINES ADVISORY GROUP (MAG)**

**Greg Crowther**, Regional Representative

**Allister Moye**, Country Director

**Thor Thoem**, Operations Manager

**Kong Chivin**, Community Liaison

## **UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)**

**David Horrocks**, Mine Action Advisor

## **GENEVA / NEW YORK**

### **GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)**

**Guy Rhodes**, Director of Operations

**Faiz Paktian**, Assistant Director

**Oliver Cottray**, Head of Information Management

### **IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT UNIT (ISU)**

**Sophie Delfolie**, Implementation Support Specialist

### **UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION SERVICE (UNMAS)**

**Paul Heslop**, Chief of Programmes

**Olivia Selbie**, Monitoring and Evaluation

**Kurt Chesko**, Donor relations Officer



**EVALUATION  
OF HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION**



**MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS OF FINLAND**